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ABSTRACT
THE DEPLOYMENT OF EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION
THROUGH FOREIGN AID:
AN INQUIRY INTO AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENTAL IDEOLOGY
FEBRUARY, 1989
MICHAEL L. BASILE, B. A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
M. Ed., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ed. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Horace B. Reed
This study examines the educational policies adopted by
the Agency for International Development (AID) over the past
three decades . The purpose is to to explore the nature of
America's developmental ideology embedded in the documented
policies by applying a reflective method of critical
analysis. The author investigates the hypothesis that the
ideological elements of the policies work to narrow the
scope with which the Agency is able to approach its
educational programming.
The first part of the study is a historical review of
the public argumentation used to establish the Agency's
approach to development. The public argumentation is found
to contain underlying ideological elements that effectively
combine rationales for national security with economic
development. The arguments set the context in which foreign
assistance was initially mounted. The study goes on to
explore the more basic underpinnings of development as an
vi
outgrowth of western positivistic thought that evolved into
a policy science of development.
The concept of ideology used herein is one based on
work conducted by critical theorists in the European
t^^hrtLon of the Frankfurt School and rts recent followers.
Ideology is looked on as an investigative device which
enables the study of how meaning is produced to mobilize
concerted policy making. The author develops a framework
for the analysis of AID's policies and the identification of
their ideological referents within a "social space."
In the second part, a semantic discursive analysis is
done on the policies to identify the themes and metaphors
contained within them. The metaphors are grouped and
analyzed to determine their place among the economic,
political, and legit imational forces in which the
developmental ideology emerges. AID’s educational policy
discourses are found to arise dialectically with the effect
of concealing their real ideological origins. Their effects
are to narrow the diversity with which AID approaches
development. The author concludes with evaluative comments
about the potentials and limitations of critical analysis
for policy research in education.
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Part 1
THE FUNCTION OF IDEOLOGY IN THE PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE
Towards a Critical Framework
CHAPTER I
PURPOSE, APPROACH, AND ORGANIZATION OF THE INQUIRY
The Probl0iD of Two Paths to Social Inquiry
The spirit of inquiry is propelled by the urge to know
the nature of things. We inquire in order to understand our
world. We explore as a result of a need to know, and in
that exploration we make use of the tools at hand. The need
to know is derived from our position in history, while the
tools to know are derived from our store of knowledge.
The endeavor to know takes place in time and space,
ordered by social convention and cultural artifact. Thus,
production of knowledge is foremost a social act. What we
know about the world and our relation to it depends on our
temporal and spatial location. Moreover, our endeavor to
understand and control our interactions with the world is
determined by our position and the state of the tools we
use. Owing to the situational referents of knowledge, our
lot is to live as imperfect beings in an imperfect world.
Problems of inquiry arise whenever our powers of
thought outpace our stage of development. We conceive the
idea of perfection out of our imperfections. In so doing,
we come to exercise the power to think thoughts beyond the
range of experience. The abyss between thought and action,
between theory and practice propels us to inquire further in
the constant endeavor to align ourselves more closely with
3our conceptions. The abyss is the source of our advance as
well as our misery. We strive to become better, seeking to
leap beyond the cage of history, our intermittent successes
tempered by propensity to failure, caught forever between
the realities of the material world below and the ideals of
heaven above.
The power to reason is used to search for and express
truth. The lot of humanity is to use this power for social
ends. Human struggle throughout history can be seen in the
light of competing interpretations of truth, where one
version is used to justify the actions of some against the
positions of others who hold to a different version. In
this struggle, competing sides are pressured to resort to
absolute authority to mobilize meaning. Their tendency is
to depict truth not as a fallible search for knowledge, but
as an authoritative source for the mobilization of action.
Reason, when so applied, is directed not purely at the
exploration of uncertainty, but at the rationalization of
certainty
.
Thus, our uniquely human power to reason is subject to
the social context in which it is applied. The problem
befalls us in the denial of the context and the subsequent
recourse to higher authority. The struggle for truth is
two-sided, the one recognizing its material roots, the other
resorting to absolute authority. The latter seeks
constantly to rise above its social origins, the former
seeks to delve into its grounds. The impetus to turn the
quest for truth into a scheme to impose knowledge is ever at
work, confusing the difference among us all, irrespective of
background and education.
The practice of social inquiry is realized then as a
dilemma. Reason applied to the study of society is the
keystone of deliberate progress. But, if any difference is
to be made, reasoned conceptions of progress must render
meaning in some social sense. The students of society must
exercise the power to mobilize action. Whatever their
content, the effect of social conceptions must be to
convince enough of us to follow a similar course of action,
to develop along a common path. We must be convinced of
their truth.
The search for truth is therefore subject to, indeed
fueled by, the advancement of social interests. In fact,
truth-seeking is an activity imbued with the clash of
interests. The dilemma we face is that efforts to find
truth are prone to use knowledge to deny their relationships
to specific interests, rather than to reveal them. The
purpose of knowledge production then becomes the validation
of findings in absolute terms, as if the findings were
totally free of the circumstances in which they were made.
The process of knowledge production tends to deflect
attention away from the task of exposing real material
interests and relegate it onto the plane of universal proof.
5How does this happen in concrete instance? This study
is premised on the assumption that the search for and
application of knowledge is tied to the advancement of
special interests. I accept the validity of this premise
fully. My purpose is not to examine its truth or falsity in
a philosophical sense. It is rather to see how the premise
works in a specific instance and to alert us to its
implications. My interest is to explore the questions of
why and how we tend to separate knowledge from social
interests in order to further them. I take this to be a
problem in need of attention because unless we become aware
of its origins in the circumstance of history, we are prone
to use knowledge more as a weapon in the arsenal of
domination than as a tool for social liberation.
Our fate as thinking beings is to produce and use
knowledge for good or ill. The obligation we have as
researchers and students of society is to appreciate more
fully the fact that the knowledge we produce inevitably has
social referents.
Purpose of the Study
I offer this work in the interests of deliverance from
the propensity to apply knowledge without appreciation of
its social referents. Insofar as we fail to see the
situational roots of knowledge and the interests behind it,
we act not out of informed choice, but out of ignorance and
6deceit. We serve others unwittingly, and in so doing, we
remain subject to the perversion of the very meaning of what
we do
.
My concern is with education and development. The
endeavor to improve education iq the Third World is fertile
ground on which to examine innovative attempts to spread new
knowledge. In the Third World, the clash of approaches to
revamp education offers the opportunity to examine how
initiatives to modernize educational systems are
characterized by starkly conflicting views of political
economy. In the effort to promote one's interests over
others, competing claims are made to prove the validity of
one's knowledge about economy and political organization.
The knowledge claims are usually based on assumptions that
are held as if universally true, irrespective of variations
in culture and history.
My immediate purpose is to examine these claims and the
assumptions that underlie them in a specific instance:
United States foreign assistance to education in the Third
World. U. S. aid is guided by a set of policies that are
based in a view of economy and polity that is held to be
valid for adoption by other countries. While they claim to
accommodate, indeed provide for local variation, I suggest
here that the educational policies adopted by the Agency for
International Development (AID) are based on knowledge
claims whose validity is subject to doubt. The principal
7question that guides ray inquiry is:
* Can an alternative way to investigate the validity of
the knowledge clairas erabedded in AID's policy
stateraents be developed? If so, what form does it
take, what can it find, and what are its limitations?
The significance of this question is derived from ray
purpose. I wish to develop a way^ to resist the propensity
to apply knowledge absolutely, without due regard for its
social origins and consequences. To this end, I explore the
possibility that American development policy is based on
knowledge claims that are fallacious. The claims AID makes
to revamp and modernize educational systems rely heavily on
research procedures conducted in the western tradition of
logical positivism. AID's policies' in education appear to
advance this traditional approach to knowledge formation and
application to the exclusion of alternatives. In doing so,
the Agency risks furthering obscure, special interests
without appreciating their implications for narrowing rather
than expanding options for development.
The hypothesis I examine is that AID's educational
policies have the social effect of concealing the interests
that underlie them. Insofar as the policies conceal such
interests, the opportunity to examine, choose, and pursue
alternative paths to educational development is diminished.
My search is for a way out of the bind in which uncritical
adherence to fallacious procedure in social policy keeps us.
Unless we develop a way to relate policy to interest more
openly, we further - instead of counter - the propensity for
8. We thus remain prone to use educational
modernization to diffuse falsity through ideology rather
than advance the cause of education as a means to pursue the
search for truth in its diverse constructions.
/
The specific questions I pursue in the study relate to
ideology. At the outset, I take ideology to lie at the
heart of the problem. Ideology performs a deceptive
function in that it enables policy to be produced without
explicit reference to the interests it serves. From this
perspective, ideology has a dual function. First, ideology
provides a means to unify the disparate and conflicting
forces of the political economy into rational "wholes."
Second, the ideological wholes then operate to produce
ostensibly rational discourses on which to base policy. The
effects of the discourses are to conceal rather than reveal
the ideological interests that underlie them. I suggest
that by investigating this dual functional role of ideology
a way can be found to counter the propensity for concealing
the social interests undergirding policy that at first
glance may appear to be neutral, benign, and free of value.
The first set of implementing questions I address
therefore has to do with the epistemological foundations of
development. What kind of claims has AID been making to
pursue the course of development it has taken over the past
thirty years? What are the arguments the Agency has used to
support such claims? What historical basis in western
9social thought can be found to support the knowledge claims
embedded in the arguments? The objective of this set of
questions is to develop a theoretical framework for the
investigation of the function of ideology involved in
producing AID's educational policies.
,
The second set of questions focuses directly on the
policy statements which constitute AID's developmental
discourses. What are the policies AID has followed since it
assigned explicit priority to education in the early
seventies? What major developmental themes can be
ascertained in the policies? What metaphorical elements can
be extracted from the themes? The objective of this next
set of questions is to elucidate the metaphorical sources of
knowledge embedded in AID's developmental policies. Once
the metaphors are made explicit as such, the door to
alternative interpretation may be opened wider.
The third set involves the relationships that I suggest
exist between the metaphors found and the ideological wholes
in which they were produced. In what ways might the
conjunctions of ideology and the specific developmental
metaphors conceal interests? What are the implications of
continued adherence to present policies? Finally, what is
the potential of the frame of analysis I propose in this
work for a critical alternative to conventional modes of
knowledge production in current use? What are its
limitations ?
10
Proposing an Alternative Model for Critical Analysis
Organization of the Study
The specific instance of ideology I study here makes
use of both deductive and inductive processes of
investigation. The overarching concern I have is to avoid
the error of replicating the problem I seek to address: the
propensity to apply exclusively positivistic methods to the
analysis of social problems in the effort to generate new
knowledge. In this work, therefore, I apply a critical
perspective in the tradition of the Frankfurt School of
social analysis. My concern is not to produce new findings
as an increment to current lines of conventional social
research. Instead, I seek to generate new insight by
critical investigation of the fallacies inherent in the
current social research used to support educational policy.
The mode of critical analysis relies on reflection as the
means to investigate the social roots of knowledge claims.
My intent is bent on revealing the internal contradictions
embedded in the knowledge claims on which AID has based its
educational policies.
The study is divided into two parts. Part 1 is
concerned with establishing the theoretical potential for
the study of ideology in the production of knowledge. This
part is directed toward the formation of a critical
framework with which to pursue deductively the investigation
of the functional role of ideology in the rationalization of
11
certain economic and political interests. In order to
develop this framework, I direct questions to the
epistemological origins of the claims AID has made to ground
its educational policies. Part 2 applies an inductive
method of analysis to "deconstruct" the policy statements
made to guide AID's initiatives in education. In the second
part, I examine the relations between the metaphorical
elements of policy discourses and the ideologies that
undergird them. The study concludes with an evaluation of
the potentials and limitations of a reflective analytical
approach to the investigation of the epistemological
foundations of policy formation in education. Figure 1 on
page 12 displays the convergence of the inductive/deductive
flows of research I use in the effort to expose the nature
of the relationship between the clustering of discourses I
call "developmental consciousness" and its ideological
referents
.
Since I start from the position that knowledge is
always based in a social referent, my initial focus is on
how knowledge is generated in a particular tradition of
research, that of positivistic sociology. In Chapter II, I
set the historical stage by recollecting the foundations of
aid's developmental policies since the late forties. I
begin with a review of the arguments put forth in support of
foreign assistance as an instrument of development. ihe
review takes the form of reflections on the historical
12
Historical Review of Arguments
for Foreign Assistance
.
I
Critical Review of Literature on Ideology
I
Investigation of Scientific Positivism
and Developmental Science
The
Investigative
Framework
of the
Social
Space
Exposing the Developmental Ideology
f ^
Identification and Grouping of Major Metaphors
t
Identification and Grouping of Major Themes
t
AID'S Policy Texts in Education
Semantic
Discourse
Analysis
THE FLOW OF THE INQUIRY
Figure 1
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debate that went into defining AID's foreign assistance
programs overall. By examining several samples of the
coi^tent of that debate, I draw several preliminary
conclusions about the limitations of its focus and their
effect on the scope with which development was conceived
from the start. From that review, I plan to draw a few
critical inferences about the shortcomings of those
arguments as impediments to clear thinking about possible
options for alternative development theories.
Proceeding from these insights. Chapter III examines
the theoretical possibility that the production and
application of development theory is subject to historical
forces that are neither self-evident nor self-explanatory.
1 develop the concept of ideology both as a focus of
attention and as a reflective tool for the investigation.
This application of a theory of ideology is directed to the
task of reviewing the ways in which knowledge has been
produced in the western positivistic tradition. I examine
this tradition in accordance with the strands of economic
and political thought that have come to be incorporated in
development theory. The idea that the theories make certain
epistemological assumptions about the nature of the social
and natural world is explored. 1 suggest that the
assumptions collectively form an ideology that sets the
frame in which development can be defined as a concept.
14
In Chapter IV my focus is on the means through which a
science of development emerged through the separation of
ideology from science. This "split" resulted in a narrowed
version of ideology and the legitimation of a universally
scientific approach to the resolution of development
problems. The chapter introduces the concept of language as
the central means by which development ideology is
legitimated. The concept forms the basis for the critical
framework with which I examine those policies later on in
Part 2.
This phase of the analysis culminates in Chapter V in a
conceptual framework that contains a series of questions
whose focus is on the economic, political, and
legit imational ideologies that undergird the production of
development policy. The framework introduces the analytical
concept of the "social space" with which I explore the
functional role of ideology in the instance of aid to
education. The concept of social space provides a deductive
method to study the economic, political, and legitimizing
forces that converge to create disparate ideological
clusters, the developmentalist version included.
The second direction taken is inductive, where the
research methodology of critical reflection is applied in an
analytical flow from "earth to heaven." The earth generates
the concrete
,
tangible material in the form of AID s
educational policy. Part 2 treats that material with three
15
discursive operations: thematic, metaphoric, and
locational, the latter designed to explore the linkages
between the themes and metaphors and their respective
ideological positions within the social space.
In Part 2, I begin with what I take to be the central
problem - the power of the actual language used to mobilize
action to further obscure ideological interests. The
purpose of Chapter VI is to examine AID's policy statements
with a view to "deconstruct" them. The premise I start with
corresponds to the critical theme used throughout the study
as a whole. Knowledge is produced to accomplish social ends
that are not always sel f -evident j knowledge is constructed
from a certain position. Tools of investigation therefore
cannot be neutral. They are created, borrowed, and applied
so as to persuade others to follow a certain path, in this
case, the developmental path implied by a specific approach
to education. With this in mind, I refer to analytical
schemes proposed by Foucault and Ricoeur to identify the
metaphorical sources of knowledge AID uses to formulate its
educational policies. The deconstruction process is
directed toward clarification of the knowledge discourses on
which the policies are based. My objective here is to
extract the knowledge themes and metaphors that lay embedded
within the policies.
In Chapter VII, I link the metaphorical themes to their
respective ideological positions within the frame of
16
analysis developed in Chapter V. I see this final operation
as a grouping of metaphorical themes within the four major
component forces of the social space. At this point I
explore what I suspect to be a dialectical relation between
the developmental metaphors and their ideological location
'within the social space. Of particular interest will be the
concrete ways by which the discourses on policy act to serve
two purposes: To provide a rational basis to govern action
on behalf of specific interests while simultaneously
concealing them.
I conclude the inquiry in Chapter VIII with an analysis
of the implications for continued adherence to such policies
without critical reflection on their social effects,
devoting particular attention to the possibility that the
developmental ideology may act, in fact, to constrict the
diversity with which AID can approach assistance to
education. Finally, I plan to examine the utility of the
proposed approach to the critical analysis of policy
production in development education. Ideology, the
deconstruction of knowledge discourses, and the dialectical
method of examining relations between knowledge and
interests are reviewed in order to identify their potentials
and limitations as tools for the critique of policy
production and application processes in education and
knowledge building.
CHAPTER II
A REVIEW OF PUBLIC ARGUMENTS FOR FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Introduction
The questions of how and why the U. S. Government
became involved in the enterprise of development is the
subject of this chapter. In the late 1940s, the United
States was faced with the choice of returning to
isolationist policies of the past or embarking on a new form
of global involvement as the most powerful of the
industrialized nations to emerge from World War II. The
debate turned on the concept of security. Providing
assistance to the newly emerging states of Africa, Asia, and
Latin America would enhance U. S. security while failure to
do so would provide the expansionist tendencies of the
socialist states room to spread.
Of interest is the argumentation used to justify
national involvement in terms of developmental assistance.
This argumentation offers an excellent point of departure to
explore the grounds on which a matter of essentially
unilateral political interest, that of international
security, was transformed into a question of technological
progress for the entire nonindustrialized world. In order
to begin study of this transformation, this chapter focuses
on the discursive arguments put forth by development
advocates as a way to examine the rationales on which they
18
were based. Once identified, the rationales provide a means
to trace the epistemological foundations of development
thought that undergirds U. S. development policy to this
day
.
Organization of the Chapter
This chapter examines the historical context in which
foreign assistance has been framed since the demise of the
Marshall Plan in the late forties. I look at the public
argumentation that has been put forth as a way to raise the
security, economic, political, and other social issues that
have served as justifications for one kind of foreign
assistance or other. My purpose is to trace the evolution
of arguments in support of foreign aid in order to identify
the major rationales used to support them. Once clearly
stated, the rationales will allow me to draw several
preliminary inferences about the approach to development
taken by the Agency over the span of three decades
.
Public Argumentation for Foreign Assistance
Referring to the "main tenets" of an "international
ideology of development," Francis X. Sutton (1982, pp . 49-
57), then deputy vice-president of the Ford Foundation,
extracted several ideological themes that were evident in
the arguments used to support foreign assistance to
19
developing countries after the Second World War:
* ^^°f®ssed egalitarianism which proclaimed the right
ot self-determination of all peoples and viewedinequalities between and within nations as problems tobe remedied.
Obligation of all nations to strive for material
observe the rights and freedoms
codified in the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights.
* With the exception of the Communist Bloc, division of
the world into the now developing and the already
developed nations, with the latter obligated with
concern for the former.
* Transformation of national governments of developing
nations from "guardians of law and order" into centers
to guide the process of "rationally controlled change."
* Control over the development process as the rightful
govermental prerogative of the developing nations
themselves, which would exercise choice over the kinds
of external assistance to be introduced.
* Appropriate training as the remedy for governmental
deficiencies to carry out development programs.
* Education as the keystone of development and the
universal right of all.
* Foreign aid as a neutral technical and economic
instrument
.
* Open international economic system characterized by
the free movement of capital and trade.
* International political system carried on according
to principles of self-determination with the exception
of "defection" to the Communist Bloc. (pp. 49-50)
Using Sutton's extrapolation of ideological tenets as a
point of departure, I begin with the period when America's
attention was initially directed to the emerging problems of
developing countries during the Truman Administration.
The effort to forge a consensus around a new direction
for foreign assistance was launched as "Point Four" by
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President Truman in his Inaugural Address of 1949:
Fourth, we must embark on a bold program for
making the benefits of our scientific advances andindustrial progress available for the improvement andgrowth of underdeveloped areas....
I believe that we should make available to peace
loving peoples the benefits of our store of technicalknowledge in order to help them realize their
aspirations for a better life. And in cooperation with
other nations, we should foster capital investment in
areas needing development....
Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the
world, through their own efforts, to produce more food,
more clothing, more materials for housing, and more
mechanical power to lighten their burdens....
Greater production is the key to prosperity and
peace. And the key to greater production is a wider
and more vigorous application of modern scientific and
technical knowledge, (cited in Daniels, 1951, pp . 10-
Several of the themes mentioned by Truman were actually
incorporated into the "Act for International Development"
passed by Congress on June 5, 1950:
Section 402. (a) The peoples of the United States and
other nations have a common interest in the freedom and
in the economic and social progress of all peoples.
Such progress can further the secure growth of
democratic ways of life, the expansion of mutually
beneficial commerce, the development of international
understanding and good will, and the maintenance of
world peace.
(b) The efforts of peoples living in economically
underdeveloped areas of the world to realize their full
capabilities and to develop the resources of the lands
in which they live can be furthered through the
cooperative endeavor of all nations to exchange
technical knowledge and skills and to encourage the
flow of investment capital .... (From Public Law 535,
Chapter 220, Title IV)
Taken together, Truman's public announcement, Sutton's
summary of tenets, and the Act for International Development
include the basic elements of the publicly argued case for
the United States to embark on a new program of foreign
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economic assistance to the developing world.
In the following paragraphs, I extract the rationales
embedded within the arguments. While overlap is evident, I
divide the arguments into their military, economic,
political, and social components. The divisions correspond
roughly to the historical sequence of arguments put forward
following the success of the Marshall Plan in Europe in the
late 1940s.
The Backdrop of the Cold War
The realization that competition for influence among
nations could be engaged without direct military conflict is
commonly termed the "Cold War." The post-war bipolar
conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was
characterized by policies of military deterrence and
positioning through the formation of strategic alliances,
contending economic approaches to development, political
agreements for mutual assistance, and social policies of
modernization. The concept of bipolarity depicted a world
divided into two major adversaries, the "free world,"
increasingly dependent on the military largesse of the
United States for protection, and the socialist world, whose
member states were led by the Soviet Union. The U. S. saw
itself in the position of leadership in defending the
interests of the free world against the impending spread of
both Soviet - insp ired and Asian variations of communism.
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which were viewed collectively to make up the "Communist
Bloc."
The early debate for and against technical assistance
took place in this context of bipolarity.^ Following its
decision to reduce the amount of military and economic
assistance to Europe in the early 1950s (LRS
, 1968, pp. 46-
^0) > the United States increased military assistance to
selected nations of Asia, the Near East, and Africa, with a
lesser amount going to Latin America (pp . 57-61). The total
amount the U. S. expended for exclusively military purposes
throughout the developing world until 1958 was less than one
third of that spent for other, chiefly economic, purposes,
the majority of military and military-related assistance
shifting to Southeast Asia over the period (Pentony, 1960,
pp . 6-12). While the relative emphasis on and utility of
military versus economic assistance dominated the debate
during the early years, Kaplan (1967, pp. 282-288) concluded
that both sides of the debate exaggerated the difference
between the two, inasmuch as the forms in which both
military and economic assistance were given resulted in
"...add[ing] resources to the recipient society and
free[ing] its own tax revenues and foreign exchange for
other uses. Both programs may purchase similar and even
freely interchangeable goods and services. Either can be
used to promote a wide variety of donor or recipient
objectives, whether they pertain to national security or to
social reform" (pp. 283-284).
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The Cold War also set the context in which arguments
were made in support of non-military initiatives into the
developing nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Economic development provided the means for countering the
appeal communist revolutionary philosophy was thought to
have to the impoverished, weak, and susceptible peoples of
the developing world.
Accordingly, the economic development rationale was put
forward as another "peaceful" weapon in the west's arsenal
of strategies available for countering the threat of
communist expansion. The bipolar view of two armed camps
fueled the public debate in the U. S., particularly around
the notion of "containment."^ As a whole, the debate
sharpened the American public's concern for communism, not
simply as a military, but also an economic and political
peril which had the power to spread the tenets of communism
O
to the world's helpless and uninitiated."^
One element of the contemporary American national
psyche is important to recall here. During the late forties
and early fifties, fears of domestic communist infiltration
were fueled by several concrete instances. The Hiss trial
(Cooke, 1951; Hiss, 1957; Chambers, 1952), McCarthy's
charges of subversion against the Voice of America, the
State Department, and the Army (Straight, 1954; Rovere
,
1959; Shils, 1956), disloyalty accusations against nuclear
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physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer (Curtis, 1955), the trial
and execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for atomic
espionage, and the 1952 vice-presidential election campaign
of Richard Nixon, which focused on ridding the Truman
Administration of communist conspiratorial influences all
contributed to a heightened awareness, indeed a
hypersensitivity to the growing communist subversion at the
very heart of national government.
On the international front, Soviet military and
technological successes at home were paralleled by expansion
of communist influence in Asia, most dramatically with the
fall of the Kuomintang in China and recognition of
insurgency activities in several other countries. Fears
that a cherished way of life was threatened from both the
outside and the inside by an alien system of belief quite
naturally extended into the realm of foreign policy where
the threat was most immediately encountered. The idea of an
alternative economic approach to life that was actually
making headway in the world was most worrisome to an America
in the process of increasing its economic ties not only in
Europe, but throughout the world of developing nations as
well. Milton Friedman (Pentony, Ed., 1960, pp. 105-116) set
out the theme of competition between two radically opposed
economic systems this way:
What is involved here is no less than another phase of
the ideological war in which we are engaged. A central
premise of the Communist ideology is that the state
must exercise comprehensive control and direction over
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the economic activities of its citizens; a centralpremise of Western liberalism is that free men
operating in a free market can promote their own
objectives without the necessity for an all-powerful
state, (p. 111)^ F^ tirLUi
While Friedman's reminder about the essence of liberal
democracy may have rung true in an ideological sense, at
least to classic economic liberals, tangible efforts to
contain communist expansion in Asia and elsewhere emerged in
reality as a hodgepodge of tactical and strategic measures
which represented a diversity of interests. According to
Kaplan (1967, pp. 280-319), early conflicts among
administrators and legislators about aid hinged mainly on
its form, that is, whether it was to be delivered by way of
loans, grants, in-kind deliveries of food or equipment,
programs to finance imports or activities, or technical
assistance projects. The conflicts tended to detract from
achieving security and development objectives on a country-
by-country basis according to the conditions actually
encountered in the field.
Differing views on how to bring about peace,
international stability, and national security often
resulted in restrictions on the discretionary authority of
aid administrators to develop appropriate responses to local
conditions. Stemming as they seemed from conflicting
strategies, disparities often prevented the attainment of
compromises strong enough to formulate consistent policy.
Nonetheless, security needs to implement a consistent
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foreign aid policy eventually overrode the objections
leveled previously. To this end, a development cum security
rationale was advanced with success. The components of that
rationale are examined below.
The Military Component of
the Developmental Rationale
Arguments made in the early 1950s in support of
linkages between military and economic assistance claimed
that such assistance in order of priority would:
* Further U. S. security interests by building a strong
free world alliance.
* Assist in building adequate defenses while preparing
basic economies.
* Enable the U. S. to provide for its own defense more
economically
.
* Help deter Soviet aggression.
* Make the communist alternative less attractive by
raising living standards.
* Maintain access to raw materials.
* Maintain long term strength to resist the Soviet
bloc
.
* Lay the foundation for world prosperity by raising
living standards.
* Help build the economies and defense establishments
of allied nations.
* Provide strategic military bases throughout the
world
.
* Help develop a more favorable attitude toward the
United States.
* Help stimulate more American private interests,
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expand exports and markets in developing areas while
stimulating employment at home. (Paraphrased from LRS
,
1968,
pp. 83-84)
One group of proponents took the position that military
assistance was needed because overlapping U. S. national
security interests and the vulnerability of developing
nations required: First, build-up of allied conventional
armed forces ready to resist insurgency and aggression; and
second, temporary compensation for the disproportionate
amount of indigenous capital and other resources the
developing nations were obliged to devote to their own
defense needs (Pentony, 1960, p. 18). The Military
Assistance Program to non-European nations was begun in the
early fifties with the avowed purpose to promote internal
and external stability and compensate for the lack of
regional cooperation among key countries situated on the
periphery of the Communist Bloc (LRS, 1968, pp . 57-61).^
Together, the rationales combined military with economic
interests to fomulate a security-based development policy.
Justification for military assistance for development
was provided by Lucien W. Pye (1963, pp . 49-62). Beginning
with the question whether "...military rule can, in fact,
establish the necessary basis for the growth of
representative institutions" (p. 49), Pye first noted the
lack of research into this question on three counts. the
western scholar's inattention to "the sociology of armies,"
the lack of knowledge about the transitional process from
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"...a traditional and authoritarian basis to the
establishment of democratic institutions..." (p. 50), and
the lack of a doctrine to guide U. S. policy in providing
assistance for the establishment of such institutions. He
raised the administrative institution as a point of focus
for targeting assistance, military and otherwise.
Kaplan (1967, pp. 284-286) further identified several
forms of military assistance that had economic parallels:
operational costs funding, supply, maintenance and repair,
construction, and training. The organizational forms by
which such administrative functions were argued to
correspond with their "purely" economic counterparts could
be distinguished in the concern for administrative
procedure, bureaucracy, education, and institutional
capacity to manage resources efficiently and effectively.
In effect, what Pye did was to define the army as a "modern
organization," presumably because it was capable of managing
resources by carrying out the above functions efficiently.
This definition contrasted the army's "rational management
model" with the disorder and backwardness supposedly
characteristic of "ritualized, tradition-bound" societies
(Pye, pp. 52-53). The analytical artifact of asymmetrical
definition was employed later by modernization theorists.
Modernization rationales were initially based on the logical
convention of supplying the definition of modern by
counterposing other forms of social organization as
"traditional" (e.g., Inkeles and Smith, 1974).^
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The development potential of military assistance
clearly extended beyond the deterrence-oriented thrust of
containment policy. The backdrop of the Cold VJar provided
the American public with enough reason to support
intervention in the domestic affairs of other nations with a
physical presence in the form of military force. However,
it could not in and of itself prescribe the forms this
presence would actually take. Other rationales had to be
devised to guide U. S. involvement in development.
The military rationale in support of economic
development can be summarized as a cluster of rationales
justifying the expenditure of resources and direct American
involvement in the internal affairs of developing nations in
the name of security. Such involvement was viewed to be
compelled by two essentially external conditions: The
spread of communist ideology; and the resultant
vulnerability of countries that had not yet developed the
means to adequately defend themselves. The cluster of
rationales can be stated as:
* A cherished way of life was threatened by an alien
force of ideas, practices, and arms.
* The threat could be contained by organizing
sufficient counterforce of ideas, practices, and arms.
* The U. S. was obliged to protect itself and other
free nations by involving itself in alliances through
which it could transfer military and other equipment,
transmit knowledge of new practices, and assist in the
development of local institutions that would be
instrumental to the task of modernization.
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The military aspect of development policy was thus
supported by the combined rationales for the deterrence of
external threat by means of arms and the administrative
backing required to deploy them. The cluster as a whole
amounted to an operant rdeology of protectionistic
interventionism (cf
.
,
Preston, 1985)
,
where American
technological assistance through the military apparatus was
si^gued to be indispensable to the development of the new
states whose continued vulnerability to communist
exploitation posed a danger to American security. The
economic corollary of this view is pursued in the following
section where I examine how the Cold War shaped economic
development
.
The Economic Component of
the Developmental Rationale
Some proponents of increased foreign economic
assistance argued for more direct involvement by the U. S.
on a government -to-government basis in order to create or
improve the conditions under which economic growth could
best take place. Along these lines, Millikan and Rostow
(1957) proposed several development policy guidelines: The
United States take economic leadership in advancing an
assistance program that would make sufficient capital
available for "self-sustaining growth"; offer direct
assistance in the way of techonology, infrastructure, and
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institutional development programs; and create a climate for
international economic activity which stressed commercial
ties among the industrialized nations (p . 55).
While the contemporary American emphasis on vigilance
against communist subversion was not the only factor shaping
the foreign policy of the period, programmatic arguments in
support of foreign economic assistance far from trivialized
public attention to the communist problem as an economic
challenge. Indeed, in the effort to bolster the force of
the economic rationale, proponents of such assistance often
cited the economic necessity for combating the spread of
communist influence through foreign assistance programs that
were responsive to economic needs (Rostow, 1963, pp. 8-18;
Chenery
,
1962, pp . 32-45). The Rockefeller Report (Daniels,
1951, pp . 77-83) summarized the primacy of the economic
rationale that "Peace, free institutions, and human-well
being can be assured only within the frame of an expanding
world economy" (p. 77). The Gray Report (Daniels, 1951, pp
.
72-77) states that ... "the need for economic development in
these [underdeveloped] areas [is becoming] daily more
pressing, not only for their own welfare, but for the
security and the well-being of all the free nations" (pp •
72-73). Others made similar arguments (e.g., Condliffe,
1951, pp. 152-156; Russell, 1951, pp. 156-158).
The majority of economic arguments about limiting
foreign assistance to the removal of trade barriers alone.
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with Milton Friedman's conservative Chicago School leading
the list, were cast in the mold of bipolarity with a hostile
economic system. On the other hand, the point made by those
concerned to do more was that the United States as a
responsible leader among free nations was obligated to
become involved in efforts to cultivate private enterprise
in developing nations as one way to insure the continuation
of its own economic ascendancy. Arguments in support of
such involvement took different forms. Initially, a series
of programmatic strategies were devised as investments to
lay an adequate infrastructural base so that economic
assistance might be used effectively and wisely without
waste. In 1950, the State Department's Special Assistant
for Economic Affairs Samuel P. Hayes elaborated on the need
to develop sufficient "receptivity" factors among the
people
:
...Before capital and modern technology can be fully
utilized in an underdeveloped area, there is usually a
lot of groundwork to be done. The people in that area
must be ready to receive technical knowledge and to
make efficient use of capital, and the early stages of
economic development in many areas must, therefore, be
concerned with improvements in basic education, health
and sanitation, and food supply. (1951, p. 13)
The "groundwork" was seen to be an infrastructure that was
prerequisite to the efficient introduction of technological
and capital investments. The groundwork argument was
designed to counter charges leveled by conservative
legislators and others about "waste" and unnecessary
spending down the "rathole" of corrupt governments whose
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leaders were prone to take the gifts of American taxpayers
and misspend them for their own selfish purposes (e.g.,
Castle, 1960, pp . 26-31; Braden, 1960, pp. 52-55; Oganesoff,
1960, pp. 130-138). As was the case with any investment,
public or private, foreign economic assistance directed
toward laying this groundwork was viewed as "risky business"
for the single, unprotected corporate investor. The use of
public monies was justified on the grounds summarized by
Rosenthal that:
. . .There is ample scope for private investment
throughout the world if there is first an impetus to
economic development in those areas where so little has
been done and where the people have such a low level of
existence that their purchasing power is almost nil.
Therefore, the American businessman should welcome
the prior and proper use of public funds, to give the
underdeveloped areas a start toward improving
themselves .... (Rosenthal
,
1951, p. 135)
Within the economic arguments advanced above on behalf
of foreign assistance, several rationales were held in
common
:
* The advance of communism in the underdeveloped world
could be countered by American economic leadership
exercised through the formation of commercial and
governmental ties among independent nations.
* The economies of the underdeveloped nations had to be
modernized as a condition indispensable to their own
and U. S. security against the spread of communism.
* If given the choice, people of the underdeveloped
world preferred modernization over the traditional way
of life. The route to modernization could be expedited
through economic collaboration between more and less
developed countries.
* The exercise of economic choice in a free market
economy was conditional to the concept of democratic
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freedom. Conversely, restrictions on free marketsdiminished such freedom.
This ensemble of rationales set the parameters for the
specific kinds of economic assistance that could be provided
to the developing world in the early 1950s. Collectively,
the arguments contained elements of optimism that peace and
the democratic way of life could best be secured through the
adoption of specific economic policies; faith in the
goodness of the modern American version of economic life as
appropriate for and desirable by all peoples; and belief in
the power of foreign assistance to improve economic
conditions for the majority of peoples in the free world.
Though not totally consistent, the rationales were combined
to form an ideological consensus that proved sufficient in
strength for the Truman and Eisenhower administrations to
mount what was then an unprecedented economic initiative
into the world of uncommitted, newly emerging, and
politically independent nations.^
In summary, the terms by which U. S. involvement in the
economic transformation of developing societies were
structured can be distinguished as an ideological cluster of
rationales for obligatory American intervention by economic
stewardship . The sense of urgency and justification for
such intervention was conveyed sufficiently by the context
of the Cold War. I will now turn to the political corollary
of this cluster.
The Political Component of
the Developmental Rationale
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The world political context within which foreign
economic assistance was initiated was also characterized by
the emergence of two contending ideological systems which
confronted one another in the arena of "peaceful
coexistence."^ The political dimension of the confrontation
was summarized as a competition for the allegiance of the
peoples of the developing world who were expected to choose
sides according to their perception of their national
interests. Chester Bowles, Ambassador to India in 1951,
stated in the New York Times Magazine :
. . .Military power is not enough because it deals with
only part of the problem. . .we are also faced with an
idea, the idea of world communism; and planes,
battleships and tanks have never yet been able to
destroy an idea, even a bad idea. The whole history of
mankind demonstrated that an idea can be matched in
only one way, and that is by a better idea... As we face
the threat of world communism we should be thankful
that inherent in our American democracy is an idea
which potentially is the most powerful in the
world... The stakes are no less than the future of the
democratic ideal in America and throughout the world.
If this ideal is to grow and expand, we must face up
honestly to weaknesses in our own democracy. We must
offer vigorous assistance to other less fortunate
peoples in the development of their economies. We must
reject the isolationist concept of military power as an
end in itself... If we fail, the ultimate hopes of the
free world die with us. In the grim cycle of Professor
Toynbee, America will take its place among other once
great nations which placed their sole faith in
militarism and materialism, and so finally died of
moral dry rot. (Bowles, 1951, pp. 38-42)
Bowles' essentially political argument consisted of
several rationales. It was framed within the peaceful
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struggle between two expansionist ideologies. It was
addressed to Americans as part of the effort to garner their
support for a political /ideological analog to the exclusive
reliance on military power. It called for the spread of
democratic forms of government among developing nations.
And it drew moral inspiration by invoking the sense of
obligation of the most highly developed nation to safeguard
political and economic freedom by helping those in need.
Besides, more than anything else Bowles' claimed that
support for aid could produce tangible security benefits by
spreading American democratic ideals while it fostered
domestic economic prosperity from growing involvement in
foreign economies
.
In reality, however, the political history of U. S.
foreign assistance throughout the decade of the fifties is
rather confusing. A clear sense of purpose and direction is
difficult to discern (Pentony, 1960, p. 24). By 1960, it
was evident that the political benefits actually derived
from the dispensation of aid were very much in doubt.
President Kennedy's Message to the Congress of March 22,
1961 (cited in Goldwin, 1962, pp . 1-9) called past concepts
"unsatisfactory" and "unsuited" for the sixties. Banfield's
review of past doctrines (1962, pp. 10-31) dispelled several
of Millikan and Rostow's (1957) premises which guided past
aid policies and programs:
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* The doctrine of "indirect influence" whereby aid was
expected to change the cultural outlook and institutions of
underdeveloped countries was flawed, he said, because the
chain of logical assumptions that raising incomes would
necessarily change institutions, which would then lead to
freedom and democracy, which would then lead to peace, which
would result in the enhanced security of the United States,
was too precarious and fraught with wishful thinking to
produce intended results (pp. 11-18).
* The doctrine of "direct influence" was based on the
direct effects aid was to have on policies set by foreign
governments and influenced by public opinion. Such
influence was to have been exercised in several ways: (a)
as part of a " quid pro quo " bargain between governments; (b)
through long term "business friendship" whereby unspecified
political benefits would ensue in exchange for economic
ones; (c) by "maintaining friendly governments" in power;
(d) through the "power of prestige" which would tangibly
demonstrate the donor's strength; (e) by establishing a
joint climate of "good will" between people; and (f) with
the "moral force" that aid would inspire on public opinion
in developing nations to reciprocate similarly (pp* 18-21).
* Altruistic rationales (e.g., Millikan Rostow, 1957)
for aid could not hold water because one culture's
definition of "good," namely the recipient's, would
necessarily differ from that of another, the donor s; or
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because it is right," in that only individuals acting
voluntarily, not government whose nature is coercive, could
act morally. Nor could it be argued for the cultural
benefit of America, whereby the American professional
community's efforts to create a better world would
automatically improve the domestic quality of life. Such
could logically be countered by groups who would
organize themselves to oppose aid (Banfield, 1962, pp . 23-
26) .
Banfield 's refutations notwithstanding, several
political doctrines in support of foreign assistance
progressed from the contextual concern with developing an
arsenal of means to counter the communist appeal (Watnick,
1963, pp. 103-119) toward the deployment of a more
comprehensive strategy of modernization. This strategy
required "...the development of an ethos and system of
values which can compete sucessfully with the attraction
exercised by communism for those sections of the native
intelligentsia which have been the source and mainstay of
its leadership" (Watnick, 1963, p. 119). The counterappeal
was to be directed first toward such targeted elite groups
as
:
"...the traditional feudal or tribal leaders, the
military, the initially small but growing urban
commercial and business class, the landowners, and the
intelligentsia. As the process [of modernization]
takes on momentum and the perception of new
alternatives spreads through the society, new groups
become important - the peasantry, urban labor, the new
student class." (Millikan and Blackmer, 1963, p. 136)
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Millikan elsewhere (1962, pp. 90-108) further developed
the instrumentalization of aid argument as a multi-purpose
component of U. S. foreign policy. This line of reasoning
contended that the promotion of American interests in
developing nations could be accomplished through a flexible
combination of technical assistance programming, the
allocation of capital, assistance to land reform, and the
international organization of aid. Aid as an instrument of
development presupposed the need for the United States to
assist directly in the process of reconfiguring internal
power relationships in favor of those predisposed to
modernization and against those in a traditional form of
alignment which were retarding progress. Owing to the
competition, according to Millikan, the U. S. had little
choice but to involve itself in the process of
modernization, as the breakdown of rural society and rapid
urbanization were creating potentially "explosive"
situations where "...what is required ... is a fundamental
transformation of social structure, of loyalties and values,
of modes of political participation, of opportunities for
education, skill acquisition, and challenging employment,
and of channels for constructive energies" (p. 99). Of
interest is the leadership role he assigned to the central
government of the nation involved as coordinator of
assistance, allocator of resources, and manager of national
development policy, with a primary concern to "override
local and parochial interests" (p. 100).
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The guiding rationale for the management of the
development process through political alliance was based in
the concept of "modernity," which Millikan and Blackmer
defined as an "ensemble of behaviors that compose the modern
style [and is] given its coherence by a frame of mind..."
(1963, p. 30). The political significance of the ensemble
was that it required a shift in power from rural to urban
and from the tasks and virtues of agricultural life to
those of commerce, industry, and modern administration" (p.
30). In effect, the shift meant that aid was to be used to
butress alliances of political economy with selected
internally productive elements of a society at the expense
of other "traditional" elements. The modernity rationale
explicitly called forth its educational corollary where
needs for training, skill building, institutional
reformulation, and infrastructural development through
technical advising gained prominence. Situated in the
milieu of the Cold War, the adaptation of aid as an
instrument for the reformation of political and economic
institutions can be called, the laboratory approach to
political stabilization
,
where the donor introduced diverse
approaches to development into the recipient nation in the
form of resources and technical advice for the purpose of
ushering its advance into a predefined state of "modernity."
The introduction of innovations for the purpose of
developing institutions that would oversee and manage
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development program activities in a range of economic and
political areas can be classified as a social project that
aimed to restructure local and national institutions. The
rationales of that project are examined in the following
section
.
The Social Component of
the Developmental Rationale
As the sixties progressed, aid programming diversified
into several, what I call - social areas, which were adjunct
to the economic focus. Technical programs were directed
toward improvements in argricul ture
,
health, transportation,
electrical power, industrial development, education, and
many other areas depending on the needs of the country, U.
S. security interests, and unanticipated crises (Nelson,
1968). The overall purpose of the majority of
developmental aid was to provide the context for economic
growth through the following measures:
* Development of technical, professional,
entrepreneurial, and managerial skills.
* Increased productivity and output in industry and
agriculture
.
* Diversification of crops and industries, to reduce
dependence on one or a few mineral or agricultural
exports and consequent vulnerability to world market
price fluctuations, and to reduce relative reliance on
imported goods...
* Increased savings and investment, to the point where
self-financed investment plus foreign private
investment permitted output to grow faster than
population
.
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* Increased exports, to the point where export earningsplus foreign private investment could finance
rN^.1
consumption and investment.(.iNeison, 1968, p. 14)
The question then became one of what strategies should
be adopted to bring about such developments. In reviewing
three decades of development programming, Mikesell (1983, p.
21) concluded that past approaches which had emphasized
technical assistance but little capital were "...grossly
inadequate for realizing the economic goals of the
developing countries. What was required were development
institutions with both abundant financial resources and
technical capacity. Economists formulated capital
-oriented
growth models to justify large global aid programs, but
failed to analyze the basic elements of development strategy
and the role of domestic policy in development...." What
had been regarded as a matter of general political economy
in the decades of the fifties and sixties was seen in the
seventies to require more direct attention to domestic
institutions which were thought to play a necessary role in
the process of attaining a state of self-sustaining economic
growth.
By the mid-seventies AID embarked on a new initiative
to address itself more directly with the equitable
distribution of national developmental resources to the
poorest elements of society. Called "New Directions," the
policy was based on the philosophy of "growth with equity"
advanced by Hollis Chenery and others (1974), whose major
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recommendations were for AID to pay more direct programmatic
attention to the question of prior neglect of the labor-
intensive rural and urban employment seeking sector and the
redistribution of development resources necessary to do so
(Morss & Morss, 1982, p. 37; Mickelwait, Sweet, and Morss,
1
2
1979). The sequel to this strategy was the adoption of
the "Basic Needs" approach advocated by Paul Streeten
(1981), which recognized the failure of economic growth
policies alone to alleviate conditions of poverty and the
widening gap between the rural and urban poor and the urban
rich
.
Morss and Morss (1982, pp. 28-31) distinguished three
major strategies of intervention argued to address the
problem of economic redistribution: (a) the traditional
strategy advocated restraint from interference in the social
structure of the recipient nation by working through the
local power structure for benefits to "trickle down" to the
poor; (b) the incremental strategy argued for cooperative
arrangements with institutional elements of the social
structure to enable them to redistribute capital assets
toward greater participation of the poor; and (c) the
revolutionary strategy rejected the utility of any
assistance as a stimulus to redistribute in countries
whose regimes oppressed the poor. Programmatic initiatives
launched by AID in the seventies and eighties have been
based on the former two approaches to redistribution under
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the general headings of basic needs, employment and income
generation, integrated rural development, appropriate
technologies, infrastructural and institutional development,
and improved agricultural techniques (pp. 32-39).
Activities undertaken within each of the headings show
several common rationales:
large measure from organized
^ffotts, usually called "projects," with outcomes
designed to improve the economic welfare of targeted
groups.
* Beneficial outcomes are predicated on and result in
overall improvements in the rate of economic growth.
tecipient state acting through and in the form of
its agencies and ministries is expected to play a
central role in initiating and sustaining development.
* The modification of existing and/or the creation of
new organizations to manage the development process is
key part of the foreign assistance strategy.
While others may also be evident, the common rationales
listed here are acknowledged by their proponents as
operationally integral pillars indispensable to AID
programming until today. In all, the evolutionary process
through which developmental approaches have progressed over
the span of the last three decades has a history of growing
involvement in the technical internal administration of
those key segments of agriculture, health, transportation,
infrastructure, and education that have been dedicated to
the development phenomenon.
Current thinking on the subject for sub-Saharan Africa
(e.g., Morss St Morss, 1986, pp. 88-110) suggests the
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following areas of possible programming research for the
nineties: population control, shifting the agriculture
focus from rural export to self-sufficiency, urban
development, institutional development, revising donor
attitudes, and increasing policy making capacity in
recipient nations. Considering trends to reduce numbers of
technical advisers and the reduction of technical assistance
overall, new means to generate developmental strategies and
approaches need to be devised to take advantage of locally
trained professionals and common regional circumstances.
In this line of reasoning, development rationales
continue to be modernity inspired and western located. What
originated as a Cold War security strategy to stave off the
radical propensities of the desperately poor has evolved
into an array of technical strategies for engineering
institutional development. Development conceived as an end
requires social restructuring by a class of specially
trained professionals who can be called on to offer discreet
inputs within the various institutional systems organized
for the task, from agriculture to education. The cluster of
arguments on behalf of the social modification process have
become increasingly technical. The legitimate grounds for
discussion of development have shifted from the political
and value centered to the instrumental. The shift is
directed to the reordering of society according to technical
requirements. I therefore call this cluster of rationales
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expertise guided social engineering
, where value and
politics are subordinated to exclusively technical problems.
Summary of the Rational Components of
Public Argumentation
So far, my focus has remained at the level of public
argumentation put forward over the span of three decades of
U. S. foreign assistance. I have identified four major
ideological dimensions injected into the debate that roughly
parallel the historical flow of AID programming implemented
during the period:
^
Protect ionis tic Interventionism served to justify
miTTFaxy ass is t ance in the form of standing personnel,
the provision of equipment, and the allocation of
internal resources as a developmental concern of
national security.
* Obligatory Intervention by Economic Stewardship at
once provided for a viable economic alternative to
communist expansion into the Third World (as the group
of "developing nations" came to be called), and for the
involvement of U. S. governmental and private
institutions in the process of nation-by-nation
economic development.
* The Laboratory Approach to Political Stabilization
sought to direct attention to the political task of
revamping national and local institutions in accordance
with techniques and methods introduced by the donor to
facilitate progression toward a state of "modernity."
* Expertise Guided Social Engineering defined
development as an end state to be reached through the
social restructuring of key institutions according to
the technical requirements introduced by western
trained experts. The problem of development was posed
as a technical matter which could be addressed through
mainly technical measures.
In the next two chapters, I set out to devise a
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critical framework with which to explore the deeper ideology
embedded in this public argumentation. The arguments
reviewed up to this point do not adequately explain how such
evidently diverse and often contradictory rationales for
development have managed to mobilize concerted policy and
action in foreign assistance. That exploration will focus
on the relationships between positivistic sociology,
development science, and ideology.
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Notes
c
Library of Congress ReferenceService (LRS, 1968) those supporting foreign economic aid
subscribed to the view that foreign aid programs
constituted:
rational attempt to coordinate the resources of
all the countries of the free world... in presenting a
strong, united front against the forces that would
undermine them individually ... Those who believe that
the free world community must stand united against the
common enemy of Communist aggression ... also believe
that economic foreign aid and military defense aredifferent aspect of the same problem. (LRS, 1968, pp.
97-98) ’
Those taking positions against foreign economic assistance
argued for American military power alone to be deployed in
strategic locations throughout the world and supported by a
strong economy back home in "Fortress America." A variation
of this stance was to support foreign military assistance to
friendly governments with economic assistance as a temporary
supplement for resources allocated to defense.
2. The doctrine of containment was formulated in the
late forties by George F. Kennan (1947), Soviet specialist
in the State Department. Writing under the pseudonym "X,"
Kennan argued that the significance of containment lay in
the formal recognition incorporated in the "Truman Doctrine"
of the need to both militarily and politically foreclose the
spread of communism through a policy of mutual assistance
with the other western powers (Blum et al., 1963, pp . 739-
743). As a strategy, containment was premised on the belief
that opposition through united strength would wear down the
Soviet penchant for expansion (Schuman, 1958, pp. 594-599).
3. According to Morgenthau (1960, pp. 79-82), the
"policy of prestige" was designed as an adjunct to display
U. S. power in Latin America and to preserve the
international political status quo by securing the
allegiance of the uncommitted nations. As such, foreign aid
"...intends to impress the recipient nation with the
economic and technological proficiency of the aid's
provider" (p. 81), and thereby convince that nation its best
interests lay in maintaining a close political relationship.
In this view, a policy of increasing such alliances would
tend to tip the balance of power in favor of the nation
whose assistance was sought most.
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4.
Friedman's argument here is not so much directed atthe communist economic system as it is against thefjroponents of bilateral assistance undertaken in the name offree enterprise." Friedman argued that strengthening anygovernment involvement in any one else's economy is a —
~
contradiction to the development of free market economies.Foreign assistance in this regard should be limited to the
removal of trade barriers and should not engage in technicalprojects through the sponsorship of government.
5.
According to the Mutual Security Act of 1951, theMutual Security Program was administered by the Mutual
Security Agency until the formation of the Foreign
Operations Administration in 1953 under the Eisenhower
administration (LRS
,
1968, pp. 69-70). The issue was
administrative - Which department of government was to be
responsible for the various aspects of U. S. military and
economic aid? By 1955, Eisenhower created the International
Cooperation Administration (ICA) and placed it
organizationally as a quasi-autonomous unit with its own
budgetary and operational authority under the aegis of the
State Department. The Agency continued operating under this
arrangement until the 1960s. Military assistance was still
managed by the Defense Department, with overall coordination
responsibility assigned to the Undersecretary of State for
Economic Affairs. The Technical Cooperation Administration
established by Truman in 1950 was merged with the ICA bv
1955. ^
6. The behavioristic implications of modernization
theory stem in part from Pars on's (1951) analysis of
"pattern variables," a classificatory device which
distinguished levels of social development between one
society and another. Inkeles and Smith (1974)
differentiated personal characteristics they associated with
"modern" behavior, recommending that inducing changes in
"traditional" behavior patterns would lead to modernity.
7. Coffin's (1964) defense of aid, written some ten
years later, aimed to revive a "working consensus" to expand
and improve aid programs in the face of Congressional
criticism about lack of progress. The consensus was to be
forged around the following principles:
* Aid's increasing importance as an aspect of foreign
policy instrumental to the "advancement of freedom in
the world."
* The need to improve programming quality in light of
past experience.
* The effort to involve nongovernmental resources.
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RecognitLon of the need to institute a "practice ofCongressional decision" that would facilitate
responsive programming.
* A set of "realistic expectations about the
limitations and potentials of foreign assistance in a
complex world." (Coffin, 1964, pp. 267-268)
The effort to achieve a consensus at the time in the early
sixties was directed to counteract growing legislativeimpatience with the lack of concrete successes, particularlyin light of the promise of a decade earlier.
8. The term "peaceful coexistence" was emphasized by
Premier Nikita Khrushchev from the mid-1950s. Its
significance lay in the Soviet endorsement of an alternative
arena of competition between socialist and capitalist
economic systems
. While Khrushchev took appropriate steps
to verify the doctrine as a legitimate Soviet strategy
derived from Lenin, his efforts to do so were disputed by
both western and Soviet scholars as well as the Chinese
(Mager 8t Katel, 1961, pp. 59-75).
9. Banfield's (1962, pp. 10-31) resume of foreign aid
doctrines summarily refutes purely humanitarian motivated
arguments made in favor of government sponsored foreign
assistance on the grounds that "doing good" in American
referenced terminology cannot determine what good means in
other cultures at their individual moments in history. We
thus risk doing more harm than good. Recourse to "good
intentions" on our part do little to assuage the furtherance
of suffering caused by failure of implementation. Just ask
those on the receiving end (pp. 23-24).
Another objection he raised to altruistic inspired aid
is primarily Constitutional. The only justification for
governments to appropriate the property of some for
redistribution to others is for the "common good" of the
community over which it rules. By this definition, the U.
S. Government is prohibited from acting to assist the
citizens of other lands for purely humanitarian reasons (pp.
24-25).
Finally, providing aid because it is morally right to
do so is a precept derived either from the will of God or
from the imperatives of nature. As such, the moral dictum
only applies to individuals acting out of deliberate choice.
The nature of government being coercive would preclude
taxation of its wealthy members to re-give to the poor on
moral grounds alone, as morality remains the exclusive
preserve of the individual acting out of personal concern to
do good and not out of obedience to the public obligations
mandated by rulers.
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Countering this critique was the shift in moral
emphasis reflected in President Kennedy's appeal for youngAmericans to volunteer for the Peace Corps (Shriver 1964
‘
Sullivan, 1964; Textor
,
1966). The argument in this case
was presented as an opportunity to exercise one's personal
obligation to help the less fortunate by applying the skills
with which one was endowed by virtue of being reared in a
prosperous society
. While Peace Corps programming was
usually conducted as group initiatives, the core of its
appeal was the opportunity provided by an agency of
government to take moral action.
10. Primarily administered under the Mutual Security
Act of 1954, responsibility for foreign assistance in the
form of the Development Loan Fund and the International
Cooperation Administration was shifted to the newly formed
Agency for International Development (AID) in 1961 (Nelson,
1968
, pp . 4-5)
.
11. Underpinning the developmental ideology of three
decades has been the conviction that however the term is
defined, development minimally depends on achieving a
sufficient rate of economic growth within individual
nations
. Mathematical models independently derived by
Harrod and Domar in the mid-1940s (Todaro, 1977, pp . 52-54)
were used to influence investment and other aid policies
that required a certain minimal percentage of national
income be saved and invested as capital to support the
growth of industrial capacity. This model was corroborated
by Rostow's (1960) linear stages theory of growth, in which
he postulated that all countries must necessarily progress
through a series of developmental stages on the way to
economic prosperity and modernity. The origins of this
thinking are addressed directly in the next chapter.
12. Interestingly, the economic model of greatest
programming influence in AID the previous decade was
developed by Hollis Chenery and Alan Strout (1966, pp. 679-
723)
,
both of whom occupied senior policy positions in the
Agency at the time. The model was based on the Rostowian
version of self-sustaining growth, a target which required a
minimum level of savings, skill capacity, and foreign
exchange from exports. AID was argued to have a positive
impact on ameliorating the gap existing in any single or
combination of areas. Mikesell (1983, p. 7) observed, "The
Chenery-Strout model became exceedingly popular and was
broadly used as a basis for both the administration of
foreign aid programs in individual countries and the
estimation of global aid requirements..."
CHAPTER III
THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY AND
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC ELEMENTS OF DEVELOPMENT THEORY
This chapter focuses on the potential of ideology to
guide inquiry into the subject of development. Following a
theoretical discussion of ideology and knowledge production,
1 will review the evolution of ideology as a concept in
western social science. The review traces the broad streams
of positivist social and economic science that have been
incorporated into modern development theory. The chapter
concludes with an itemization of factors that have been used
to ground a regulatory social science, the developmentalist
version included. The aim of the chapter is to explore and
bring to the surface the ideological foundations of social
science so that a critical frame of reference for
investigating ideology in a particular instance can be
developed
.
Ideology as an Investigative Concept
In this study I use the concept of ideology in two
ways. First, ideology as it consists of a set of rationales
about the true nature of the social world and how it should
be ordered; second, ideology as it provides a theoretical
means for investigation into the knowledge claims implied by
the rationales that are used to order the social world. As
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an investigative concept, the theory of ideology provides a
means to reflect on the problem of how and why society is
ordered the way it is.
For a start, I subscribe to the position taken by John
B. Thompson (1984, p. 5) that a theory of ideology should be
directed
...towards the study of the complex ways in which
meaning is mobilized for the maintenance of relations of
domination...." This position sets out the task for my
inquiry into ideology in a specific instance. It means that
the public argumentation I reviewed in the previous chapter
reflects the attempt to further interests through the
influence of public policy. Competing rationales were
offered to further one view of truth over another. The
study of ideology therefore must begin from the premise that
rationales contain knowledge claims that are rooted in the
clash of interests.
This view contrasts with the position taken initially
by Marx where he defined ideology merely as an "imaginary
reflection" of more fundamental activities undertaken to
sustain productive life (e.g., Marx, 1978 [1846], pp.l55-
156)
,
with the forms of social relations being determined
directly by the nature of production (p. 150). According to
Habermas (1971, p. 44), Marx's initial emphasis on the
imaginary tended to reduce the role of critical reflection
as a forming and moving force of history. Following the
lead of Habermas in this respect, Thompson instead refers to
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the constitutive power of language to convey meaning in the
effort to order social life. In this sense, the use of
particular forms of language is immanently practical
.
Certain expressions, slogans, arguments, and metaphors have
the force of formulating and legitimating courses of action
taken to maintain or advance the interests of a particular
individual or interest group. Material relationships to the
mode of production are therefore not so immediately
determined as Marx first proposed.
Language then becomes ideological to the extent that it
serves to rationalize the pursuit of the self-interests of
one race, class, gender, or one social group over another.
The intent of some expressions are to distort the real
nature of social relations into "figments of truth," namely
those governed by laws and facts. Any rationale is
ideological to the extent that it masks the oppressive
nature of certain social relationships. It does so by
resorting to a source of absolute truth, such as positivist
science, to justify a particular social formation. The
comparative social effects of competing versions of
scientific rationality depend on the explicative power that
is accorded them. The instance of scientific rationality I
investigate in this work owes its explicative power to
positivistic versions of social and economic science that
gained preeminence in American twentieth century social
thought (Held, 1980, pp . 171-174). I claim this version to
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be the one that has governed the production of development
theories used by AID to rationalize its policies in
education
.
A Personal Note
In my view, the business of reflecting on public
discourse involves an attempt to "make sense" of the
development activity that has been promoted by the United
States in the Third World. The task of making sense is
neither objective nor passive in the conventional mode of
social research. My approach throughout is reflexive and
critical, fueled as it were by a personal need to understand
more clearly the nature of the work with with which I have
been engaged for more than twenty years. I subscribe
outright to the position held by those who believe that
reality is a construction of participants in a field of
interaction. I make no claim to be investigating a subject
that exists apart from my experience of it. I have a
personal interest in resolving the apparent dilemmas and
contradictions involved in doing "development work." I say
this with the expectation that the project of knowing is one
not possible to circumscribe with certainty. The grounds
for knowledge are neither concrete nor immutable. I find
most objectionable the assumption implicit in many
development initiatives that knowledge can be packed and
tranposed given the right blend of appropriate content and
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effective technique. The direction of this inquiry is
toward a refutation of the propensity to resort to the
certainty of knowledge to back policy.
On the other hand, I am not a relativist in the sense
that I believe truth to lie only in the eye of the beholder.
Impressions of the social world are formed by those engaged
in the act of experiencing it. Following Weick (1979, pp.
164-169, 1977, 271-277), I base my analysis on the position
that people bracket" their own versions of their social
®^tting. In this act, they refer both to their own history
and the contingent factors that comprise the immediate
situation. As with Popper (1962, p. 73), they "...impose a
set of regularities upon the world. . ." which serve to define
the problems with which they deal. My disaffection with
past practice is compounded by the conviction that such
"bracketing" activity cannot of itself constitute truth. I
am left to search, propose, and be refuted socially much as
my own search is prompted by the need to refute.
The process of sense making is foremost a pursuit of
truth. It is in this respect a social activity, one which
uses language and, through exposure to critical scrutiny and
refutation, develops. According to Popper (1962, pp . 3-30),
the pursuit can vary in form insofar as it is conducted in
conformity with "common standards of criticism or
rationality." What he suggests:
...is to give up the idea of ultimate sources of
knowledge, and admit that all knowledge is human; that
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it is mixed with our errors, our prejudices, ourdreams, and our hopes; that all we can do is to erooe
or truth even though it be beyond our reach. We mayadmit that our groping is often inspired, but we mustbe on our guard against the belief, however deeply
that our inspiration carries any authoritydivine or otherwise. If we thus admit that there is noauthority beyond the reach of criticism to be found
within the whole province of our knowledge, however farIt may have permeated into the unknown, then we can
retain, without danger, the idea that truth is beyondhuman authority
. And we must retain it. For without
this idea there can be no objective standards ofinquiry, no criticism of our conjectures; no groping
for the unknown; no quest for knowledge. (pp. 29-30)
Following this suggestion, I see this inquiry as an
attempt to overcome a fault in the pursuit of U. S.
development policy for education. Until very recently, no
one has investigated AID's educational policies from an
ideological standpoint, that is, with a view to reveal the
nature of the ideological positions enmeshed in policy
discourse. This approach at the outset follows that taken
by Preston (1985, pp . 11-30) in his study of development
theory where the notion of "ideology construction" as a
method of social theorizing guides his inquiry:
The idea that social theorizing is, in its central and
most unequivocal guise, concerned with the construction
of ideological schemas whereby action in the world
might be ordered and legitimated is readily available
within recent discussions of the nature of social
theory . .
.
(p . 11)
My line of inquiry follows this approach in that it seeks to
reveal the nature of the ideological stances that have been
packed within a particular brand of development theorizing,
that of aid to education.
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Ideology in Western Social Scientific Thought
The analysis of development theorizing published by
Preston in 1985 devotes a great deal of attention to the
role played by social science in the development process
advanced by western nations and thinkers for the Third
World. In this he follows the dissent advanced by Giddens
(1979) concerning fallacies in the importation of the
received model of the natural scientific mode of
investigation into the social world. The deployment of the
orthodox scientific position into the social realm, argues
Giddens, is wrong on several counts. Preston's (1985, p.
68) summary refers to errors found by Giddens with respect
to the origins of social vis-a-vis natural science and the
status of "laws" in the former, the nature of language, the
"revelatory" capacity of social science, concepts of "agency
and stucture," and the "affirmation of the 'received model'
(positivistic) of natural science." Preston (pp. 74-89)
goes on to fault by example several practices engaged in by
theorists advancing specific development approaches,
foremost of which is the notion of "modeling" used by
orthodox economists. The result of such practice in his
estimation is to "sow confusion" by metaphor, confusion
emanating from investing authoritative backing to what in
reality is an ideological position . The immediate question
then arises as to the origins and the effects of the status
enjoyed by science in development planning.
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The Historical Origins of Development
as a Scientific Concept
Human Mastery over Na tur
e
The notion that human endeavor is plagued by a dual
nature was advanced by Francis Bacon (1939, pp . 5-27) over
three hundred fifty years ago. To Bacon, while humans were
capable of great understanding and endowed by the Creator
^i-th innate powers to sense the world as it truly exists,
efforts to understand nature were unfortunately subject to
"...the idols, or phantoms, by which the mind is
occupied ... as ... the needs of men are strangely possessed and
beset, so that there is no true and even surface left to
reflect the genuine rays of things..." (p. 18). In this
view, true knowledge of the order and laws of nature could
only be derived from what is perceived through the senses.
The purpose of knowledge seeking was to convey an accurate,
simple, and pure understanding of these laws so that they
could be obeyed. The proper conduct of the scientific
enterprise then was to exercise controls over the perverse
tendencies of the human mind.
According to Held's (1980, pp. 163-164) summary of
Horkheimer and Adorno (e.g., 1972), which I paraphrase here.
Bacon's assertions about the proper derivation of knowledge
were formalized subsequently by social theorists into a
positivistic method of investigation that accepted the
validity of several assumptions:
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* All research knowledge derives from sensory
experience.
* Meaning is derived from observation.
* Concepts and generalizations originate in the
observation of particular things and events.
* The sciences represent the pursuit of knowledge
through an ideal methodology which applies mathematicalformulations derived from the smallest possible number
of axioms
.
* The relegation of human value to non-factual, hence
non-knowledge status.
The idea that the workings of nature were knowable
through science meant they were subject to manipulation, as
Bacon concluded that "...those twin objects, human knowledge
and human power do really meet in one..." (Bacon, 1939, p.
23)
.
The obligation of scientific endeavor was foremost to
observe the natural laws laid down by God. This
representation of "man as facilitator" carrying out the will
of the Lord presupposed a higher authority guiding the
scientific enterprise which was done to further the cause of
human mastery over nature. Nature was considered to be
real, discoverable, and objectively controllable insofar as
laws of observation and experimentation were properly
observed. This supposition of the relation of the human
being to nature is analogous to the idea of stewardship,
which ascribed the right of human dominion over the natural
world as a form of custody. Through science, in other
words, the world could be transformed for the greater good.
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Science and the Regulation
of Human Relations
While Bacon made frequent reference to the congruity of
science (the "new philosophy," in his terminology) with
divine purpose, the newly acknowledged power of the human
mind to apprehend and transform nature signified a step away
from the traditional authority of religion to more secular
versions of authority in the regulation of life. Bacon's
focus on the relationship between the human and natural
worlds led the way for Comte's later focus on the regulation
of human relations. If the natural world could be
transformed for the better, why not the human? For the
...the fundamental purpose of Comte's philosophy ...was an
enlargement of a belief that had always been central in
liberal doctrine, the conviction that human relations are
amenable to intelligent understanding and control" (Sabine,
1961, p. 717). Comte went so far as to suggest the
existence of a "second law" governing social development, a
process of evolutionary progression to which all societies
could be expected to conform. Combined with the belief in
progress, the idea that a "science of society" could play a
decisive role in the development of peoples spawned a host
of new endeavors in the investigation and regulation of
human behavior.
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The Individual and the Concept
of Private Property
The social implications of a "scientifically based"
regulation of human relations extended naturally into the
economic realm. Locke's (1939, pp. 413-423) treatise on
civil government lent force to the principle of the
^ri^ivfdual s right to the fruits of one's labor as a matter
of personal property. The determining factor of ownership
was the exercise of personal labor which derived from a
combination of acquired ingenuity and individual effort.
The result was the private appropriation of the object of
labor from the realm of accessibility to the community into
the realm of the individual existing apart from community.
The transformation of nature by human activity was a right
that came to be politicized as individual right.
The basis of Locke's argument in support of individual
rights to material property attributed final authority to
nature as it was interpreted through science. Locke opened
the door to the subsequent merger between private rights to
property and the functional rights accorded to those inured
with the scientifically based power to organize society.
Eventually, the private interests of the individual came to
be viewed as separable from those of the community.
The Individual, the State, and
the Concept ol: Authority
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Mill's later (1939, pp. 1032-1036) call for the state
to insure the development of liberal principles through
education was argued in the context of the liberalization of
society, where the state as an embodiment of democratic
principles had the constitutional right to enact and enforce
law to safeguard the individual's right to freedom of
action. Notwithstanding his strongly argued admonitions
against the potential excesses of state power. Mill's
principle that the state should be so authorized as to
P^Gvent violations of individual liberty nonetheless
occasioned various forms of public scrutiny over the
potential excesses and deficiencies of private action.
Presumably, the state would be expected to play a more
intrusive role in those instances ". . .when society in
general is in so backward a state that it could not or would
not provide for itself any proper institutions of education
unless the government undertook the task..." (p. 1034).
Mill left for his followers the task of working out the
specific characteristics of what he called "proper
institutions." In part, however, he provided the
theoretical groundwork for the development of institutional
mechanisms to further private interests throughout the body
politic as a progressively liberal development. The
establishment of such institutional mechanisms were later
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determined to be prerequisite to the modernization of
society. The state's responsibility was to protect and
encourage private initiative to establish such institutions.
The evolution of the concept "private" vis-a-vis
community can be understood with reference to authority.
The question of individual rights and how conflicting
interpretations were to be mediated could only be answered
by referring to an authoritative source, one that had the
power sufficient to resolve conflict. The nineteenth
century search for a suitable authority structure in which
to invest relative powers for the regulation of social
behavior gained impetus from Max Weber. Weber provided a
new set of secular ground rules for the legitimation of
authority in The Theory of Social and Economic Organization
(1947)
.
According to Weber (pp. 324-341), while the exercise of
authority over subordinates in an organizational setting
could take various forms, the belief in the "legitimacy" of
the authority structure was fundamental. As a practical
concept, legitimacy relates to beliefs shared about
property. Authority figures and their subordinates ascribe
ownership of material goods, capital, and contracts for
labor as a legitimate basis on which to arrange work for
compensation. The foundational requisites of bureaucratic
life, whether public or private, rest on the validity of the
claim to obedience implied by the correspondent
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administrative structure. Weber proceeded to classify
various types of office and function associated with the
bureaucratic model, thereby laying the theoretical
background for institutional forms in several fields of
endeavor throughout the western world. It was Weber who
rationalized the individualistic principles identified
earlier by Locke and Mill as matters of right into formal
p^r inciples generic to the operation of modern institutions
.
Weber s classification of modern institutions derived
its authority from its status as a scientifically based
scheme for ordering social progress. In this sense, the
scheme served as a rational basis for the diminution of the
legitimacy accorded to traditional ranking systems. It
thereby both legitimated and unified the authority of a new
ranking system, this one characterized by the achievement
driven model of technical merit. As a definitive
characteristic of "modern" institutional operation, Weber's
technical system exercised its social force as a model
appropriate for the organization of "developed" societies.
Social Action as a Scientific Enterprise
In the twentieth century. Parsons had used Weber's
scheme in such a way as to combine science with social
policy to formulate his version of "systemic functionalism,"
which served as the point of departure for later
modernization theorists. If the form of institutional
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— for the scientific organization of
society to Weber, the question of social action was the
primary focus for Parsons. According to Kinloch (1981, pp
.
62-79), Parsons' theory of social action was based in the
idea of a system, which consisted of "...an actor, end,
situation, and choice of alternate means to an end or
normative orientation..." (p. 63). Parsons developed the
conception of a systemic basis for the purposeful
organization of society. Using empirical science as the
rational methodology for social analysis, he laid the
foundation for later development specialists of the
institutional modernization variety to apply the concept of
system across cultures with a view to the manipulation of
their operant pattern variables." The conception of
society as a functional system with interacting subsystems
that tended toward cohesion became a fundamental tenet of
western development planners. Parsons provided the grounds
on which later modernization theorists were able to combine
notions of the regulation of individual behavior in the
wider social setting with the requisites of a capital
economy
.
67
Social Referents for the
Deployment of Science as Development
The progressive application of scientific rationality
to the study and regulation of society was forged by way of
several assumptions made about knowledge. According to
Burrell and Morgan (1979, pp . 1-9), the history of the
social sciences is characterized by differing ontological,
epistemological, human, and methodological assumptions. The
significance of the assumptions is that they determine the
nature and scope of questions asked in the conduct of social
research. The assumptions suggest a way to trace the social
referents for the developmental science that was to come.
The Social Referents of
the Natural Science Model
Bacon's call for the control of the potentially
contaminating effects of the human mind presupposed the
existence of a world governed by natural law, to which all
God's creation was subject. The process of control evolved
as a matter of the observance of orthodox procedure. In
their purest form human senses are capable of perceiving the
world to the extent such procedure is followed.
Accordingly, the role of science was to objectify the
relationship between the human being and nature into
procedure so that nature could be both "sensed" and made
sense of in a manner consistent with its natural maxims, as
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if their existence were entirely independent of human
influence or interpretation.
As an ontological stance, the severance between nature
and human will was based on an assumption that had several
social effects:
The elevation of the status of science as the
exclusive source and purveyor of absolute truth.
* The relegation of other forms of knowledge to the
status of myth. (e.g., Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972, p.
* The subversion of traditionally local forms of
authority by an external source and interpreter of
truth.
*
^
advancement of the belief in the potentials and
benefits of an empirical social science.
The last effect emerged from the epistemological
efforts mounted in the late nineteenth and the beginning of
the twentieth centuries to place "...the study of human
social conduct upon a scientific footing..." (Giddens, 1977,
p. 24). Giddens (pp. 25-26) points out that the scientific
enterprise previously envisioned by Marx and Comte alike was
to develop the linkage between the "predictability" of human
conduct through the social sciences and the task of social
liberation. The followers of Comte were less interested in
the discernment of the contradictions inherent in this
approach than were the followers of Marx. As it turns out,
Comte's successors came to dominate the field of social
policy investigation practiced in the United States and
other European countries. The field of international
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development since its inception in the nineteen fifties has
owed its guiding tenets to this ontological position. The
rationales used to undergird development assistance
identified in the previous chapter are based in an empirical
sociology that takes human behavior to be governable
according to natural law. For example, the economic
modeling activities that have formed the theoretical basis
for aid's development policies are based in the
unacknowledged ideological conception that social behavior
follows natural laws. Such an assumption takes the idea of
•^stural and transforms it into a set of "naturalistic"
discourses as a basis for the rationalization of policy.
The postivistic ontology raised certain epistemological
questions about the laws that supposedly governed social
behavior. What are they? How might they be investigated
scientifically?
The critical view of epistomology
,
on the other hand,
raised the kinds of questions that had to do with human
agency in the social setting: What role do our conceptions
of social law play in the process of organizing social
relations? What role do our conceptions of reality
themselves play in the constitution of society? Giddens
(1977, pp. 26-28), following Habermas (1971, pp. 71-81),
raised questions about the interconnectedness
("intersubjectivity") of conceptions and the social order.
Their questions were based on a rejection of the uncritical
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attribution of human behavior to natural law made in the
positivist tradition. Giddens argued that people,
particularly members of the dominant class, act as agents
when they use these conceptions not simply to describe the
constitution of society, but actually to formulate various
institutions and other social relations in accordance with
such conceptions.
The idea of an agency rather than a naturally
constituted social order makes alternative paths for the
analysis of human behavior possible. To the contrary,
conventional positivistic sociology incorporates natural
assumptions as the authority to explain and influence the
extant social order. The social referents for making such
assumptions are supported by the following rationales:
* Humanity is placed in a hierarchy above the rest of
nature
.
* An objectively real universe operates in accordance
with natural (divine) law.
* Insofar as natural law is empirically observed and
known, nature exists to be perfected by human effort.
* Knowledge should be structured according to the
hierarchical order derived from the model of scientific
positivism.
* The model of research developed to apprehend and
transform nature is appropriate for the apprehension
and transformation of human society.
* The idea of evolutionary progress is distinct from
culture and value.
* Social improvement according to the tenets of science
is a legitimate activity.
The assumptions that underlie positivist sociology have
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achieved some of their effects under the ideological rubric
of "development," a term which has come to embrace a range
of activities and interventions. Sociology has had the
function of legitimating this range by providing experts,
administrators, methods of research, and political leaders
with a common language to manage the process of social
change. While positivist sociology has provided a
scientific method with which to structure social change, the
purpose or end state of such change has been legitimated
primarily in economic terms, the subject to which I now
turn
.
Economic Referents for the
Deployment of Science as Development
The discourse that characterizes development is
distinguished primarily in economic terms, that is to say,
in terms that equate human social development with
principally economic ends . How traditional conceptions of
human productive and reproductive life were transformed into
questions of economic development is a matter of historical
interest that has a direct bearing on the business of
international development today.
The Transformation of Society
into Questions of Economy
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The history of economics, according to Lewis Haney
(1949, pp • 8-21)
,
is interwoven with other historical
aspects of thought, most fundamental of which are the
dichotomous streams between "Idealism and Materialism." The
idealist position rests on the principle that human social
life can be purposefully shaped by propositions derived from
general conceptions of nature. In this view, humanity is
depicted as distinct from nature in the sense that the human
mind has a quality possessed by no other creature - the
ability to conceive ideas not derived from experience. The
materialists, on the other hand, tend toward a view that
conceptions of the world are induced empirically from the
interaction people have with their environment. Idealists
tend to refer to abstract principles in their deliberate
efforts to influence social policy whilst materialists
usually refer to the influence of natural law. The concept
of "value," for example, to the idealist is ultimately the
result of human attribution while the materialist refers to
a law that "objectively dictates" value (Haney, 1949, p.
16) . Although economists often mixed various aspects of the
opposing streams of thought, the science of economics can
trace its origins to the positions taken along each of the
streams by the various exponents of economic policy.
Early Hebrew, Greek, Hindu, and eastern philosophers
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did not distinguish economic activity as a virtuous endeavor
apart from the social milieu or other aspects of an upright
life. Aristotle s (1981, pp. 392-393) observations on the
subject were commonly shared. "...[I]t is not by means of
external goods that men acquire and keep the virtues, but
the other way round ... for the acquisition of goods external
to the soul is due either to the coincidence of events or to
fortune, but no man is just or restrained as a result of, or
because of, fortune...." Haney (1949, pp. 50-55) noted
several common elements that characterized ancient thought,
including the subordination of individual material wants to
the notion of community and citizenship within the concept
of the state, which was often empowered to codify individual
behavior to a high degree of detail, particularly in the
case of Hindu, Brahman, and Hebrew societies.
Plato (1942: pp. 332-368) may have been the first to
deal with the concept of the individual as an entity with
interests distinct from the state or community. Throughout
the middle ages, however, the concept of individual interest
continued to be circumscribed within the protective
framework of authority accorded by an overarching
establishment of natural law and social institutions,
foremost being the church and the state (Haney, 1949, pp.
97-108) . It was not until the rise of mercantilism that
prior emphasis given to the individual as agent of church
and state was inverted, with attention increasingly devoted
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to the material needs of humanity as a collection of
interests and needs distinct from both church and state. In
this view, the status of the church in human affairs gave
way to the state as agency to facilitate commercial
exchange. Hobbes' (1949, pp. 184-192) description of the
state furthered the unification of public with private
interest in such a way as to elevate the status of the
individual to an unprecedented level:
. . . for the passions of men are commonly more potent
than their reason. From whence it follows that where
the public and private interest are most closely
united, there is the public most advanced ... The riches,
power, and honor of a monarch arise only from the
riches, strength, and reputation of his sub iects . .
. (pp
.
185-186).
While the state in Hobbes
' view maintained superior
position over the individual, the purpose of the nation
evolved into the service of the material needs and wants of
its citizens who were capable of acting only to enhance
their private interests. The mercantilist state was
accordingly empowered to raise armies and regulate commerce
through a variety of organs whose principal purpose was to
protect individual rights to the fruits of commerce and
manufacture. The lexicon of economic life was increasingly
charaterized by the value accorded to the acquisition of
goods. As a concept, the independent value that was
embodied in goods was determined "extr insically" by exchange
on a competitive market rather than "intrinsically"
according to the utility set by individual actors reaching
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agreement on price. The notion of cost as an aggregation of
labor and other assets expended for production came to play
a greater role in the new economic science of supply and
demand. And furthermore, the concept of "profit" as
favorable balance of trade (surplus) rose in importance to
both the nation and the individual with the interests of the
two not always compatible.
\^mere regulation of trade and the accumulation of money
as wealth were important to the mercantilist position, the
physiocrats emphasized the development of manufacturing
industries and agriculture with a view to ending reliance on
government as regulator . The social impact of their
resulted in the enhancement of individual economic
liberties at the expense of state power and the furtherance
of such scientifically economic concepts as annual net
surplus, capital, taxation, social responsibility expressed
as economic concern, and land as income generator through
rent (Haney, 1949, pp. 204-205).
Adam Smith and the Equation of
Self with Social Interest
The question faced by economic and social theorists of
the Age of Enlightenment began in the sphere of morality:
How to reconcile personal interest with the social good by
means of secular authority. Enlightened social thinkers
approached the regulation of behavior as a moral problem.
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They were concerned to apply the principles of scientific
authority to the regulation of society. Smith's
comprehensive work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations (1937), first appeared in 1776. Its
force did not result so much from the introduction of new
economic concepts as from its comprehensive scope of
previous thought on establishing the most favorable
conditions for the expansion of business as a social good.
To this end. Smith's main concern was to develop a rational
basis to explain, guide, and support the exertion of
economic power wrought by industrialization and commercial
enterprise as a progressively moral development
characteristic of modern civil society. While his interest
may still have been the moral principles expressed in his
earlier treatise on personal ethics published as The Theory
of Moral Sentiments in 1759 (1976), he ultimately succeeded
in providing a scientific basis for addressing the problem
of personal acquisition of wealth to which later economic
policy makers would refer. In Smith's view, morality was
defined as a matter of the maximimum dispensation of
material benefits for all . An individual acted rationally
insofar as s/he could be motivated by the "...disposition to
admire, and consequently to imitate, the rich and the
great..." to whom we accord the power "...to set, or to lead
what is called the fashion..." (1976, p. 64).
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The Wealth of Nations was an exposition on the
naturally operating mechanisms whereby the artificially
imposed restraints on trade espoused under the heretofore
predominant mercantilist system could be counteracted. The
"artiface" of the purposeful direction of the economy for
the public good was argued to actually create more harm than
good as ...I have never known much good done by those who
affected to trade for the public good. It is an
affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants..."
(1937, p. 423), which would play havoc with the self-
correcting mechanism effected by the "invisible hand."
Smith s contribution to the science of economics
consisted in the development of the laws of the market,
which is the self regulating mechanism of a capital economy
whereby the self interests of all compete to achieve social
harmony (Heilbroner, 1980, pp. 51-57). Among these laws
were the division of labor, whereby the natural differences
and talents of workers could be so specialized as to effect
greater productivity for labor rendered. Since applied
labor was the primary factor in determining its cost, an
item's value for exchange purposes could be determined
objectively by accounting for the labor used to bring it to
production. Such one sided determination, however, could
not account for its full value, as the item was created for
the value it could command as exchange
,
defined by Smith as
the amount of labor it was worth on the market (Haney, 1949,
pp . 217-222). The natural drive to accumulate exchange in
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excess of cost was defined as the "law of accumulation"
(Heilbroner, 1980, pp. 61-63), where such surplus, termed
"profit," could be saved and converted to the creation of
"capital." Smith's vision for the mechanics of an efficient
economy was expressed metaphorically as a grand cycle.
Interrelationships of cause and effect between the three
factors of production (labor, capital, and land) worked
continuously toward harmonic balance according to the
mathematical imperatives of their own laws (Adelman, 1961,
pp. 25-28).
His recourse to scientific rationales notwithstanding,
the moral precepts of Smith's vision remained preeminent.
His economics as a system were invariably directed toward
the general material betterment of the nation as an
ion of consumers acting in pursuit of their own
interests. Through growth that resulted from the greater
productivity and consumptive power of common people, the
social welfare would improve. He distrusted artificial
tampering with the workings of the market, not because it
would interfere with unbridled power to accumulate wealth,
but precisely because it would arbitrarily accord unfair
advantage to a class of legislators and bureaucrats who
would feign to act in the public interest while in reality
act only in their own. The new science of economics, in
other words, remained solidly under the moral aegis of
humanity in the natural service of itself, only now in
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possession of the technology with which to usher in a new
age of abundance.
Smith's Successors and Exponents:
The Split of Economic Science from its Social Referents
Heilbroner (1980, pp . 69-72) pointed out that Smith's
grand scheme was developed in an age just preceding the
upheavals of the Industrial Revolution. Smith's major
assumption was that the natural propensity of society was to
be cohesive, that is, the interplay of individual interests
would tend toward equilibrium within the context of
evolutionary growth. Smith's analysis was conducted in a
historical context of economic transition. At the practical
level, the assumption provided an ostensibly rational means
to achieve economic stability. It gave assurance that there
was indeed a right way, a naturally functioning mechanism,
which would promote human welfare in due course.
The works of Robert Malthus and David Ricardo lent
force to Smith's earlier propositions concerning the natural
laws of population and labor. Malthus, however, reversed
Smith's optimistic predictions about relatively smooth
progress whereby improvements in productivity would
automatically counterbalance cyclical rises in population
(Haney, 1949, pp . 260-269). In the face of extreme misery
and disparities of wealth, Malthus argued that naturally
operating economic mechanisms would work best in "checking"
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excesses of population which became a key factor of
production regulated by the availability of subsistence. He
nonetheless believed natural human impulses could be
restrained only by individual action, not by government
interference
.
Ricardo added weight to the doctrine of social and
economic laissez faire" with a view of wages most
productively set at the level of subsistence. Such a level
would keep demand for food at the lowest level possible
while still maintain a labor supply sufficient to permit
growth in profits. Since manufacture by its nature had the
advantage over agriculture to effect technological
improvements in productivity, the greater share of capital
from profit would accrue to industry, as "...agricultural
production is subject to historically diminishing returns,
the larger population [able to] be supported on the same
amount of land only at an increasing real cost..." (Adelman,
1961, p. 56).
As a businessman (Heilbroner, 1980, pp. 84-85), Ricardo
adopted the pessimistic population projections of Malthus.
He carried Smith's mechanics to an extreme level, where
there "...is nothing but principle, abstract principle..."
in a world not populated by human beings but by "prototypes"
who are bound entirely by "laws of behavior" (Heilbroner,
1980, pp. 92-93). In this world, both the capitalist and
worker stood to lose as the inevitable result of their
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respective dispositions to accumulate and expand wealth and
to reproduce themselves in good times, while the landowner
stood to gain no matter what the state of the economy.
Ricardo's achievement was to abstract the science of
economics from ethics and other branches of social knowledge
(Haney, 1949, pp . 307-310). He gave sole recognition to a
branch of social analysis that was built entirely on the
imperatives of an exclusively economic system: The
capitalist would inevitably seek to maximize earnings
through improvements in technology, opposition to higher
wages, and increases rents, while the worker would
inevitably seek to reproduce in numbers to the extent that
increases in wages would permit him to feed more mouths.
Considering the fact that all human social groupings were
deemed to fit into his economic system, such behavioral
imperatives were not merely a subordinate part of a larger
social scheme posited to simply explain the economic aspects
of social relations. Ricardo went so far as to transform
the entire realm of human social relations into an
internally reciprocal system of economic relations . Neither
ethics, religion, kinship, nor other sources of motivation
were considered valid to account for the means-ends
relationship purported to govern all instances of human
behavior
.
While Ricardo's endogenously complete system was
fabricated on principles governed by natural law, its
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infrastructure was pliable. The debate that ensued in the
early twentieth century between the interventionists, or
planners as they have come to be termed in later development
parlance, and the classical and neo-classical schools took
place on the cornerstone of natural law as it stood in
opposition to human artiface through government. The object
of inquiry was nonetheless the same for both camps: What
was the most effective means by which a political economy
could provide for material wants? Were policies that
emphasized the natural course of events more effective than
the deliberate management of savings, investment, and
exchange rates, for example, by a central authority? All
sides accepted an economic calculus on which to structure
social behavior.
The Modern Interventionists
Keynes (1964) placed the economic calculus in the camp
of those who advocated the deliberate manipulation of the
economy to achieve certain social ends, such as full
employment. Seeking a remedy for what conventional
economics could not explain as a protracted depression, he
argued that the state had a deliberate role to play in
offsetting the extreme cycles of a capital economy in that
it alone was in a position to promote more consistently full
employment. "...I expect to see the State," he said, "which
is in a position to calculate the marginal efficiency of
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capital-goods on long views and on the basis of general
social advantage, taking an ever greater responsibility for
directly organizing investment..." (p. 164). His faith in
the innate power of capitalism to promote prosperity was not
at issue. He offered a theory whereby business and
government might cooperate in rectifying the disequilibria
that cycled through the economy. In so doing, he laid the
theoretical foundation for state management of the
development process in the Third World. The premise on
which his theory of government intervention rested was that
since economic factors were interrelated, the economy could
be directed positively through planned measures.
The Ideological Referents of Development Science
The elements of social thought I covered above can be
combined into an ensemble of rationales that together
grounded a science of development:
* Economic science was accorded the power to order
social policy;
* Traditionally diverse systems of social relations
were transformed into a single system of economic
relations governed by natural law; and,
* The state was assigned the role of prime actor in the
promotion of economic development.
In the last three decades, this rational ensemble has
evolved into a developmental ideology that has served as the
basis for the reorganization of Third World societies.
Development under this scheme has become an end state in a
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system in which social relations are conceptually
transformed into a calculus of variables which are to be
changed. Adelman's (1961) conclusion in this respect is
logical: Given the supposition of underdevelopment as a
state in which specific quantitative variables are
descriptively to contrast with a state of (industr
development, "...to generate economic development,
must impose upon the society shocks that are large
alter its behavioral patterns significantly..." (p
The purposes for rendering such "shocks" are
rationalized as economic development. My effort is directed
toward the study of how these ostensibly economic ends have
been incorported into policies supported by the following
social referents:
Regulation of social life by means of new belief
systems promoted as matters of scientific fact through:
- The conversion of human effort and talent
formerly directed toward community into a merit
driven system of individual rights to property;
- The disengagement of the individual from
community life through the deployment of external
institutions to supplant traditionally reciprocal
and local patterns of interaction;
- The disparagement of local knowledge by
transposing an alternative, purportedly "superior"
system of knowledge production.
* Ascription of social regulatory authority to
scientifically trained specialists through:
- The arrogation of the political function from
the realm of local public discourse over questions
of value to the realm of public administration;
- The introduction of diverse extensions of the
state and private enterprise into the mainstream
of community life;
- The reorientation of productive activity from
subsistence to specialization for external
commerce
;
used
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The assumption of increasing responsibility for
social integration of the young by the state.
* Provision of an instrumental means to rationally plan
social change that accounts for cultural difference.
In the next chapter, I examine how these socio-economic
rationales have been translated into the basic components of
America's developmental ideology.
CHAPTER IV
THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF AMERICA'S DEVELOPMENTAL IDEOLOGY:
THE ELEMENTS OF A CRITICAL FRAMEWORK
this chaptGr I covGr thrGG avGnuGs of IntGrGst.
First, I GxaminG thG social factors at work in the United
States to reduce the concept of ideology to a matter of
political doctrine. I investigate how this reduction was
due in part to the failure of twentieth century American
sociologists to deal adequately with the the proposition
that scientific knowledge could be socially produced. I
focus on the historical factors that contributed to the
"split" of ideology from the field of social science. The
first section ends with a look at how sociology has been
appropriated into the service of the American state, with
consequences for the production and management of
development policy.
Second, I investigate the relationships between this
enfeebled concept of ideology and the production of
development theory. I focus on the language of development
as a representation and refinement of what has been called
"policy science." And third, I introduce the basic
components of a critical framework for the ensuing
investigation of the ideology behind state policy in
education
.
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The concern of the chapter as a whole is to explore the
epistemological foundations of the scientific backing for
the mobilization of U. S. development policy. The
rationales for development policy identified in the previous
chapter originate in certain knowledge production practices.
The socio-his torical referents of the economic and political
practices are reflected on in critical terms.
Delegitimizing Ideology:
The Purge of Social Science
Uncovering Ideology in Social Policy
The investigation of ideology is a paradoxical endeavor
primarily because the object of study — ideology -- is
contrarily constitutive of the means for studying it. The
difficulty involved in analyzing ideology stems from the
fact that the means available to undertake such an analysis
originate in the self-same ideology. The world within which
ideology is produced also produces the methods by which we
have come to know the world. Not only is knowledge
constructed socially, as Berger and Luckmann (1966) pointed
out , ^ ideology circumscribes the space in which knowledge is
produced
.
This apparent paradox reminds me of an exchange I once
saw between a meddlesome tourist and a copra factory worker
on an island in the South Pacific. Interrupting her deft
maneuvers in extracting the white copra from its inner
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shell, the tourist asked the easiest way to open a coconut
fresh off the tree. After some hesitation, she replied
rather tersely, "From the inside."
Both knowledge and mind are constituted socially.
One's personal history is a collective assimilation of modes
of thought acquired throughout life in a social setting.
The tendency to reimpose these modes of thought to regulate
one s reality is a part of one's social inheritance and
being (Weick, 1977, pp. 267-300), one's identity in the
world. The social effect is to reproduce the world as a
reenactment of one's personal history. While Weick'
s
concern was more with the individual processes of
organizational reproduction, it nonetheless illustrates in
microcosm the social basis on which our concepts about
society have been conditioned. My general interest in this
section is with ideology as a concept both derived from and
constitutive of the composite of social relations within
which our world has been made.
The study of ideology is therefore a potentially self-
deceptive exercise. Ideology tends to reproduce social
relations without exposing them. It is ironically most
effective when it is least evident. For precisely this
reason, it is necessary to establish a critical vantage
point from which to study ideology. Otherwise, the risk
would be to reproduce current misunderstanding in new
dressing, but without new insight.
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Below, I begin with a review of historical factors that
have conditioned the insertion of ideology into the means we
have developed to understand the social world. Although the
stance on which I undertake this review assumes a
materialistic basis for social organization, I accept the
power of language to influence the social order. Immediate
references to the mode of production are highly complex and
extremely difficult to draw. For the sake of critical
reflection, I start from the point that all our ideas arise
from the social conditions in which we live. In this view,
mind does not develop in a vacuum. Ideas do not beget ideas
in a stream of conscious development divorced from the real
conditions of life. The study of history consequently
cannot be reduced to a review of particular streams of ideas
as if they autonomously gave rise to rather than resulted
from the social conditions under which they were produced.
The Historical Backcloth
The concern I had in the previous chapter was to raise
several theoretical issues about the social foundations of
knowledge in the positivist tradition. To this end, I
touched upon key historical junctures in the development of
social science, beginning with Francis Bacon and proceeding
summarily through Comte, Mill, Weber, and Parsons. I
identified instances in which the production of knowledge
was advanced as a result of fundamental assumptions made
about the nature of reality, science, human nature, and
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society. I also reviewed the historical trend to reduce
what had been matters of social relations to empirical rules
of economy. In this vein, I traced the main exemplars of
political economy in the British tradition, including Smith,
Malthus, Ricardo, and finally John Maynard Keynes, who
represented various stages in the advancement of the science
of economics and its integration into the socio-political
sphere of life.
Theorizing Ideology:
American Sociology Prior to 1960
Ideology as an object of study was almost entirely
absent from the American scene in the first third of this
2century. It was not until Robert Merton (1957, p. 457)
addressed critical remarks on Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia
(1946) in 1949 that American sociologists directed their
attention to the new concept of "the sociology of
knowledge." Merton reacted strongly to the
'functionalization of knowledge" he saw represented in
Mannheim's work. According to Merton, the dilemma inherent
in accepting the validity of the concept of a "sociology of
knowledge" was that the search for knowledge should be
rationally governed by universal grounds for truth and
validation. The danger with recognizing knowledge as a
socially produced activity undertaken to advance the
interests of special groups or classes was that it dispelled
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the certainty with which the social world could be known.
Truth-seeking should not be a relative enterprise. Truth
could be known and explained universally.
Mid-century America needed to rely on the practical,
utilitarian approach to understanding social problems
advanced by its new breed of pragmatic social scientists.
Brains and social planning were viewed to be instrumental to
America's recovery from the upheaval wrought by the Great
Depression, the Second World War, and the new threat of
communist expansion. To America's new breed of applied
sociologists, the idea that knowledge could be generated
socially was part of a remote, basically European,
idealist/materialist debate that arose at the inspiration of
Marx to counter the dominance of Hegel's spirit in German
social thought. The more immediate needs of a once moribund
and a still vulnerable socio-economic system had to be
addressed in practical terms.
The frame of socio-economic analysis advanced by
Talcott Parsons, for example, provided for "structural
functionalist norms" and a "central value system" (Hall,
1978, p. 9) far more suitable for America's immediate needs
to build a model society in an age of optimism. Even within
the ranks of the American socialist movement, Dittberner
(1979, pp. 6-7) noted that the notion of "ideology" was
treated with no more than lip-service, the overriding
concern instead necessitated by the practical needs for
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tangible results in the areas of political organizing and
the labor movement.^
American sociology responded accordingly. Bierstedt
(1981) noted that ten of the key figures (namely, Sumner,
Ward, Znaniecki, Ross, Maciver, Cooley, Sorokin, Lundberg,
and Merton) instrumental to the development of American
twentieth century sociology adopted Spencer's views of
society. Spencer had argued that society could be analyzed
as a totality of component elements which interacted in
accordance with discernible objective laws in an
evolutionary scheme (pp. 491-492). It was the business of
sociology to develop various means to investigate through
cause and effect analysis the functionally interactive
elements of American society. The structural-functionalist
approach, as it came to be called, was modeled on the same
model used to study natural phenomena.
Overall, the main concern of the American community of
sociologists was the establishment of a scientific
discipline for the analysis of society. While some
variation of approach and emphasis was evident, the common
aim was to elevate the status of sociology to a level of
legitimacy recognized as one among the other sciences. The
elevation effort was enhanced by the incorporation of
methods, assumptions, and principles generally accepted for
use by the natural sciences.'^
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Burrell and Morgan (1979, pp. 42-43) noted a tenet
central to the study of society in the structural-functional
mode. American sociologists were prone to adopt the
biological metaphor wherein society was viewed as a super-
organism with its constituent elements tending toward
functional cohesion. Having originated with Spencer, the
biological metaphor had contributed to Durkheim's concept of
the "collective life" (1938, pp . 97-112), whose component
elements could be studied under the rules of causation.
While Durkheim did not feature prominently per se in the
development of American sociology, his basic rules of method
laid the foundation for an objective, cause and effect,
evolutionary investigative practice that helped distinguish
the science of society from the science of the individual,
that is, from psychology. He gave precedence to what could
be called a "universal flow of social development" outside
the realm of human will where conflict was seen as an
internal, temporary phenomenon anomalous to the overarching
tendency toward social cohesion. This supposition, as much
as any other, was appropriated into the mainstream of the
pragmatically oriented American sociology which predominates
to this day. The subsequent contributions of the American
sociologists mentioned above were cast within this cohesive,
incremental, conflict-as-pathology mold.
It is small wonder that Mannheim's vision of the social
roots of knowledge formation was received with such
hostility in the company of American social scientists whose
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chief concern was with the establishment of a firm bedding
of knowledge production in a potentially tumultous social
climate (Bierstedt, 1981. pp. 11-12). The very idea that
the products of disciplined reason could be subjected to the
social forces at work in a specific historical epoch was
Viewed as defiance of the ascendancy and the influence of
the new science of society. Dittberner's (1979, pp. 21-40)
survey of the reaction among different members of the
American scholarly community is notable for the consistency
with which Mannheim's notion of attributing class or group
Interest as instrumental to the knowledge production process
was attacked as a relativistic enterprise without scientific
basis. Merton's summation is typical:
. •
.
[Mannheim s] theory of ideology is primarily
concerned with discrediting an adversary, a tout prix,
and Ls but remotely concerned with reaching valid
art iculated knowledge of the subject matter in hand.
It is polemical, aiming to dissipate rival points of
view. It is implicitly ant i-intellectualistic
. It
would establish truth by fiat, by sheer politicaldomination if necessary. It seeks assent, irrespective
of the grounds for acceptance. It is akin to rhetoric
rather than to science ... (Merton
,
1957, pp. 493-494)
Merton's project, to the contrary, was directed toward
the recognition of pluralistic sources and types of
knowledge within a universal scheme of proof outside the
specific circumstances of history. To this end, he
conceived a "scientific ethos" (pp. 552-556) whose purpose
was "...the extension of certified knowledge...," a process
of investigation guided by four sets of institit ional
imperatives: "universalism,
"
"communism" (a term referring
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to membership in a scientific community to which scholars
contributed for the public good), "disinterestedness," and
"organized skepticism" (pp. 553-559). Merton's refutation,
however, did not so much address the epistemological issues
raised by Mannheim as it attempted to further the cause of
the American version of sociology. He did so by attacking
Mannheim s own attempt to "transcend" (Dittberner, 1979, p.
71) the charge of relativism through a concept Mannheim
called relationism, " which was itself an effort to claim
validity through testing the researcher's view of the object
of study.
This debate was indicative of the importance placed by
American scholars on their project to establish a scientific
orthodoxy by disengaging the study of society from the realm
of political struggle. The lengths to which they went to
consign the subject of ideology to a safe, explicable space
by opposing it to their science can be seen in "the
functionalization of thought" characteristic of the rise of
organization^ and communications theory which, according to
Dittberner (pp. 73-74), may have had the effect of
"absorbing" concepts like the "sociology of knowledge" into
a totality manageable within the confines of the structural-
functionalist paradigm. The overall effect of the
absorption was to remove the subject of ideology from the
agenda of science.
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The problem that emerged, however, was what to do with
Lt. It was not going to fade away. The critical theorists
of the relocated Frankfurt School, ^ for instance, as well as
other European scholars, had been engaged in the project of
redefining the concept of ideology in terms outside the
quiet enclave to which it had been pigeonholed by America's
sociologists. I do not mean the topic was ignored on the
American scene by any means. How ideology instead was
relegated to the domain of politics is a subject of great
importance to the scient ization of early development theory
in America.
The Impact of the Cold War
and the Appropriation of Ideology
Beginning with the decade of the fifties, the study of
the role of ideology took place within the parameters of the
Cold War. Treatment on the subject by American scholars
tended to confine itself to a view where one's "ideology"
designated one's political place within the social fabric.
The question of how the existence of that place may have
derived from a larger socially determined process was for
the most part neglected. In the late forties and continuing
through the fifties, a series of international conferences
were held, which had an overall effect of sharpening the
political contrasts between the two ideological systems of
totalitarian communism and free world capitalism,
particularly as they related to the interests of scholars.^
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The argument advanced by American sociologists was that
the domestic utility of the concept of ideology had
dissipated in the modern industrialized state. Ideology's
principal role in the future, they argued, should be
redirected to the struggle for influence in the developing
nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The dissipation
thesis featured prominently in the independent declarations
of two eminent liberal sociologists of the period, Seymour
Martin Lipset (1960) and Daniel Bell (1962). Each concluded
that the heretofore "ideological" aspects of the struggle
for economic and political influence in the United States
and other industrialized democratic nations had, in effect,
been institutionalized" within the legitimate scope of the
American social setting. In this setting, contending
parties subscribed to a basic consensus on the exercise and
disposition of their conflicting interests. The pragmatic
orientation of the liberal view was evident in the
enlightened self-interest theme they argued should be
pursued as a matter of national policy among the developing
nations. Lipset saw ideology playing a major role in the
struggle to win over hearts and minds:
...Ideology and passion may no longer be necessary to
sustain the class struggle within stable and affluent
democracies, but they are clearly needed in the
international effort to develop free political and
economic institutions in the rest of the
world ... (Lipset
,
1960, p. 417)°
Bell, on the other hand, confined his view of ideology
to narrower terms, particularly with respect to the role
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sociology would play in development by providing the
to deal with the question of:
means
... ow, within the framework of freedom, to Increasethe llving standards of the majority of people 90^31the same time maintain or raise culturallevels.
.. (Bell, 1962, p. 38)
The uplifting process in Bell's way of thinking would
be aimed at transforming the total, doctrinaire conception
of ideology into the more "parochial" model deployed by
"Russia and China" as a domestic call to action toward
economic development (p. 403). Such a reorientation of the
term would mean dispensing with the "universalis tic" aspects
of equality and freedom" promoted on a world scale, as
these and other ideological notions were clearly detrimental
forces in what he viewed as the very practical struggle to
elevate the human race. The problem was historical in the
sense that total ideologies of the past tended to simplify,
distort, and inflame the passions much as a "secularized
religion. ' The question of development then would involve
building democratic institutions for the economic
transformation of societies. Such a process would employ a
kind of empirical ladder" by which the target, means,
costs, and actors would be specified as sub-elements of a
more general systematic approach to the rational planning
and orientation of a new society.
The "end of ideology" debate in one sense signified the
successful reification of its meaning into the domain of
political struggle. Reified as international politics, the
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American version of ideology took on a politically neutral
shape as a nuts-and-bolts predilection for the pragmatic.
So concealed, it was free to be reinsinuated into U. S.
policy toward the Third World as an emergent apolitical
science of development. The main features of its
insinuation can be distinguished in the sixties, a topic 1
will pursue after completing the task of establishing a
vantage point outside the confines of the ideology to
American sociology has been subject.
The review of ideology in America I have pursued up to
this point was done to distinguish the historical referents
involved in splitting the concept of ideology from the
practice of sociology. American sociology's exemplars and
liberal critics succeeded in appropriating a positivistic
version of social science, one that tended to conceal its
ideological roots. The problem of critically reflecting on
that appropriation process and its implications was left to
sociologists of a different orientation. Their work laid
the ground for study of how a sanitized rendering of
sociology came to be incorporated into development science.
The Critique of Development Science
\/hatever can be said of ideology, its expression is
mediated through language. Ideology does not exist apart
from language. While particular social systems are
characterized by their own social relations, ideology
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designates, according to Thompson, "...the complex ways in
which meaning is mobilized for the maintenance of relations
of domination..." (Thompson, 1984, p. 5). The study of
ideology in its concrete manifestations must therefore deal
^ith the question of how language mobilizes meaning so as t
sustain or further forms of social domination.
A logical place to begin is with the expressions of the
actors involved in making and justifying educational policy.
Policy is produced in the effort to put theory into
practice. As an agency of the American state, AID enacts
policy as a representation of the concrete analyses,
conclusions, and prescriptions that result from the
deliberations of its policy level staff in reading and
responding to the interests of its diverse audiences:
administrators and leaders of the Third World, the American
Congress and public, professionals in the field, and its own
view of its mission. The policy production process is not
straightforward. It takes place in a world of competing
interests. AID's educational policies are therefore set so
as to reflect what appears to be commonly held rationales
amongst intersecting forces and events that are neither
congruent nor compatible.
101
Ideology and the Production of Texts
Marx and the Study of Language
The path between the concrete expression of actors and
the material they have to work with is not linear. Marx saw
the problem of the interaction between material history and
the expression of idea as one fraught with contradiction:
it
history, but they do not makeI just as they please; they do not make it underircumstances chosen by themselves, but under
circumstances directly found, given and transmittedfrom the past.^ The tradition of all the deadgenerations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of theliving (1978 [1852], p. 595)
Marx sought to counteract the heavy spiritual legacy left by
Hegel and his critics by reversing the conviction that human
affairs were ruled by ideas. He sought to deal with
"...real, active men and on the basis of their real life-
process ... demons trate the development of the ideological
reflexes and echoes of this life process..." (1978 [1846],
p. 154). He went on to emphasize the primacy of the
material roots of productive life:
...Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of
ideology and their corresponding forms of
consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of
independence. They have no history, no development;
but men, developing their material production and their
material intercourse, alter, along with this their real
existence, their thinking and the products of their
thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but
consciousness by life .... (Marx
,
1978, [1846] pp . 154-
The mere tracing of material roots, however, is a
highly complex undertaking, for the power of ideas is felt
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throughout society,
interests:
which is organized to further class
ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch
which is the ru??nE
society, is at the same time its
^
ruling intellect force. The class which hL tL
control
production at its disposal, has
production so that thereby, generally speaking the
arrsuMect°?o it° productione subject t ... Insofar
,
therefore, as they rule asdetermine the extent and compass of anepoch. It IS self-evident that they do this in itswhole range, hence among other things rule also asthinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate theproduction and distribution of the ideas of their age:thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the
epoch.. (Marx, 1978, pp . 172-173 [emphasis in
original]) ^
What Marx began to address was the complexity of the
interconnections between material reality and its expression
in language. It is a project unfinished (Hall, 1978, p.
28), as It were, left for the interpretation of followers in
the critical tradition, several of whom were interested to
develop an objective means to unravel the knot of reality as
a socio-material construction with its correspondent
relations of domination. The unresolved problem noted by
Hall that haunts the materialist project to this day is the
tendency for such objective analytical approaches to
"collapse back" unwittingly into some form of structural
idealism, leaving the whole field of a materialist theory of
ideology itself "under-developed" (p. 28).
Thompson's (1984) interest is to avoid the pitfall of
the "idealist collapse" by exploring the means through which
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language may itself be materially constitutive of social
reality. His sense is that Marx's notion of material
ac tivity alone being determinant of ideological constructs
was wrong (p. 37). While he rightly attributed the origins
of social change to changes in the mode of production of
material life, Marx failed to address the fact that the mode
is forever mediated through language, which provides the
domain within which ideology works. In this line of
thinking, language plays a formative role in the production
of consciousness. Language does not merely reflect a
reality that underlies it - it actually provides the "deep
structure" for its creation.
This leaves open the question of how the creative act
is conceived possible. Marx's thesis of the dominant
ideology being simply the ideology of the ruling class, that
is to say, a ...pure reflection of the conditions of life
and the world conceptions of that class..." (McDonough,
1978, p. 40), does not so much circumscribe the role of the
subject, the utterer
,
in creating history; it paradoxically
necessitates it:
The chief defect of all hitherto existing
materialism - that of Feurbach included - is that the
thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the
form of the object or of contemplation
,
but not as
human sensuous activity, practice
,
not subjectively. .
.
The materialist doctrine that men are products of
circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore,
changed men are products of other circumstances and
changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change
circumstances and that it is essential to educate the
educator himself .... (Marx
,
1978 [1845], p. 144
[emphasis in original])
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Marx's thesis brings up the crux of the difficulty in
analyzing the role of ideology in the formation of the
American consciousness. Eyerman (1981) noted that "...in
American society
...' false consciousness' seems so wide-
spread that it appears as a normal state of existence. And
ideology', far from being super- imposed through various
types of 'superstructural apparatus', is part and parcel of
societal praxis..." (p. 12). Ideology itself serves as a
constitutive element that necessitates
, in Eyerman 's terms,
the false cognition that one's ideas of the world can emerge
apart from one's experience through "collective human
activity" (p. 13). Human beings use language to express
their knowledge about the world and in that process they
objectify their reality. This objectification, when
engaged in collectively, forms the basis for social life.
Using Thompson s (1984) definition, ideology is then the
study of the composite of those relations in which
domination of class, sex, and other interests is sustained.
The study of ideology must therefore involve how
consciousness is produced to obscure real social realtions.
The Language of America's Developmental Consciousness:
The Ideology of Modernity and Economic Expansion
In the first chapter I was concerned to review the
public argumentation made in support of foreign assistance.
Within the general context of the Cold War, I distilled the
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arguments into four ideological subgroups: protect ionistic
(military) interven tionism, obligatory economic
-—
L
^^'^^^tionism
,
—
p^olitical st abilization toward modernity.
and institutiona l restructuration through social
engineering
. In this section I examine how the language of
development has been produced with a view to both obscure
and realize this ideological ensemble. Three questions
guide my inquiry: What is the language of modernity and
economic growth consciousness that has been used to guide
American international development policy? In what sense do
modernity and growth consciousness relate to a developmental
ideology? What are the material roots of this ideology?
The Language of Modernity
The principal rationales of the language of modernity
can be distinguished both in the exegeses of its major
exponents and in its social referents. Collectively, the
rationales compose the ideology out of which the production
of developmental texts is made possible.
The notion of modernity made its appearance on the
development scene in Lerner's seminal work of 1958, The
Passing of Traditional Society . In this work, Lerner
introduced the concept of "systemic balance" as an ideal
condition toward which all societies evolve, the conditions
made up of a constellation of "common compulsions" toward
which key members of societies in transition feel the
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impulse to move (Lerner, 1958, p. 77). Movement on a
societal scale is attributed to a growing transition-minded
group of key actors whose collective energy is thought to
uplift society out of its traditional orientation and move
towards a new, modern outlook. The social is interwoven
with the psychological in that the group of "transitionals ,
"
by adopting a new set of attitudes and behaviors,
"modernizes" the whole society.
Lerner suggested four basic indices of modernity, with
descriptive features - by definition - extrapolated from
western, primarily American, society as the prototypical
model "...that ...reappear in virtually all modernizing
societies on all continents of the world, regardless of
variations in race, color, creed..." (p. 46):
* Urban iz at ion is a term characteristic of
industrialization where rural populations migrate to
the cities for jobs in factories or peripheral
activities. This "phase" (p. 61) of the modernization
process creates the need for its sequel, literacy.
* Literacy is designated as a need arising from new
concentrations of population who demand more impersonal
means of communication for consumption and production
purposes. This demand eventuates into "...all sorts of
new desires ... and the means of satisfying them" (p.
62) .
* Media Participation denotes the phase of
modernization in which participation in all sectors of
social life increases - the economic and social
included. Participation signifies a general consensus
in which the definition of the "Self" changes from a
"constrictive" model to an "empathetic" one (p. 72).
* The notion of " social empathy " is noteworthy because
it is central to the developmental scheme. The concept
is psycho-social to the extent that it signifies a
"readiness" of the general population to adopt the more
impersonal features of modern life as normal.
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The public broadcast media open a space in which the
new individual is able to place herself into the heretofore
social-imaginary world of desire, a world not yet
experienced, but held enticingly out as attainable given the
right combination of social behaviors and attitudes. This
juxtapositioning of media with a reorientation of the self
IS fundamental to the rationalization of development.
Others concerned with adding substance to the
reorientation sought to define in more explicit terms just
what it was the media, as well as other modern institutions
of communication, were supposed to portray. That definition
was provided by Inkeles and Smith (1974), who noted twelve
qualities necessary for modern citizenship, including
openness to new experience, readiness for social change,
disposition to acquire facts and information, orientation to
the future, belief in personal efficacy, use of planning,
calculability or trust in institutions, distributive
justice, value of technical skill, aspiration for education
and work, respect for dignity of others, and understanding
of the factory production process (pp. 20-24).
The individual model of modernity is complemented by
the institutional, where a dynamic interaction between the
two is thought to result in the dissipation of traditionally
parochial relations and the growth of new organizations to
regulate the transactions of a modern political economy.
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What resulted in fact was a huge proliferation of
prescriptive research on such topics as institutional
development, innovation diffusion (e.g., Rogers, 1971 )
community development, organization analysis and
development, leadership training, technical assistance,
development administration, costs and benefits, linkages
»
Havelock, 1971)
,
and strategies for change.
An important benchmark in this proliferation of new
material was the AID-sponsored digest on institutional
development compiled by Melvin Blase in 1973. Blase’s work
included the most current thinking that defined the scope,
substance, and vehicles for the deployment of technical
assistance in use up to that day. Works that appeared later
in the seventies (e.g., Lindquist, 1978; Hall and Loucks
,
1978) focused more specifically on environmental factors
that influenced the institutionalization process. One
common element in the language of institutionalizing
innovations was the recognition that the right experts
applying the right methods comprised a positive force for
development. Esman's (1972) summary of this perspective
illustrates this point best:
The IB [Institution Building] perspective posits
purposeful social innovation induceci by change-oriented
elites who work through formal organizations. Their
objective is to build viable and effective
organizations which develop support and
complementarities in their environment. This support
permits the innovations to take root, gain acceptance,
become normative and thus institutionalized in
society . . .
.
(p . 21
)
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His later summary is more to the point: "The IB model is an
elitist theory with an explicit social engineering bias.
Changes occur from the top down, not from the bottom up..."
(p. 26). In this line of thinking, Esman refers to several
"theory-related perspectives on social change" (pp. 24-25):
* Development is a process that Involves theintroduction of (technological) innovations in adeliberate manner.
^ The development
by those who see
change
.
process is both in
ersonal and social
tiated and guided
benefit in planned
* Inducing innovations requires the creation and/or
adaptation of formal organizations which serve to
support the institutionalization process.
* result desired is the inducement of changethrough networks in the wider environment so that
will be valued for their own sake (Friedland,
19b9, p . 75)
.
This latter point on the wider society is of course
more overtly political, an observation addressed directly by
Samuel P. Huntington's (1968) effort to differentiate
between the decaying" effects of rapid modernization and
the resultant need to develop the political institutional
framework to control sustained economic growth within a
stable environment. In this view, economic growth did not
so much stabilize as destabilize traditional socio-political
systems (pp. 49-53). The problems thought to be caused by
the rapid pace of modernization necessitated deliberate
political intervention on a society-wide scale (p. 46).
The proliferation of material on development since the
1960s can be traced to several more basic theoretical
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premises advanced by the major exponents of "social
engineering ever since Weber concerned himself with the
task of bureaucracy and the rationalization of social forms
Beginning with Weber, I extract the most basic rationales
for the conflation of social and economic science into the
institutionalization model that has been deployed by the
United States in the Third World.
The Language of Economic Growth
The economic rationales for development covered in
Chapters I and II gave birth to a host of functionalist
approaches to solve the problems of the transition to
modernity that are cast within a mold of stabilization.
Changing economic factors are viewed to be the underlying
cause of the deterioration of traditional institutional
forms for maintaining order. The overarching conception is
that social change can be accommodated within a new
framework of a system of interdependent functions. Weber's
contribution to this conception was essentially to classify
economic behavior according to a rational scheme whereby
human wants were mediated within appropriate institutional
forms (Weber, 1947, pp. 158-323). His central concern was
to lend the principle of rational discipline to all spheres
of collective human endeavor, particularly the economic.
Wilson's (1977) recent study of the American ideology
emphasizes the primacy of Weber's search for "calculability
Ill
and predictability" as the guiding tenets of life, with
capitalism as its chief motivating force and bureaucracy as
its ideal form of social organization (p. 146). Weber used
sociology as the final ideal point of reference to guide the
social enterprise. He raised the rationality of sociology
to the level of supreme exemplar to which all forms of human
activity were subject. Events outside this calculus were
relegated the status of value, that is, to non-fact. The
individual as a knowing subject capable of analyzing his
position reflectively and taking action outside the
sociological frame of reference was left as anomie in an
otherwise objectively determined order.
The economic forms were those that, while coeval with
capitalism, were independent of it in that they represented
the rationalization of the social in its entirety :
Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world
and to work out its ideals in the world, material goods
ave gained an increasing and finally an inexorablepower over the lives of men as at no previous period in
Today the spirit of religious asceticism -
whether finally, who knows? - has escaped from the
cage. But victorious capitalism, since it rests on
mechanical foundations, needs its support no
longer (Weber, 1958, pp . 181-182)
The forms themselves were those generic to the free market
economy. from the production and coinage of money, to
credit, accounting, profit making, the division of labor,
the conduct of commerce, the expropriation of the worker
from the means of production, and the numerous other,
primarily empirical, observations made by Weber on the
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workings of modern industrial capitalism. Throughout his
analysis, Weber was concerned to Induce the ideal forms for
the functioning of relationships within the capitalist mode
of production and to hold them up as a compelling spirit of
rationality that governed individual behavior. The concrete
manifestation of that spirit was bureaucracy, or, in Weber's
preferred terminology, the several types of "corporate
groups" he identified as the regulatory institutions
governing economic intercourse (Weber, 1947, pp. 171 - 173 ).
What Weber accomplished was to provide the conceptual
scheme whereby the private interests of those holding
economic and political power were rationalized. His scheme
in effect subordinated the individual subject to the asylum
of the irrational, thereby delegitimizing contrary action as
anomalistic. Rationalization in reality meant formalization
of an authority structure, usually hierarchical in nature,
that was accorded legitimacy either by its own members or by
the members of a higher authority to command the obedience
^ts lower status members within the framework of an
impersonal, impartial set of rules (pp. 328-341). This
system gave rise to a host of related activities: the
production of codes of office, descriptions of function and
limits of authority, individual rights of appeal, training
of staff, technical expertise as career associated with the
functions of a specific office, and so forth. Permeating
the scheme at the level of society was the system of
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interaction between bureaucracy and social class, whereby
the former tended to "level" (p . 340 ) the latter by reducing
instances of the historical ascription of privilege.
Weber's sociology served as the ideological antecedent
for two subsequent developments. The first derived
immediately from the products of his work: The capitalistic
forms of organization he classified were later incorporated
into a totality to describe and explain social change as a
moment within the natural evolution of societies. I proceed
to the economic features of that process below. The second
IS less immediately obvious, but more illustrative of the
deception involved in the transposition of the rational
mentality that lies at the core of America's developmental
ideology: The significance of Weber's contribution is that
It provided the imaginary space within which development
could be theorized. While I treat that subject in detail in
the final section of this chapter, particularly with
reference to its major theoretical exponent Talcott Parsons,
suffice it to say at this point, that the idea of
development presupposes that technical knowledge can be
applied to the regulation of human behavior for development.
Toward this end, the diversity characteristic of traditional
cultural life is exorcised at the cutting edge of science,
which turns the individual into an instrumental object in
the service of the economy.
;^e Language of Economic Development
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The light In which my analysis of the function of Che
ideology undergirding development economics was cast by
Ronald Meek (1967) when he observed that schools of economic
thought arise in response to the real conditions and
problems faced in their respective historical periods. The
propensity for error increases, he said, to the extent that
a particular theory of economics is "extracted" from its own
historical circumstances and used to explain or predict
events in others (p. 15). This point is central to the
analysis of development programming, as this kind of
transposition process is the driving force for its
economics. Ultimately, the transposition process attempts
either to contravene or collapse history. Development
theorists are predisposed to insist on the deployment of a
preferred version of economic modeling as integral to
economic development.
The problem inherent in modeling of any sort is
inescapably ideological. The process usually entails a
...curious admixture of syntactical apriorism (elaboration
of f^3.meworks) and semantical empiricism (the frameworks
grasp the 'real world')..." (Preston, 1985, p. 75). The
model that dominated the policy of the sixties was the one
that posited, in a neoclassical mold, the causal
relationship between capital accumulation, savings, and
investment. Known as the Harrod-Domar model of economic
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growth, the model was Incorporated Into the five stages of
growth scheme advanced by W. W. Rostov (1964), where the
"sweep of modern history" was portrayed as a series of
successive developments on the road to the final stage of
the society of "mass consumers" (pp. 4-9). 10 It followed
logically that at a particular stage of development, certain
interventions could be made to accelerate the process toward
economic "take-off" and beyond. The problem then became one
of applying the correct analytical procedure to determine
the extant condition of a particular society's economy,
thence to inject the correct "admixture" of Ingredients to
produce the desired results. The organismic metaphor was
preeminent as social and individual development paralleled
one another closely.
The organismic metaphor was realized as a compression
of economics and sociology into development policy. In
fact, it was an ideological construct concealed as science
and logic, the conceptual origins of which stemmed directly
from Weber. Rostow, referring to his stages of growth
theory, simply extended the applicability of Weber's
analytical frame as social scientific fact:
These stages are not merely descriptive. They are
not merely a way of generalizing certain factual
observations about the sequence of development of
modern societies. They have an inner logic and
continuity. They have an analytic bone-structure,
rooted in a dynamic theory of production
, (pp . 12-13
[emphasis addedj)
If is the case, then the stages concept presumes to stand as
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truth as we are consciously able to comprehend it. And if
it enjoys such standing, then its application is justified
£rima facie , and those so engaged spread its truth. This is
what I mean by recourse to the rationale of the absolute.
The authority of science is invoked to support the analysis
of development problems.
As an incontrovertible premise of economic development,
Rostow's empirical observation is raised to a level of
internal logic. It is extracted from the real world of
actual social conditions and postulated as deductive truth
impelled neither by the momentum of history nor material
circumstance, but instead by scientific reason . In this
of thought, the American economic model is not subject
to the pecuniary interests of class or individual. It is
representative of reason itself, with the order of society
being subject to it and not the reverse. The material
conditions in which the developmental variations of the
model were born have not changed so much as they have been
laundered, canonized, legitimated by economic science for
transplantation in refined forms as model reconstructions.
Research in diffusionist models is thus rendered appropriate
for the economic regulation of "backward societies." At the
same time, the real material determinants that drive the
predominant society and its component interests is
conveniently concealed.
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In accordance with these determinants, the language of
economic science serves a dual function. First, it unifies
the related members of the community of development
theorists and practitioners into a constituent element of
the social totality within which they function. They make
their living within the dictates of a technocratic society
much as the rest of us. Second, the language serves the
ideological purpose of defining the imaginary space in which
development theory can be produced. In this sense it
provides the rational structure for the mobilization of
economic resources and interests to be brought to bear on
the Third World. The language of economic development is
t ized and as such bears the stamp of universal
validity to determine the content and substance of policy
initiative (Katouzian, 1980, pp. 166-172).
In addition, several tenets of export capitalism can be
traced to "[the] general tendency towards abstraction from
the relations between men in production...," which
development economist Joseph Schumpeter argued was
"scientifically justified" (Meek, 1967, pp. 205-206).
Schumpeter's (1954) review of economic analysis echoed
Weber's tone of regret for the inevitable mastery of ideas
over the conduct of human affairs. I say "regret" because
each in his own way yielded reluctantly to the self-
generated sway they accorded to the compelling logic of
capitalism, whether the logic was to do itself in by the
weight of its own "matter of factness," as Schumpeter
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concluded (1962 nn jtpp. ipi-i42), or, sadly, to ensnare all
individuality into its "iron cage" (Weber, 1957).
Schumpeter's work is of interest because he furthered
the advance of development as an economic science which was
capable of dealing with technology and the social setting.
While he saw the overall goal of economic development as a
matter of increasing the rate of production, a concern he
shared with other growth theorists, he stressed that
technological and social changes were necessary to stimulate
an increase in the rate of growth (Adelman, 1961, pp . 94-
98). In this calculus, the other factors of production,
namely available capital, qualified labor, and exploitable
natural resources, were either exogenous or neutral in an
equilibrium state economy. Consequently, the inducement of
posit ive economic changes into a socio-cultural setting
depended on the introduction of discontinuities, namely
innovations, into the current state of technological
relations. The process of innovation, however, depended on
the one feature of nascent capitalism that appeared to
atrophy in highly industrialized societies:
entrepreneurship. The pessimistic outlook that dominated
Schumpeter's analysis is a direct outgrowth of the inner
logic he attributed to the structure of capitalism, which
contained an institutional vulnerablility traceable to two
generic imperatives: The rationalization of the small
entrepreneur out of existence (1962, p. 140); and the
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subjection of the institutions of "property and free
contracting" to the shadow of the enlarging corporate
edifice (pp. 141-142). The result was the removal of the
vibrant person from the "inner walls of the enterprise,"
from the "life centering, substantial grip" of tangible
property to the remote background of "shareholding" (p
.
142), a massive default to the lackluster professional
stewardship of corporate management and government
bureaucracy
.
Schumpeter succeeded in advancing the theory that
economic and social development were interrelated by an
empirical calculation that was determined by impersonal
logic, a logic that removed the notion of class from the
calculus of value. In Schumpeter's view, the subordination
of class from the central position assigned by Marx was made
possible by rejecting the labor theory of value and
replacing it with "the marginal utility theory" (Meek, 1967,
pp. 207-208). Meek noted the significance of this switch
as one that introduced an alternative causation into the
calculus of value where the relation between the commodity
and its consumer took precedence over the relation between
producers represented in the commodity as embodied labor.
The ideological nature of the switch was hidden by its
scientific logic, with an overarching effect to remove the
economic calculus out of the political realm and, so freed,
lay the theoretical foundation for development as a socio-
technical problem to be addre
120
ssed by the state, not a
problem of class originating in the contradictions within
the mode of production. The materially based logic of the
regime of capital, in Heilbronner
' s (1985, pp . 53-77) words,
was thus obfuscated by its rational logic, the latter having
the effect of masking the class dominating imperatives of
the former. As the functions of the state in the regime of
capital are multivariate and pervasive, ^3 I focus below only
on those that have a direct bearing on the instrumentality
of its role in the extension of American interest in the
development of the Third World.
The imperatives of the regime of capital as a whole
serve to explain the way society should be constituted in
the abstract by the way it is constituted in actuality :
* First is the fundamental need to amass capital. The
drive to accumulate profit was symbolized by Marx (1977
[1867], pp . 198-220 8: pp . 247-257) as a continual cycle
where commodity is produced and exchanged for money, which
is then reconverted into commodity, the surplus value of
which in turn is extracted as profit by the owners of
capital in an inexorable process of expansion for its own
sake as its "...central historical task " (Heilbroner, 1985,
p. 77). The whole organization of society then is absorbed
into this cycle as facilitator, beneficiary, administrator,
insuring its smooth, efficient operation while concealing
the relations of domination embedded within it.
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Second, the immanent drive to accumulate wealth is
legitimated as individual right. I touched on this in the
second chapter in the exposition of Locke's central thesis
on property which has come to be interpreted in modern
capitalistic society as individual right to the unlimited
ownership of property (Tully, 1980, p. x) . Tully's point is
that Locke's original meaning was cast in the light of the
moral duty to dispose liberally of one's possessions to
others (pp. 175-176) and to use such property according to
the laws and intentions of God (pp . 72-73) . According to
Locke's axioms, human rights derived from both divine and
natural law. They included the right of possession of those
goods necessary for survival and enjoyment. His basic
conception of the right to property of any kind, however,
whether common or individuated (private)
,
was derived
neither from natural law nor the convention of political
society, but hinged on "...the performance of a social
function: to preserve mankind..." (p. 99). It is in this
frame of reference that the individual developed personhood,
a concept derived from conscious action as an extension of
the self into the world. The person therefore owned her
actions and, by extension, the fruits of those actions:
. . .With the transition from man as such to the human
agent, the moral analogue of the person and his action
is on stage to actualise the natural duties derived
from the conceptual model of God and His workmanship.
(Tully, p. 110)
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Counterposed to Locke's original intention is the
metamorphosis of the concept of private property into an
ends-motivated force for economic development. As the
capitalist mode of production took hold in Britain, the
concept was extricated from the context of personal
relationship stressed by Locke and inserted into the domain
of private acquisition framed in the line of Hobbes and
Smith. The idea of property as an extension of human
relationships was thus reified into the objects of personal
possession where things possessed were accepted as a sign of
prudent conduct in one's self-interest before God. Having
originated thusly in the Puritan work ethic, the concept of
self-interest was later converted into its economic
corollary where the successful "man of business" was viewed
as upholder of the public welfare, only to be attacked still
later as "insatiable exploiter" of labor when the concept of
"economic man" gained prominence in the industrial expansion
of the nineteenth century (Myers, 1983, pp . 12-27).
"Economic man" as the embodiment and executor of self-
interest was nonetheless sanctioned as the naturally
dictated prerequisite of development.
It is this concept of "economic man" that sits at the
heart of development theory exported by the United States
today. Its preeminent exemplars base their respective
prescriptions for economic development on one fundamental
principal: Economic expansion and how best to induce
1 S
conformity to its needs.
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^ Third, the drive to acquire wealth is realized within
the dictum of progress. The epitome of this reasoning in
the post war era was seen in the work of McClelland and
Winter (1969) and the line of behavioral psychologists who
hypothesized the relation between national development and
Its futherance by applying specific, ad hoc educational
inputs on a massive scale so as to raise the need to achieve
among a critical mass of the people. In this case, the
desire to acquire wealth, rather than being a motivator £er
was viewed as one among many possible measures of
achievement. The basic idea was that people's needs and
behavior can be shaped to effect their own economic
development
.
This idea of the individual's power to progress also
needed its own "guarantor." That guarantor took hold
through the metaphysical power ascribed to science. Preston
(1985, pp . 124-130) observes that the scientific guarantor
§^tned prominence within the community of eighteenth century
"enl ighteners , . .
. who took themselves to be the natural
governors of society through an equally natural alliance
with the rising bourgeoisie..." (p. 128). In the nineteenth
century, with the rise of industrialism, the idea of a
progressive society became intertwined with that of a
liberal (i.e., laissez faire ) economy , where the individual
is held up as prime mover. The individual in this reasoning
is accorded the power to pursue the maximization of his own
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utilities. Human desire is depicted as the paramount
nature motivator, vouchsafed by the political right of
unlimited accumulation (p. 134). The two main guarantors of
this right in today's economic development parlance are
economic and policy science in alliance with the principal
beneficiaries of the extant social order: international
investors, multi-national corporations, agencies of the
state, and the technical expertise they call on to advance
their interests in the Third World. The ideology, then, is
very much one that sanctions individual change managed from
above while it delegitlmlzes changes in the relative power
relationships determined by class. The ideology of the
absolute mastery of positivistic science was most succinctly
summed up by McClelland and Winter!
Scientific knowledge is the new God, the new
source of man s conviction that he has the competence
another sense, of course, it is a very
old God, a conviction that there are certain immutablelaws which exist outside of man in the Universe and
which, if known and obeyed, give man the power to shapehis destiny. (1969, pp. 377-378)
* Fourth, the development of institutional forms was
the concern of several theorists who believed that the right
mix of values necessary to effect change depended on a
prototypical organizational model. The preeminent exponent
this line of thinking was Gunnar Myrdal. Myrdal sought
to counter the "value free" philosophy of the policy
scientists of the sixties with an alternative. He promoted
the value of "world welfarism" as justification sufficient
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to Intervene in the effort to reshape old and build new
institutions for managing the development process as
humanely and equitably as possible. His institution-
building approach remains the inspirational centerpiece for
social transformation through education that is the focus of
this study.
I consider Myrdal critically in spite of the fact that
he, along with Dudley Seers, has been noted as one of
foreign aid's severest judges (e.g., Seers and Myrdal, 1982;
Myrdal, 1973, pp. 126-132). The point of his critique,
however, underscores the thrust of his original approach,
which involved the transference of a constellation of values
through efficient organizational management for development.
The cluster of rationales that guided Myrdal 's project was
stated by Paul Streeten in his introduction to Myrdal 's
Valuation in Social Theory (1958): How to account for the
necessity to exercise value judgment in the implementation
of social programs. The necessity to exercise value
judgment obligated the social theorist cum practitioner to
become critically aware of and to act in accordance with
standards of valuation which were to be applied in the
social program. The institutional focus was economic in the
sense that the "welfare state" was modelled as the composite
of means to effect a more just world (Myrdal, 1973, pp . 45-
48) .
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The role of the economist envisioned by Myrdal
contrasted with the inflexible macro-growth models that were
then, as now, being promoted on a world scale. His models
were thought to differ in that they were to be developed in
closer conjunction with the realities and "facts" of the
local situation (pp. 96-98). National and international
economic planning were to be integrated into a centralized
approach aimed to reform the domestic socio-economic
structure toward more egalitarian ends. Such reforms would
include programs to foster national consolidation,
redistribution of income, social welfare, industrialization,
agricultural productivity, land reform, population controls,
education, which included vocational training and literacy,
public health, and "social discipline" to counteract
corruption (pp. 101-118).
While he emphasized the need for such reforms to be
undertaken with local (i.e., national) initiative, Myrdal 's
call for a developmental ethic could be realized only under
the aegis of heavy foreign involvement. Expert advice,
training, technical assistance, and resources had to be
with the proper motives. However much he may have
regreted the fact such involvement eventuated as bilateral
aid, Myrdal laid the conceptual basis for the
"scient izat ion" of value as a transferable prerequisite of
development.^^ In this respect, the resemblance of his
reforms to orthodox empirical models is indisputable. In by
far the largest donor nation, the United States, whose
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motives he saw "mixed" at best, rationales for value
transfer took form as humanitarian arguments in support of
aid and the Peace Corps. The ideological position of
"expertise-guided social engineering," to paraphrase Preston
(1985), is nevertheless conveyed implicitly within an
tnterventlonistic mode. Development is viewed as being
either naturally determined, with the expert-as-facllitator,
or as one culture's common sense solution to the problems it
poses for another.
In sum, the language of development theory and practice
has grown exponentially, as refinements in several
professional fields continue to provide the basis of
research and application. As the proliferation of theories
is extensive, the production of development policy can be
analyzed as on essential moment in the scient ization
process. My purpose is to explore how the moment of
development science conceals the social referents by which
cultural and historical difference is submerged into a
predominant economic mainstream. In the next section, I
draw several inferences about the development science
rationales that have been used to form educational policy
and conclude with the rudiments of a framework to examine
their ideological referents.
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Ideology and the Science of Development
In the preceeding section I dealt with issues of
ideology as a social construction and the economic and
sociological language of development. In this section, my
concern is with how that language is instantiated into the
technical science we know as development. The investigative
concept I use here is suggested by Brian Fay's investigation
of policy science. The notion of policy science is
especially apt for critical reflection on the work of
Talcott Parsons in that Parsons' theory of social action
P^ovi-ded the theoretical base for the state's role in
setting and implementing development policy.
Social Action and the Concept of System
The history of the development theory that emerged in
the sixties and seventies can be cast in the systemic mold
originally set out by Talcott Parsons. It was Parsons who
provided the theoretical backing by which Weber's earlier
work on bureaucratic rationality was given specific social
application. Parson's concept of "civil society" was
central to the whole theory of social action. Civil
society, according to Parsons, was an objective entity that
could be analyzed as a "structural-functional system of
action." He defined the concept of social structure as:
...a system of patterned expectations of the behavior
of individuals who occupy particular statuses in the
129
social system. Such a system of patterned legitimate
in so tar as a cluster of such roles is of strategicsignificance to the social system, the complex of^
?efe?red 't
expected behavior in them may ber r to as an institution
... Inst itutional
structures in this sense are the fundamental element ofthe structure of the social system. They constitute
relatively stable crystallizations of behavioral forcesin such a way that action can be sufficiently
regularized so as to be compatible with the functional
requirements of a society.
From the psychological point of view,
institutionalized roles seem to have two primaryfunctions. The first is the structuring of the reality
situation for the action of the individual ... Second
they structure the "superego content" for the
individual. It is fundamentally the patterns
institutionalized in role structure which constitute
the moral standards which ^re introjected in the
process of socialization and become an important part
personality structure of the individuiT
himself ... It may be stated as a fundampriral rb^n-ram of
social science that one measure of the integration of a
social system is the coincidence of the patterns which
are introjected in the average superego of those
occupying the relevant social status with the
functional needs of the social system which has that
particular structure. (Parsons [1951] in Hamilton, Ed.,
1985, pp. 126-127 [Emphasis added])
In this passage. Parsons is concerned with two things,
the second of which I get to in a few paragraphs. First,
the institutional patterns are framed within a larger
general theory of four sets of "functional imperatives"
deemed necessary for the maintenance or survival of any
social system. Of most immediate interest here is the set
concerned with the "institutionalization of values" (Parsons
and Smelser, 1956, pp. 16-22). The social system as a
whole, irrespective of its unique cultural content or
history, resides in a situation external to it. The
system's sets of functional imperatives interact
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reciprocally so as to maintain the institutionalization of
the values which define it as one system apart from others.
The system seeks to maintain itself by tending toward
Stability
.
The second set of functional imperatives works to
relate directly ( interchange") with objects in or facets of
the external situation as "goal states" necessary for
maintenance of the system as a whole. In the case of
complex systems especially, a third, also interactive
imperative set, interchanges with the external environment
so that Its goal states may be attained over the longer
term. The fourth set is concerned with maintaining
solidarity among the units of the system so as to insure
their integrated functioning. The aim of systems analysis,
then, is to assess how the whole system is changing and to
intervene in the process on the basis of accurate data so as
to facilitate improvements in its functioning.
economy of a system functions in the adaptive
dimension as a subsystem concerned with production for the
provision of resources to the other subsystems and not
simply to the aggregate of individuals" who compose it
(Parsons and Smelser, 1956, p. 22). The economy serves the
other functional subsystems, which in turn perform various
goal state (political), integrative (organizational), and
pattern maintenance (definitional) functions for the system
as a whole. A biological metaphor is one in which the
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interdependencies are comparable to those in a complex
organism where its subsystems, for example, the respiratory,
are vitally interconnected with the rest so as to sustain
the whole organism. The point is that they exist as
instrumentalities to one another. They are not entities
whole unto themselves. The parts exist as sub-elements of a
greater whole. The individual in this scheme is constituted
by the interchanges of the functional subsystems, both
serving and being served by them. The grand theory
envisages the human being as a functional subsidiary of the
social whole.
Parsons granted objective status to the social system
as a living entity. The constellation of values that define
the system in this sense enjoy a status superior to the
subunits within it, individuals included. All exist as
interdependent elements of a greater whole. In this way.
Parsons succeeded in elevating the status of his sociology
to the level of universal arbiter of social change, one that
by inference has been deemed appropriate for application
across cultures. His analytical frame relegated social
content to a space circumscribed within the set of
interactive patterns functionally generic to a particular
system at a particular stage of development. The patterns
themselves are forms derived from the imposition of his
sociological scheme of reference, "the grand theory,"
the social setting in question:
onto
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in a social relationship is asocial object. To develop a systematic scheme of
^ole^-ir
for the analysis of orientations onr s It IS then essential first to analyze those basicalternatives of selection which are particularly
significant in defining the character of relations tosuch a good object, and which are constitutive nf ^hp
character of the relationship pattern itself rTEHi^
—
^an ot It s "content" in interest terms, its cTTItUFal
^ mot ivational aspects in any sense other than asc^titut ive o^^relationai patterns (Parsons I1QS11in Hamilton, 1^85
,
p^ 1 33 L bmphasis added])
Parsons proceeded to conceive a theory of social action
around the idea of alterable forms which had hitherto been
identified by orthodox sociology simply as "empirical
regularities in an equilibrium-seeking social totality.
The forms he theorized as deliberately alterable opened the
door to the unprecedented proliferation of developmental
prescriptions that was to ensue.
Parsons second concern was with the concept of pattern
as an interrelationship between the psychological and socio-
structural. The patterned "role expectations" he referred
to define the space within which the subject is constituted.
Marx's "weight" of the past in Parsons' scheme consisted of
the collectivity of social values that were embodied in the
relations by which members of a society already live
together . Parsons placed the pattern variables he
identified on five continue: affectivity vs. affective
neutrality, sel f-orientation vs. collectivity orientation,
universalism vs. particularism, achievement vs. ascription,
and specificity vs. diffuseness.
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Pattern configurations such as these were interpreted
by subsequent development theorists to be characteristic of
the level of cultural development of whole societies. For
example, "...the 'Universalistic Achievement Pattern' was
best exemplified by the dominant American ethos. The
combination of universalism and achievement
-orientation put
the primary emphasis on universalis tically defined goal-
achievement and on the dynamic quality of continuing to
achieve particular goals..." (pp. 140-141).
The space circumscribed by the constellation of pattern
configurations in a society, however, was not merely a
structural matter of concern so much as it restricted the
membership of acting subjects in social action programming
to those qualified to participate. Wilson's (1977) remarks
on the ascribed status of pattern variables underscored the
limits of intentful social change inherent in Parsons'
theory:
. . .The infamous pattern variables display not
structural alternatives, even within civil society, but
"behavioural" possibilities less and less available as
real alternatives to people inhabiting a gigantic
secondary group. Beyond this, of course, they
constitute categories of formally logical possibility
within which the functionalist plots empirical
probabilities exercising the kind of discipline
Durkheim demanded of his sociological army. This is
evident in the alternatives alleged to be available in
the sociological system - universalism and a
performance focus or particularism and
ascript ion . . .
.
(p . 190)
Parsons failed to see that his version of social action
could be so easily reduced to an intrusive, heavy-handed
conceptual tool which, as Marx saw, would itself weigh much
as
134
tradition.
.. like a nightmare on the brain of the
living." In this critical light, Parsons’ developmentalist
successors could be judged to have turned his dream of
rationally managed social change into a nightmare of quick-
fix schemes to revamp whole cultures. His grand theory
fundamentally lent itself to misapplication of its own
momentum. Adriaansens ' (1980) otherwise fresh look at
Parsons and his critics acknowledged the basic consistency
evident throughout all his works, but nevertheless admitted
to
:
...fundamental ambiguity and lack of precision in TheSocial System, which translates voluntarism into adouble bipolarity, makes the structural-functional
theory a hotch-potch from which to pick and choose
according to one's book. If only for this reason, thegreat synthesis
,
the king-pin of Parsons's convergence
theory can be said to have failed in the structural-functional version and a fresh attempt will have to be
made. (p. 174)
Developmental Systems and State Policy Science
I
I
The Parsonian systems approach, in a profusion of
I
I
sequels and refinements, has been advanced within a frame of
'
I
policy science advocated on a world scale. Lasswell (1951, '
pp. 113-116), for instance, observed a global "trend toward
scientific and democratic homogeneity." Within the general
external trend toward political bipolarity, he noted a
corresponding internal trend characterized by: (1) The
movement of science and technology toward universality,
imposing "uniformities" on world attention and attitudes;
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(2) Universal demands to acquire, exercise, and reward
"socially useful" skill; (3) Shared control over decision
making in skills; (4) A new equilibrium of "collectivlzlng-
individuallzlng" tendencies with the appearance of
homogeneous Institutions; (5) Homogeneity of social
structure without uniformity of doctrine or single state
rule; and (6) The possibility of "unity of moral attitude"
which tolerated political and doctrinal difference.
Merton and Lerner (1951, pp . 298-300) used a similar
world view to outline two policy "functions" of research in
vogue among positivist social scientists at the time - the
sensitization of policy makers "to new types of achievable
goals" and the means to achieve them. Reciprocally, policy
makers themselves were seen to need the assistance of social
scientists for the task of public or individual persuasion,
the collection of data for decision making, and to delay
action by allaying criticism for inaction.
Diesing (1982, pp . 130-132) noted that the Parsonian
model was diffused in the works of several "developmental
functionalists" (e.g., Apter, 1965). Their approach, as
well as source of frustration, was to compress otherwise
natural historical development by using a strategy where
"...all four functional prerequisites [imperatives] have to
be satisfied simultaneously, when almost none of the
structures for doing so are yet in place..." (Diesing, 1982,
p. 131). In a more critical light, that endeavor resulted
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in schemes to control for the unpredictability of the human
actor as exerciser of rational choice which had been a core
tenet of neoclassical economics.
The effort to shape behavior toward scientifically
predictable ends was central to the Keynsian economic and
the Parsonian institutional calculus. The advantage to be
gained was that all social phenomena, both economic as well
as non-economic, could be covered by the systemic blanket
and Its rational speech (e.g., management information
systems, feedback, organizational memory, MBO, etc.)
(Diesing, 1982, pp. 149-150). As such, the corporation, the
individual, the community, and other social groupings could
be studied as collectivities which were accountable in both
qualitative and mathematical terms.
The Scientization of Development Politics
The notion of mixed economy" pervades developmental
politics to this day. The primary vehicle to insure the
protection of U. S. public and private investment in the
Third World originated in an effort to consolidate domestic
state power. The consolidation of state power was realized
as an implicit condition for the receipt of American foreign
assistance. Notwithstanding the fact this condition
contradicted the "free market" Chicago School approach to
economic development, the alliance between political
liberals of successive Republican and Democratic
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administrations and social/developmental advisers and
practitioners has dominated state policymaking from
Eisenhower up to the present. Also known as the "politics
of civility" in the sense advocated by Shils (e.g., 1958 ^
1960)
,
the liberal alliance focused on the administration of
development in the context of a conflation of old
ideological dichotomies into a new coalition based on
liberal principles of human tolerance and empiricism. The
concept of civility was realized in practice as a
mobilization of suitably educated political elites who were
to apply sociologically informed plans to institute social
reforms under the slogans of democracy c^ development.
The American version of global civility was formulated,
according to Packenham (1973, pp . 112-160), under four
implicit principles that were characteristic of the liberal
optimism of the age: "change and development are easy";
"all good things go together" (America had a history
characterized by economic success and prosperity.);
radicalism and revolution are bad;" and "distributing power
is better than accumulating power." The historical evidence
cited by Packenham, however, revealed U. S. official
toleration of and support for high concentrations of power
under authoritarian regimes whenever deterrence to radical
movements throughout the world was a factor. Examples of
concentrations of state power supported by the United States
include the Asian nations of Taiwan, Indonesia, South Korea,
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the Philippines, and South Vietnam; and the Latin American
nations of Brazil, Chile, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Argentina, Panama, and the Dominican Republic. Packenham's
loose classifications of the liberal ideology were not so
much concerned with the instantiation of a new theory of
development as they were with designating the political
parameters of the liberal tradition. His objective was to
draw attention to the need for policy reformulation if
foreign assistance was to regain its importance as a
substantial component of a comprehensive, informed,
democratic, and humanitarian foreign policy.
While Packenham identified the implicit principles of
liberalism at work. Monsen's (1963) earlier focus was on the
need to make the exportable version of the developmental
ideology more attractive and explicit, its main strengths
stemming from its explicit characteristics of pragmatism,
compromise, individualism, pluralism, and democracy (p.
124) . The problem was one of better articulation to foreign
elites which were responsible for setting development
policies . I would argue that such concepts were inherently
ambiguous and served to mask what in reality had begun to
happen - The ascendant political hegemony of the United
States in the Third World was being theorized as a
developmental problem. In the decades of the sixties and
seventies. The relationship between social science and
policy administration, though not wholly free of conflict,
grew closer both in theory and practice.
139
A dramatic early example of official collaboration and
the ethical issues it both raised and, more to the point,
did not raise
,
is recounted by Horowitz (1977, pp. 225-257).
The attenuation of the hitherto accepted difference between
scientific objectivity" and "social fact" is exemplified by
the case of Project Camelot," a creation of Pentagon
research which purported to "...determine the feasibility of
developing a general social systems model which would make
it possible to predict and influence politically significant
aspects of social change in the developing nations of the
world..." so as to "relieve" the conditions that gave rise
to internal war (p. 226). The good anticipated from the
project was encased in political logic. The investigation
and reform of traditional societies was justified as a good
faith effort by a democratic government with democratic
intent. Horowitz's summarization of the operant consent
among the project's social scientists highlights the
convergence of interests in terms that can be applied to the
developmental field as a whole. The source of funding was
viewed to be less important than the value of promoting
social science as such; the chance to work in a nonacademic
setting provided more freedom; the military, too, could be
educated; the military was in fact better equipped to
promote economic growth; the Pax Americana approach to
ending poverty could lessen the need for violence;
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participants were confident that the most productive venue
for resolving potential ethical conflicts of interest was in
the course of practice. Horowitz ends by noting several
still unresolved issues of concern involved in the
conscription of "orthodox- sociology: 19 The role of the
research institute (i.e., the university) as a contractor to
produce knowledge; the confusion of the scientific with the
social change agent roles; the social application of
objective" research findings across cultures; and the
sanitization" of political into technical speech.
In sum, the scient izat ion of developmental politics
evolved from the initial endeavor of American sociologists
of the early twentieth century to establish a social
scientific orthodoxy which had several basic tenets:
objectivity, universality, empirical methodology, and
applicability to explain truthfully the events, make-up, and
larger social tendencies of contemporary American society.
The problematic nature inherent in their approach, however.
was not made evident until the 1940s when they were faced
with Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia
,
where the idea that
knowledge itself might be subject to the contingencies of
its social setting was central. Such a proposition was
taken as a threat because its implications went to the heart
of the status they had been enjoying as the main exemplars
of the social scientific agenda in America. It conjured
images of Marx the counter-sociologist and of class, images
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that did not fit the regime they had developed for the
rational analysis of America's practical needs in an age
vulnerable to economic depression at home and totalitarian
communist expansion abroad. The direction they set was to
establish social science as a neutral font from which to set
a rational political agenda. They managed to succeed by the
fiat of ending ideology altogether in 1950. They had a more
practical job to do. That job entailed helping the cause of
democracy throughout the world. What they had to offer were
the tools of their science in the service of humanity in
need of modernization. The vehicle at their disposal was
provided by an alliance of private interest and state power,
an alliance that was extended and strengthened throughout
the decades of the sixties and seventies.
The Science of Development: A Critical Stance
So far, the critical comments I have made in reviewing
the positions, assumptions, and rationales of the major
exemplars of development science have been offered for
clarification. This section sets out to establish a
critical vantage point from which to examine the instance of
development science as ideology.
Wilson summarizes the central problem of the American
ideology in these terms
:
The idea that knowledge is inherently neutral,
that there is a unitary scientific method, or that
science provides the pre-eminent explanatory model
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against which the social "sciences" must measurethemselves constitutes the epistemic foundation of theAmerican_ ideology. This ideology is technocraticbecause it invokes science in order to justify policiesaimed at realizing particular objectives. Thesepolicies take the form of allegedly neutral techniques
whose origins and concerns are distended from theinterests they serve .... (Wilson
, 1977, p. 16)
The practical effects of the ideology he notes are: an
f Ifixlve and anti-theoretical bias; a concern for the
accumulation of immediately exploitable and applicable
knowledge; a "false commitment to 'objectivity'"; "a vision
of social and political processes as the product of a
piecemeal, trial and error approach" with a concern mainly
for legitimacy, reform, and "rules of the game"; and a
belief in which the "American- type Western society is
exportable," a posture supported by reference to the social
sciences and the claimed convergence of world societies
according to the Western model (p. 15).
The thrust of Wilson's argument is that the effects of
the American ideology coalesce as a constellation of
attitudes, actions, and orientations which preclude critical
reflection about the realities of social life and their
relations to class and other forms of domination. I begin
with a look at the material basis that necessitates the
function of ideology.
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The Social Function of Ideol(
Eyerraan's (1981) distinction between consciousness and
ideology is an appropriate entry point for the exploration
of the role of ideology in development. Distinguishing the
function of ideology, he says, implies "...distinguishing
between the concepts that an individual uses to understand
his/her reality - to situate himself in the world - and
those used in scientific reconstructions of that
situation.
.
.
(p. 203) . The latter refers to a process of
ideology construction by various "collectivities" in pursuit
of their respective interests. In this frame of reference,
ideology is produced to advance specific interests by
defining what I call "the social space" to their respective,
albeit contradictory, advantage. The individualistic
ideology of neoclassical economists, for example, adheres to
the central premise of their forebears in the sense that
they accept Smith's proposition as natural social law: The
interests of all are served best only insofar as the members
of a political economy act to maximize their individual
interests. Science in this reckoning becomes the supreme
arbiter of what it determines to be socially natural . This
is not to diminish the material interests of those who
control the scientific enterprise. It is to point to the
ideologizat ion of science as the sole legitimate referee in
the ongoing efforts of sectional interests to appropriate
social conflict onto the plane of technical problem .
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Some of the work of the critical theorists of the
Frankfurt School is helpful in drawing inferences about the
role of science in ideology construction. The modern
practice of social science, according to Horkheimer (1972,
pp. 5-6), tends to particularize the social world into
elements manipulable according to an idealist frame of
reference, thereby failing to acknowledge its own
situational genesis. It abstracts itself from its material
roots by collapsing the gap between reality and reason, and
in so doing, invests itself as the ultimate source of truth.
The extant social problems of the real world, in other
words, are in need of rational explication - Why the few
have so much while the many have so little, an essentially
question, is transformed by social science into a
series of technical questions which evade the political
valuat ional problem altogether. What skills are needed to
achieve success in a competitive world? This question heads
a host of others that confine the working space of social
change to an essentially behavioral problem.
First, on the social plane, the relations inherited
from the past are accepted as given. The social world is
depicted as ordered by an authority structure in a
hierarchical mode. In his analysis of family structure,
Horkheimer (pp . 101-109) observed that the child learns
obedience first. The family structure in its ideal form
reflects the authority structure found in society at large.
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with Its patriarchical system of rank where father's
position is not to be challenged. There is a head and there
are subordinates. All conventional institutional forms have
this pattern in common, whether religious, business, or the
state, with its main socializing agency, the school,
included. The child's basic consciousness is molded
according to the pattern of dominance as an incontrovertible
fact of life. The role of science in this instance is to
reinforce that pattern. Where such order had hitherto been
ascribed to myth, God, divine right, and other forms of
enlightened science introduced a universally
standard rationale by which to justify mastery in a new,
once and for all" light (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972, pp.
In this view, the unconditional acceptance of
authority in some self-evident form permeates all social
scientific inquiry. The first question I therefore direct
to the analysis of the instantiation of ideology in
development education is:
* What authority structure guides the education for
development enterprise? The authority structure
determines the personnel qualifications needed, and the
relative position of the major and minor parties:
agencies of government, donor and receiver constraints,
and the roles of advisers, policy makers, and target
audiences. I am particularly interested to investigate
the way science is used as an overarching metaphor to
guide the management of the initiative.
Second, the social world is portrayed as inherently
competitive, with persons and institutions pitted against
each other in the effort to maximize individual satisfaction
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amidst scarce resources. This neoclassical view of
"economic man" is of interest because it opens up the
problem of will and the role of the subject in an economic
order which is taken to be naturally derived. Horkheiraer
(1972, pp. 77-89) found the need in late capitalism to
abstract what he called a mythical version of the human
being to coincide with the rationality attributed to the
industrialized form of organization common to the factory
floor. The problem posed for science was how to account for
the emergent contradiction between the neoclassical economic
model of rational, free choice and the structural-
functionalist version of the social whole where all are
^®pi-Cted as instrumentally interdependendent
.
According to Horkheimer and Adorno (1972, pp. 57-62),
the contradiction was resolved by contrivance. A new,
rationally cunning creature was conceived as model to
contend with and profit by the conjunction of economic
forces that delimit his psycho-social space. This
conception, according to Head's (1985) study of French
liberalism and its early exemplar Destutt de Tracy, involves
a synthesis of "man as embodiment of needs" and society as
the metaphorical crucible in which he must strive to meet
them, with success determined by the level of achievement
the individual is able to manage over the course of a
lifetime. This insight reveals the "free" person in modern
society in terms of an abstraction, a product of scientific
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calculation in which the faculty of reason is circumscribed
entirely within a sphere of "getting and spending." The
direction of inquiry implied by this conception of "rational
man" then concerns the ideological apparatus for remodeling
and transmitting the ideal image of homo sapiens as clever
entrepreneur amidst social adversity. The guiding question
for this aspect of development education is:
* What image of the educated person underlies the
process? More specific questions would beected toward uncovering the economic, political, and
cultural factors that are incorporated in this vision
or the idealized person. The important focus here isthe analysis of factors involved in transmittingideology into consciousness.
The third focus begins with a question asked by Herbert
Marcuse (1964, p. 6): "...how can the people who have been
the object of effective and productive domination by
themselves create the conditions of freedom?" If the
ideology of work in mass industrial society has set the
parameters for what is taught and learned in school and
specialized training programs, then it has also determined
the parameters of skills actually conveyed. These skills
preclude critical analysis of the relations between what is
taught, how the learning context reproduces the social
relations it serves, and reflection on how the consciousness
of the subject in modern society is conditioned. Major
critics of the reduction of education to exclusively a
process of skill transfer include Freire (e.g., 1974, 1973),
Carnoy (1974), Apple (1982; 1979), Bourdieu and Passeron
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(e.g., 1977), and Ilich (1970). Habermas (1970) speaks of
technocratic consciousness" as:
iife^
Repression of 'ethics' as such as a category ofl . The common, positivist way of thinking rendersinert the frame of reference of interactlonn ^^dinLylanguage, in which domination and Ideology both arisfdistorted communication and can bereflectively detected and broken down. Thedepolitization of the mass of the population, which islegitimated through technocratic cLLlousness, ifatthe same time men s self-objectification in categoriesequally of both purposive-rational action and adaptive
e avior. The reified models of the sciences migrateinto the sociocultural life world and gain objectivepower oyer the latter's self-understanding. Theideological nucleus of this consciousness is the
e limination o f the distinction between the practical
and the technical
. it reflects, but does not
objectively account for, the new constellation of adisempowered institutional framework and systems ofpurposive-rational action that have taken on a life oftheir own. (pp. 112-113 [Emphasis in original])
The question I would raise has to do with the
institutionalization of non- or anti-reflexive bias in
development education:
* In what ways does the message education conveys
reflect instrumental consciousness? The related
questions to ask would involve the content of
educational programs, their objectives, curricula, and
methodologies. Another set of questions would turn on
the interconnections between content and the
institutional needs of the governing economic system.
A final concern raised by Habermas and critical
theorists in general is with the preclusion of critical
reflection. To this end I have developed a set of
questions directed toward development education's
propensity to eliminate critical analysis from its
content
.
Finally, I wish to investigate the whole business of
development education as an instantiation of policy science
on a grand scale. Fay (1975) laid the conceptual groundwork
for my interest when he noted "...not merely that the
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positivist conception of social science underlies and
supports the idea of a policy science ... but that it is
conceptually connected with it . . .
" (p . 38)
.
I would pursue
the investigation further by postulating that the connection
is fundamentally material as well, that is to say, the
moment of policy science is both conceptual and material.
The question I address here is therefore a more
comprehensive one:
What are the means
,
methods
,
and forms by which the
model of education for development represented in AID
policy reflects the both the material and conceptual
interests of the policy science community? One set of
follow-up questions is concerned with who the actors
are, from theorists to practitioners, and who supports
them. The constraints under which they operate
comprise another set. And the last concerns various
issues arising from the attempt to put theory into
practice
.
Collectively, the four sets of questions are designed
to probe the practice of resorting to absolute authority to
support knowledge claims for policy formulation. Since my
purpose is to examine the ideological referents of those
claims, the method of critical reflection seems most
appropriate. In the next chapter, I introduce the concept
of "social space" as a way to organize the deductive aspect
of the critique. The social space is the framework that
situates the functions of ideology as the intermediary site
where the conflicting forces of society are unified into
rational wholes for the production of policy and the
mobilization of action.
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Notes
'om
and Luckmann (1966, pp. 13-16) exclude fr<their definition of the sociology of knowledge the
epistemological and methodological problems that concerned
ScLler*''"Therr°k
concept, namely Karl Mannheim and Maxb heler. They ta e a sociological perspective that
emphasizes the role of knowledge in society, not the role ofIdeas per se or the influence of theory on history. In this
th?rwo;k ideology as I use Ihe term inis wor . Their interest is with the process of "realityconstruction in everyday life," where ideology is but one^facet. My focus is rather on the socio-material roots forthe construction of theory to guide the practice of
education for development. I take this to be an ideological
and political activity which uses theoretical knowledge asIts legitimating frame of reference.
2. A brief summary of the origins of the term ideology
^ western social thought is available in
all (1977, pp. 9-31). The problem raised is one that has
confronted social theorists from the of time Marx, who
attempted to account for the problem of an autonomous sphere
of ideas and their origins in material life. The concept of
American social thought, according to Dittberner
(1979, pp. 1~50), has a much briefer history with the term
not appearing in any journal of sociology until 1936.
.3. Bierstedt (1981, p. xii) also notes the absence of
significant direct attention to the works of Durkheim and
Weber in the development of American sociology of the
twentieth century. Hall (1977, p. 23), however, notes the
appropriation of mainly that part of Durkheim' s work which
emphasized the rule of norms over individual behavior.
4. This effort can be viewed in the social sense
described by Kuhn (1970, pp. 167-168) when referring to a
community of scholars who are interested to advance the
normative research done within the confines of their
accepted paradigm.
5. Hughes (1975) reflects the views of conventional
organization theorists by predicating the need for
organization development on the increasing pace of
environmental change within the larger society and its
impact on the operations of organizations. The field of OD,
he says (p. 8), focuses on two basic concerns: "...helping
organizations become more adept at self-renewal and
survival, [and insuring] that the human values of
organizational members are furthered..." This focus for
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change starts at the level of existing relationships withinthe functional subunits of a larger social totality. ~Its
—
interest is less with the social systemic antecedents of
conflict than with the effects of the antecedents on theinternal operations of discreet subunits. The field isbehavior oriented in that it presupposes the possibility of
change among individual relations while it takes the
overarching system of social relations as a given.
.
,
5* ^ study of the history of the Frankfurt School,including the problems it faced on relocation to the UnitedStates in the mid-1930s, see Martin Jay (1973) and David
Held (1980, pp. 36-39).
7. Dittberner (1979, pp. 103-145) reviews a series ofinternational conferences held in the early and mid-1950s
out of which the Congress of Cultural Freedom was born. As
an an t i -communis t /ant i -tot al itarian association of "Free
World scholars, artists, authors, and journalists, the
Congress's stated purpose was to counteract the usurpation
of artistic and academic freedom into an instrument of state
power. Dittberner (p. 10) notes evidence to indicate the
financial support of the CIA at least in the formative
stages of the association.
The result of the Congress's first meeting in Berlin in
1950 was the issue of a ''fourteen point manifesto" in
denunciation both of totalitarian communism and neutrality.
The "intellectual airlift" to Berlin, as it came to be known
in contrast to its immediate military precedent, took place
shortly after the Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia and the
outbreak of the Korean War.
8. Lipset's (1960) main concern was to establish
empirically the superiority of democracy as the political
system best able to satisfy individual wants and needs by
offering the best practical means for classes and
individuals to resolve their differences. The theoretical
premise on which he based his analysis of social relations
he put this way:
...it is precisely in those countries where workers
have been able to form strong unions and obtain
representation in politics that the disintegration
effects of political cleavage are least likely to be
found ... Consensus on the norms of tolerance which a
society or organization accepts has often developed
only as a result of basic conflict, and requires the
continuation of conflict to sustain it...(p. 22)
The degree to which social and political institutions are
believed legitimate is indicative of political stability.
The sphere in which contending interests are played out is
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indicated by the extent of wealth, individualization
education enjoyed by the citizenry ’ (pp
.
line of reasoning would demonstrate greaterpolitical and social cohesion in those societies wLsestatistical indices along the four dimensions of stabledemocracy were higher, as this would indicate the
6 ectiyity of the basic institutional consensus in the
resolution of conflict. Such cohesion would also indicatediminished stridency of ideological conflict.
Bell's (1962) interest, on the other hand, was with
expunging ideology from the study of society altogether, asIt called forth the unwarranted "aristocratic" critique of
mass society advanced by such European scholars as JoseOrtega y Gasset, Karl Mannheim, Hannah Arendt, Emil Lederer
and others. Bell notes: ’
...The most salient fact about modern life - capitalist
and communist - is the ideological commitment to social
change. And by change is meant the striving for
material, economic betterment, greater opportunty for
individuals to exercise their talents, and an
appreciation of culture by wider masses of people. Can
any society deny these aspirations? (p. 30)
Bell s analysis is based in part on a review of several
sociological studies of industrial organization (e.g., the
Hawthorne works study, pp . 246-248). He is concerned to
establish the plurality of American life, not its
massificat ion
,
by pointing to the proliferation of voluntary
organizations, leisure activities, professed anti-conformist
attitudes, and the institutionalization of mechanisms to
promote change by which the masses are brought into the
political, economic, and social picture (pp. 32-38).
9. For a brief, concise explanation of the mathematics
involved in the model, see Michael Todaro (1977, pp. 52-54).
10. Rostow's stages of growth theory had an historical
antecedent which developed in the tradition of the Scottish
School of eighteenth century economic thought (Meek, 1976,
pp. 5-36). The thrust of the earlier theory was that
"...societies undergo development through successive stages
based on different modes of sub^s tence . . .
" (p. 6 [Emphasis
in original]), in this case there being four that were
naturally occurring: hunting, pastoral, agricultural, and
commercial. Whether Rostow was aware of this theory or not
is immaterial to his supposition of a stage theory similar
in that it shared the basic idea of natural law and
progression toward the mass consumption made possible during
the fifth and final stage of industrialization.
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of Scientific Revolut ions (1970
of'"scientikc^c?^ Oughts on THe naturet scientific communities" that may have a bearine on thedegree of interest manifested by a community of appUedsocial theorists. Their interest would be to defiL the
field^'of
they work in progressive terms as aapplied investigation. I would offer the field ofdevelopment science as a case in point. The theoretical
evelopment community would seek to establish itself arounda normal subject of investigation within a community ofscholars with its accepted standards of truth as adiscipline distinct both from other disciplines and thesocial milieu within which it functions. Such a division
would signify, according to Kuhn (p . 167), "...the verytenuousness of humanity's hold on the scientific
enterprise. I believe that the community of orthodox
social scientists as a whole has established a social
momentum of its own by the legitimacy accorded to its socialfunction and by the role it has played in the service ofparticular interests, those of the state included.
A serious impression of a likely parallel developmentbetween university research and the interests of privateindustry is portrayed by John Buescher (1987, pp. 33-47),
where the distinctions between objective research and the
needs of a budding enterprise become increasingly blurred to
the detriment of the former.
12.
Marx followed in this respect in a line of economic
analysis which placed labor as the central pivot in the
valuation of a commodity. He developed the thesis that
value represents the composite of relations among its
producers and its proper calculation should be so determined
(Marx, 1977 [1867], pp. 307-339). The significance of
Schumpeter's switch in emphasis from labor to the market
mechanism is noted by Meek (1967, p. 208) as a failure on
Schumpeter's part to recognize the principle of embodied
labor on the one hand and to substitute for it "...the
psychological relations between individuals and finished
goods..." on the other. Schumpeter thus laid the conceptual
foundation whereby the notion of consumer was abstracted
from the real relations of membership in a class of
producers. In this line of reasoning, a new ideal entity
was created whose chief motivation was determined by its
relation to the commodity as an object and not to the labor
embodied within it.
13. An analysis of the theoretical issues involved in
defining the role of the state in capitalist society is
found in Jessop (1982).
14. Tully's (1980) study of Locke stresses the
Christian concept of "man as the servant of God," His
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property
,
so to speak, whose avocation is to perform His
workmanship^ on earth. Locke's meaning of ''natural law"IS cast within the mold of God's relation to humanity. The
relationship is realized as natural (viz., moral) lawthrough the uniquely human power to reason. Locke'sdefinition of property is therefore inclusive of the human
acuities to exercise rights." Reason in this sense isderivative of God s notions," or the ideas which "stand
substances) abstracted from the real
world of objects or "modes and relations," which constitute
understanding of the world.
15. The proliferation of economic growth literaturebegan in the fifties. An indicative classified bibliography
can be found in Gran (1983).
16. While McClelland did not hold that the motive to
achieve was necessarily tied to the drive to amass wealth
per se, he subscribed to the centrality of the
entrepreneurial spirit as an indispensible factor in the
economic development of socialist as well as capitalist
societies. He was not so concerned with the structural
implications of particular economic systems as he was with
the preparation of those individuals who were motivated to
achieve with respect to their peers.
17. Another concerned with issues of ethics in
development is Denis Goulet (1977, 1971a & 1971b). His
interest is with providing an ethical set of guidelines for
policy makers and practitioners operating in the field of
development
.
18.
McCloskey's (1969, pp . 98-124) interest in this
vein, incidentally, is in the empirical analysis of
differences in opinion expressed between the general
American electorate and its active political minority. He
concluded that the general voter lacked understanding of
democratic ideals embodied in the Constitution and American
practice sufficient to inform an ideology clear enough to
guide political action and decision. This conclusion was
reached despite McCloskey's insistence that the "...American
democratic 'ideology' possesses an elaborately defined
theory, a body of interrelated assumptions, and a set of
ideals that serve as guides for action..." with basic tenets
of "...consent, accountability, limited constitutional
government, representation, freedom of thought, speech,
press, and assembly, equality of opportunity, religious
toleration, equality before the law, the rights of juridical
defense, and individual self-determination over a broad
range of affairs..." (p. 100). Such guides, he noted, had
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been codifed in law, integrated into education, repeated bypresidents, and referred to by all public figures since thefounding of the nation.
19. The term "orthodox" is used by Horowitz elsewhere
(1977, p. 113) to characterize the increasing role of
sociologists to explain (away) the turbulence of the late
sixties and early seventies. His tone is critical as he
cites instances in which such sociologists were appropriated
into a 'professional" intelligentsia and made responsible
for program innovation on a national scale.
CHAPTER V
A FRAMEWORK FOR CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Social Space
The purpose of this chapter is to build a frame of
reference for analyzing AID's policies in education. The
frame of reference is designed to examine the nature of the
developmental ideology embedded within the policies. The
frame consists of four propositions that are derived from
the four sets of questions developed in the previous
chapter. The propositions collectively formulate a critical
position from which to investigate the space within which
development rationales are produced. The propositions guide
this inquiry in the following order:
* Developmental consciousness is propelled by an
ideology of economic functionalization .
* The organizing principles for developmental
consciousness are derived from an ideology of
hierarchy .
* The mechanism for legitimating developmental
consciousness is governed by rules derived from an
ideology of socio-economic positivism .
* Developmental consciousness in its specific instances
is determined by the convergence of the three
ideologies that together constitute the "social space.
The term "social space" is the key concept for my
analysis of America's developmental ideology. The concept
of social space I use contrasts with the idea of "public
sphere" advanced by Habermas in Theory and Practice (1973,
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pp. 3-7), and elsewhere (1974). Where Habermas was
concerned with the increasing erosion of free debate over
matters of general interest that was originally
characteristic of eighteenth and early nineteenth century
democratic western society (Held, 1980, pp. 260-267), that
is, with the decline of the public sphere, I am concerned
the convergence of forces I hold responsible for that
decline. This convergence can be depicted as a three-sided
interaction of social forces with the combined effect of
shaping consciousness, the developmentalis t version
included, as shown in Figure 2 on page 158.
The base of Figure 2 reflects the economic relations
characteristic of a particular mode of production, that of
American capitalism being the case in point here. The
economic base represents the composite of forces that drives
the relations through which the goods and services that
sustain the society are produced. I covered the ideological
origins of economic functionalism in Chapters III and IV.
The right side of the figure represents the mode of
administrative organization by which political relations are
ordered. The political axis on the right represents the
forms in which decisions are made and carried out,
particularly with respect to the administration and
distribution of economic resources. I also covered the
ideological origins of political administration in Chapters
III and IV.
Formation
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The left side is concerned with representing the
methods by which the economic and political relations of the
society are rationalized. The function described here is
one of legitimation, the purpose of which is to explain in
rational terms why society is ordered the way it is.
Insofar as development is concerned, the principal means of
rationalization is through a combination of economic and
social positivism. The concept of development policy
science was covered in Chapter IV.
As an embodiment of rationales, consciousness is
situated at the center of the figure. The economic,
P*^l^tical, and legit imational forces converge to shape
diverse forms of consciousness, the developmentalis t version
being one example.
Different aspects of ideology are placed in the
critical interfaces between the economic base and the
political and legitimational sides. Ideology is produced
there, situated in between the unarticulated ("brute")
forces of the social space and the various forms of
consciousness that speak for it. While the economic base is
viewed in classical Marxian analysis as the ultimate
determinant of all social relations, the convergence of the
three forces in practice encompasses highly complex,
reciprocal, and fundamentally contradictory patterns of
interaction in which it is not possible to draw immediate
cause-effect relationships. Developmental consciousness
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arises from the interaction of this three-pronged
convergence of forces that defines the social space. The
materialist position I adopt therefore makes allowances for
the formative powers of the political and legit imational
forces of the social space.
The point I emphasize here is that consciousness is not
formed "consciously." Consciousness is formed under the
influence of the momentary convergence of its ideological
referents, those referents having their origins in the
economic, political, and legit imational structure. The
function of ideology is to hide its real referents in the
social space by producing consciousness in specific moments.
In turn, the function of specific moments of consciousness
is to mobilize social action by hiding its ideological
referents
.
The ideological production of consciousness is meant to
constrain what Habermas saw as the "public sphere," the site
where the conditions for "unencumbered, free debate" were to
be realized. The function of the public sphere in his
scheme was to sustain the "process core" of democratic
government. The concept of social space I use is not
equivalent to the public sphere. Rather, it encompasses the
public sphere. It contains both the ideologically expressed
forces that seek to erode the conditions for democratic
dialogue as well as the counter forces at work to nourish
it. In theoretical terms, I see the social space as the
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site within which the contending forces that seek to mold
and liberate consciousness takes place.
My focus is on how the moment developmental
consciousness precludes the development of diverse and
situationally appropriate forms of the public sphere in the
Third World. The concept of the social space enables me to
structure a critical investigation of the rational bases for
AID s claims to alter local economic, political, and
legitimational ideologies and practices by replacing them
'^ith the developmentalist
.
The "Interpellation"
of Developmental Consciousness
The concept of a three-sided social space circumscribes
the consciousness applied to development. Developmental
consciousness and its educational corollaries in this view
emerge within a field of forces comparable to what Althusser
refers to as a process of "interpellation" (1984, pp . 44-
45). When I speak of "developmental consciousness," I mean
to concentrate on the aspect of the social space in which
consciousness about development is conditioned. The
convergence of the three forces, being formative of all
aspects of public consciousness, thus creates its own
object, in this case the prevalent educational development
model
.
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The thinking subject, as theoretician and practitioner
of development, is "called to be" within the social space
that has predefined its object, that is, the image of
development already embedded in consciousness. The social
space provides the framework within which developmental
consciousness has emerged. The thinking subject therefore
does not create development as a result of a set of
autonomous principles and values to be applied to
problematic situations. To the contrary, the frame of the
social space provides a way to examine how the "thinking" of
the theoretician and practitioner about development has been
conditioned
.
The conditioning of the subject is not a one way
process resulting in an objectively determinable creation.
To the contrary, the determination of the subject's
consciousness through ideological mechanisms also produces
its own resistance. The ideologies spawned by the brute
social forces exist in dialectical relation to each other.
The ideologies emerge as expressions of behavior and
attitude in the form of struggles between control and its
resistance
.
The ideological struggle is thus waged on a three-
dimensional front. One flank is engaged with the economic
functionalization of consciousness. The second flank
involves the hierarchical patterning of institutional
consciousness. And the third legitimates the relations of
domination through scientific justification. Together,
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these ideological proving grounds, as it were, constitute
the site at which the struggle between domination and its
resistance occurs in specific moments.
The Ideology of Economic Functionalization
Arising as it does from the base of the social space,
the ideology of economic functionalization is concerned most
directly with the predominant mode of production as the
driving force in determining the nature of the
interrelationships among the state and the private entities
it serves.^ The mode of production calls forth certain
social relations, those based on class, sex, race and ethnic
group being the most immediately obvious. The purpose of
ideology is to insure the reproduction ^ of those relations
by producing the discursive means for the exercise of
control over its object - consciousness. To this end the
functionalist economic ideology mediates the relations
between the base, the determinative forces it represents,
and the individual through the production of consciousness
about economic development.
The effect I am concerned with is one whereby
functionalized consciousness reproduces extant economic
divisions through the mechanism of a multi-tiered system of
education. Gramsci's (1971) analysis of this effect is set
within the context of a reciprocally acting system of
international relations:
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.yEvery relationship of "hegemony" is necessarily an
educational relationship and occurs not only within anation, between the various forces of which the nationIS composed, but in the international and world-widetield between complexes of national and continental
civilisations, (p. 350)
According to the first proposition I stated at the
beginning of this chapter, the enterprise of educational
development is driven by the functional economic imperatives
of the relationships among the public and private entities
it serves. I intend to focus specifically on the
ideological manifestations of that relationship as they are
expressed in the language of AID's policies in education by
looking at
:
* The relations between the purpose of the educational
program and the economic setting. This involves such
questions as:
- For what economic purpose are
students/participants being prepared?
- What image of developed society is embodied in
the educational program?
- What image of the educated subject is embodied
by the program?
Relations between the forms of knowledge transmitted
and their socio-economic functions. This applies the
concept of instrumental reasoning developed by Habermas
(e.g., 1973, pp. 268-276) and other critical theorists
(e.g., Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972, pp. 38-42), whose
concern was with the spread of technical rationality
with the effect of subverting other forms of knowledge.
Figure 3 on page 165 sets out the economic ideological
factors that influence the production of the functionalized
part of developmental consciousness. Functionalized
consciousness is set at the top of the figure, symbolizing
its ultimate dependence on the determinative powers of the
relations of production. The overall mode and relations of
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bottom of the figure generates specific
ideologies immediately above. These in turn come to be
embodied in certain education for development texts, or
policies. The ideologies play a direct role in shaping
individual and collective consciousness about all public
matters, including the nature of work, human rights, the
social order, morality, and the faculties of reason. As
texts, these come to play a part in the production of
educational policy.
The two-way flow referred to above implies a direct
funneling of economic factors through the filtration of
ideology, which is distilled finally into consciousness.
The individual in turn influences the levels below by giving
expression to consciousness. The diagram as a whole,
though, tends to underemphasize and oversimplify what
Gramsci called the historically formative power of complexes
of ideologies which extend well beyond the immediate
confines of the conception, "mode of production."
The Ideology of Hierarchy
I use the term "hierarchy" to stress the conditioned
response whereby formal organization has come to be equated
with a "top down" administrative structure. The response
recollects and realizes the Parsonian modelling of regulated
social change where the change process is managed according
to some abstracted, universal set of theoretical premises
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about human social behavior. I wish to look for concrete
evidence that some form of this administrative rationality
IS implicitly set within the institutional relationships
that are patterned into educational policy and program
initiatives. This part of the study rests on the
proposition that the ideology of hierarchy and authority has
been structured into educational policy.
The specific instantiation of authority and hierarchy
is necessary to decipher, or "decode," in that the forms it
takes are concealed by different kinds of ideological
discourse. Broadly, I define the instantiation of authority
and hierarchy in educational policy in empirical terms as
the attempt t o support the assignment of control over the
educational process and product to some form of officially
sanctioned elite . I focus specifically on the following
sub-elements of the ideological patterning of hierarchical
and authority consciousness
:
* The locus of control over the allocation of
educational program resources. Related questions
include who exercises such control, by what office,
toward what end, and who benefits.
* The historical genesis of authority consciousness in
the sense developed by Marcuse (1955, pp. 32-36, 205;
1941, pp . 350-360) and Giroux (1983, pp . 33-34). The
specific manifestations would be evident in such
instances as:
- The management structure of the educational
activity
.
- The scope of interaction planned between
educator and participant.
- The "hidden curriculum" and its role in masking
conflict (Apple, 1979, pp . 82-104).
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Staff required to conduct theeducational activity and professionalization of
students/participants.
My main concern is with how AID's educational policies
attempt to put an authoritarian concept of order into
practice through institution building. Specifically, I
focus on the administrative mechanisms through which
educational policy is to be realized. The sub-elements of
the cross-cultural transfer of hierarchical patterns of
authority are summarized in Figure 4 on page 169. The
reciprocal character of the patterns should be stressed.
The overarching political framework consists of institutions
that are structured according to a hierarchical pattern
through which their respective authorities are exercised.
Various implicit or explicit heirarchical ideologies are
used to undergird the internal organizational patterns of
the institutions involved in implementing educational
programs. These ideologies are then incorporated into
activities at the curriculum and classroom/ training level
with a resultant effect on the shaping of developmental
consciousness. I plan to examine the institutional
discourse concerned with organizing educational programming
as a way to bring such ideological patterning to light.
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Tlie Ideology of Scientific Legitimation
In order for existing economic and political relations
to be maintained, there must be some way to legitimize the
social order. If such relations are unequal, particularly
when contrasted with western egalitarian values of social
justice and economic abundance for all, some form of
rational explanation is required. Groups holding power need
to rationalize existing circumstances in such a way as to
sustain their position over subordinated classes or other
groups. Where Christianity once exercised such authority by
divine right before the Enlightenment, the Age of Reason
ushered in scientific positivism. Here the concern is to
investigate how educational policies are legitimated through
the mechanism of positivistic economic and social science.
Brian Fay (1975) was interested in the question of the
de-politicization of social change through science:
Implicit in this belief that an applied science can
perform the tasks now seen as political is the tacit
presumption that science provides the paradigm example
of proper thinking, and that as long as any human
enterprise is not treated in a scientific way it is
being treated in an imperfect way. (p. 28)
The effect of such a belief is to remove social valuation
from the task of political administration. The question to
pursue in examining the legitimation of educational policy
is the role played by positivistic science in the policy
production process. This is important to understanding the
connections I suggest exist between educational policy and
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the causational powers attributed to scientific knowledge.
According to Fay (1975, pp. 31-44), science is used to
establish ranges of predictable social behaviors. Social
policy in the form of control is therefore conceptually tied
to the notion of prediction and explanation inherent in the
positivistic view of science. Being conceptually tied to
social engineering, it is merely a logical step to apply
objectively rational rules to the resolution of historical
problems
.
Such intervention also justifies current relations of
production because it offers a scientifically rational
explanation for them. In reviewing Marcuse's study of
rationality and productivity, Habermas (1970, pp. 82-83)
noted
:
. . .Domination is rational in that a system can be
maintained which can allow itself to make the growth of
the forces of production, coupled with scientific and
technical progress, the basis of its legitimation
although, at the same time, the level of the productive
forces constitutes a potential in relation to which
the renunciations and burdens placed on individuals
seem more and more unnecessary and irrational."
In the case of educational models applied to the task
of economic development, my focus will be on:
* In what ways conventional models of educational
research are used to further the donor nation's efforts
to reproduce its own relations of production through
the educational activity? Important to consider are:
- Models of research used in educational
programming and their respective sociological
theories of personal and institutional behavior
(Popkewitz, 1984, pp. 1-44).
- Relations of domination embedded in theoretical
models
.
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What key sociological concepts are used to tducation to socio-economic development ?
* What theoretical connections are assumeto exist between particular developmental
and educational activities?
d
s
or purported
trategies
Legitimation through scientific language is an
ideological function that enters the social space in all
three dimensions. It has economic, political, and other
social effects through the power it has to shape
consciousness most directly. The language of science has a
social impact that extends to all facets of productive and
cultural life, serving finally to objectify the world of
development and underdevelopment by posing for both all its
problems and the universally accepted methods for their
resolution. Since scientific language is so thoroughly and
pervasively embedded in all social life, it is necessary to
focus on AID s educational policy discourses with an eye
toward the scientific bases for theorizing.
The focal points for reflecting on legitimation are
summarized in Figure 5 on page 173. Scientific legitimation
spans all levels of the social space, reflecting the idea
that science has been insinuated into all consciousness.
Science can be considered to have determinative powers
irrespective of its intimate relationship with the mode of
production. Its language has been inserted into all
3development. There, it serves as the ideological mold in
which educational programming is cast, thereby legitimating
and theoretically underpinning the policies that guide such
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educational development activities as: The transmission of
survival and advancement skills, orientation to authority
and hierarchy, and individual and collective moral sense.
The Constitution of Developmental Consciousness
So far, I have directed my investigation of the concept
social space - to the identification of three dimensions
in which ideologies are formulated. The value of this
concept is that it serves as a suitable framework for
studying the determinative powers of ideology in the
production of developmental consciousness. Developmental
ideologies in this sense are not merely figments of
consciousness. To the contrary, the basis of my
investigation is to accept their constitutive powers as a
point of departure.^
The guiding proposition is that the object,
"developmental consciousness," is a composite of the three
basic forces that shape the social space. Developmental
consciousness is a vehicle that incarnates a particular kind
of thinking about development's power over the educational
process. The "thinking subject" in this sense is flesh,
blood, and brains only to the extent that his or her sense
of development is governed by the consciousness which has
>
interpellated him or her within that part of the social
space concerned with development. The impact of the three
ideological ensembles is thus realized in the set of
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developmental discourses produced by the thinking subject
acting in conformity with the object that has conditioned
it, namely developmental consciousness.
If, therefore, ideology operates in theory in the
interval between its material historical referents by
conditioning its momentary subject, namely development, how
is the subject to be distinguished from its determinants?
And further, how is one to distinguish between the
individual as dominated (determined) agent created to
reproduce relations of domination, that is to say, as
—bject
,
and the individual as origin that is. Subject of
domination?
The dilemma is addressed by Althusser (1984 [1973], pp.
132-139) when he concludes that the "Subject" cannot be
understood as human essence at all, because the very idea of
an independently thinking subject is an ideological
abstraction. The "Subject" can only be understood as
process within the stream of historical materialism with an
identity that emerges solely in the context of the unfolding
of the struggle between classes. The flesh and blood human
object embodies consciousness and its varied forms,
formulating identity within the context of conflict.
According to this reasoning, the Subject as process is
constituted within the social space. This means that the
Subject is situated amidst intersecting determinants of
economy, politics, and morality, in a state, as it were, of
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objective confusion." By "objective confusion" I mean that
the space has no objective order other than that which the
intersection of ideologies assigns to it. This is precisely
the function of ideology in its generic sense - to provide
g.ense of order amidst what in objective reality is a
confrontation of social forces.
When Althusser refers to the "interpellation" of the
subject, he means to set the ideological frame within which
the subject is called to be. Society thus anticipates the
subject through particular ideological ensembles. These
Provide the textual matrix, or the social corollary for
Lacan's (1977) psychological "Other," in which the
consciousness of the Subject is developed.^
The consciousness embodied within the individual can
and does assume varied forms. The struggle between forms of
consciousness, the developmentalis t orientation being one
cluster, is mediated by the individual. The individual as
embodiment of experience complies, adapts, resists, and
expresses the struggle in accordance with the the moments of
consciousness at work in the particular circumstances of
history. The individual may struggle to become conscious of
consciousness by accepting, rejecting, or altering
rationales in accordance with the search for truth. Choice
exists in the context of that struggle.
In searching out the referents of the developmental
cluster, I make use of the framework of the social space to
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reflect on three elemental relations of domination
identified in an unpublished paper by Mustafa Kiziltan
(1987) as characteristic of international development
assistance in education:
* Capital - Wage Labor . The ideological forms that
realize this relational pattern are expressed in theformation and execution of educational development
policy. The purpose of policy is to transmit
consciousness of an imaginary subject in marketable
terms. Education as transmitter becomes the source of
powers to sell or command certain kinds of labor. The
converse of this consciousness is that the cultural
roilieu of the object is viewed as problem-centered,
deficient in its current capacity to engage all in the
capital - wage labor relation.
* Expert ~ Layman . This relation can be made evident
at two levels of text: the one requiring qualified
candidates to institute the educational program and the
other realized as a vision toward which the local
participant should aspire. The ideological ensemble in
this relation is posited as the new system of rational
organizational patterns to be reproduced through
institutional reforms. The correspondent subject would
then appear as either suitable or unsuitable for
participation in this altered institutional framework,
depending on the attainment of individual
qualifications. Again, the converse of this thinking
is the problematized nature of the extant cultural
setting
.
* Center - Periphery . The matter that is of concern
here relates to Weiler’s (1983) observations on the
legitimation of scientific knowledge and the
correspondent delegitimation of traditional knowledge.
The production and spread of knowledge is tied to
certain institutional forms introduced by the donor
agency. On the social level, certain relations of
power are introduced from the center into the host
culture through ideological ensembles backed by
scientific knowledge. The recipient is then "de-
centered," as it were, objectified to be recreated as
new subject by virtue of being put into the position of
having to pursue correspondent avenues to new
knowledge
.
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The three critical relations function as links between
the economic, political, and legitimating ideologies and the
re-education of the subject in such areas as the
transmission and acquisition of correspondingly marketable
life skills, compliance with new authoritative modes of
instititional organization, and the subordination of ethics
and valuation to scientific rationality.
The Subject and its constitution within the frame of
the social space is depicted in Figure 6 on page 179. The
Subject constituted within the social space is not a self-
contained, symmetrical activity. The constitution of the
real subject is dialectical as well as reciprocal. That is
to say, the subject does not simply mirror the relations of
production, predictably to reinforce and realize them. The
subject is not a controllable entity in an objectively
scientific sense, as Althusser would have it. While
compliance and reciprocity may seem to result from the
deterministic standpoint, the will to resist programming is
as much an historical fact as the need to benefit from it.
The works of such radical educators as Freire, Giroux
(1983)
,
Matthews (1980)
,
and others emphasize the need and
the possibility of turning the imperative to resist into
effective critical action.
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Summary of Part 1
The analytical frame of reference developed here
provides a theoretical means for Identifying the social
referents for the development of particular forms of
consciousness. The idea of a social space permits us to
examine the functions of Ideology in the determination of
consciousness. What has been done in Part 1 is the
identification of the theoretical constituents of
developmental consciousness and their interrelated functions
within the social space. The economic, political, and
legitimational functions of America's developmental ideology
emerge in substance as a set of discourses that guide policy
formation in the specific instance of aid to education that
IS the subject of this inquiry. Part 2 is concerned with
the task of applying this frame of analysis to the
examination of the relationships between specific policies
and their ideological components.
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Notes
and between "public’private domains of activity and organization ^according to Althusser (1984 [1970], p. 19) ?s
institnMo^^’" ideological function of thetution in question is ail that matters. In hisanalysis of the capitalist state, Jessop (1982, pp. 4-5that the distinction is difficult to sustain
hpap’^
abstract, when concrete instances of the
thf state
complicity between agencies ofe and their private counterparts is considered.
his focus in a 1977 article is primarily on
reproduction, Bourdieu (1977, 487-496) reminds us:
...that the inheritance of cultural wealth which has
een accumulated and bequeathed by previous generations
really belongs (although it is theoretically
ottered to everyone) to those endowed with the means of
appropriating it for themselves
... (p . 488)
3.
Kuhn's (1970) position, to which I have referred indiscussion of the social impact of scientific communities,
IS definitely affirmative in this regard. The whole concept
ot policy science as a response to social crisis is coveredby piesing (1982, pp . 408-410), where he emphasizes the
social genesis of new developments in the social sciences.
4.
In an unpublished preliminary paper on education's
role in deve lopment
,
Don Adams (1986) reviews the changing
conceptions of education according to different theories of
development. He classifies the theories by using the
paradigmatic scheme proposed by Burrell and Morgan (1979).
I find the review very helpful, as it has provided a concise
summary of the evolution of major streams of thought that
tie education and development.
5.
In his 1964 essay (1984, pp. 156-159), Althusser
explores the basis on which Freud and Lacan attempted to
develop a science of psychoanalysis with its object of study
totally distinct from that of philosophy, the physical and
social sciences, and the then dominant trend in the practice
of "bourgeois" psychology:
One of the "effects" of the humanization of the
small biological creature that results from human
parturition: there in its place is the object of
psycho-analysis, an object which has a simple name:
"the unconscious ." (p. 157)
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I have been using the terms "consciousness"
unconscious" without distinguishing between tLm H ^mean to elide the difference between th^tvS thereby t, Tfone conception were identical to the other, but instead I
in^th^
position not dissimilar to that argued by Althussere same essay (pp. 161-169). The way I intLpret hir
tb^n^
terms, their difference is less qualitativeha quantitative, with the (conscious) discourse of thesubject based in the fundamental (unconscious) discourse ofIts determinative ideological ensembles.
Part 2
THE INSTANTIATION OF IDEOLOGY IN AID'S EDUCATIONAL POLICIES
Its Nature, Social Referents, and Implications
CHAPTER VI
A DISCURSIVE ANALYSIS OF AID'S EDUCATIONAL POLICIES
TTiemes and Metaphors within the DiscoursP
The method of discourse analysis is most suitable for
an investigation of the instance of ideology. Ideology is
cloaked within its own rhetoric. It is therefore neither
self-evident nor easily subject to direct scrutiny. It
hides itself within the language it produces. For this
reason, an analysis of AID's policy statements in education
cannot be accomplished in a deductive fashion alone. To
have directed the questions developed in the last chapter to
the statements as such would have yielded too little.
Something else needs to be worked out in the interim with
the problem of the ideological basis of the language in
which development policy is encased.
Policy as Discourse: The Metaphors Within
The interim step involves three operations, the first
two of which are undertaken in this chapter, while the third
is done in the next
:
* Uncovering the basic themes found within AID's
educational policy discourses;
* Extracting and grouping the metaphors embedded within
the themes; and.
* Locating the metaphors according to their ideological
referents within the social space.
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In the following paragraphs I spell out the relevant theory
on semantic discourse analysis used to deconstruct the
policy statements.
Deconstructing Policy Discourse
In his introductory paper on ideology and development
education, Kiziltan (1987) suggested that a connection exits
between a theory of ideology and its instantiation in
educational policy. He proposed that ideology could be
revealed through an analysis of the discourses issued by
development theoreticians and practitioners. To this end,
he said that "...the study of ideology from a perspective of
discourse analysis themat izes the connection between
language and ideology, i.e.
,
between word and power, and it
locates the ideological within language
,
be it everyday
language or scientific formulations..." (1987, p. 2;
emphasis added). This demands a shift of attention away
from the thinking subject, as I call him, to the "texts"
which authored his thinking and not the other way around.
Burton and Carlen's (1979, pp . 32-33) work on deconstructing
official government discourse in Britain closely parallels
the focus on the view of texts as social constructions. The
thinking incarnated as a certain orientation of
consciousness within the Subject and the conditions which
produced the texts for such thinking then become the object
of attention, not the Subject as independent author of the
texts
.
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I choose to emphasize the words "thematize" and
locate" to indicate how I plan to examine AID's discourses.
First, I look for the themes that reflect specific instances
of how the discourses were formulated. These instances can
be classified according to an analytical scheme proposed by
Foucault, who focused on discourse for;
...the existence of rules of formation for all its
objects (however scattered they may be), for all its
operations (which can often neither be superimposed norlinked together in succession)
,
for all its concepts(which may very well be incompatible)
,
for all its
theoretical options (which are often mutually
exclusive) (Foucault, 1978, p. 9)
Accordingly, I examine such instances of discourse in AID
policy to discover the rules that formed their objects,
operations, concepts, and theoretical options.
I begin with the text as a discursive formation with a
view to "deconstruct" it by revealing the rules by which it
was formed. The themes suggest various metaphors which I
will then "locate" according to their respective ideological
positions in the social space. This method of analysis is
analogous to the historical novelist who freezes a moment
much as a photographer would, only then proceeds to trace
the individual histories of the moment's components. The
individual histories represent the convergence of social
forces at work to create the conditions that produced the
"frozen" moment. Such a method corresponds with the
analytical approach suggested by Coward and Ellis in their
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LanSuage and Materialism (1977), In which they remark
that unity, that is to say, "the text" as (photographic)
moment, is only one moment in passing amidst the
contradictory flow of history (pp. 88-89).
In the view of Michel Pecheux (1971, pp. 67-69), any
discourse can be assumed to be determined by a set of tacit
productive conditions which represent the general or
interactional context. Pecheux's "tacit" is suggestive of a
cloaked set of rules that governs the production of AID's
policies in education. It remains for the discursive
analyst to identify the operative rules by starting with the
obvious - with explicit statements of policy the production
of which represents a composite of underlying themes and
metaphors
.
Uncovering Themes and Metaphors
Several attempts have been made of late to focus
attention on the "unconscious" use of metaphor and other
unacknowledged images to guide educational programming
generally and development education in particular. Kinsey's
pending article in the Comparative Education Review reviews
several metaphors in common usage in the field of
international education. A metaphor under his definition
would be a mode of speech that is developed and applied in
one context and subsequently transposed, often
unconsciously, onto another, ostensibly because of the
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power" Lt holds to "...mold our perception, questions,
conclusions and prescriptions..." (p. 5 ). What he finds
with respect to content is a predominance of metaphors
imported from the world of business, with frequent
references to terms like "'broker' of ideas," "input-
output," "flow-wastage," "supply-demand," "cost-benefit,"
"productivity," "accountability," and "efficiency" heading
the list.
In addition to the business metaphors, he identifies
such other metaphorical ensembles as those suggested by the
field of engineering (e.g., those derived from mechanics and
construction [Kinsey, p. 7]), which, as with those derived
from business, conjure up images of a world of manipulable
objects. In a similar vein, the worlds of sports and the
®^l^bary suggest confrontat ive stances in surmounting
competing approaches to life and development, while science
offers the biological, geographical, meteorological, and
medical (pp. 8-9). Kinsey calls for direct attention to the
problem of domination of one class of metaphor over others,
the "cool" and hard object manipulative, over the "warm" and
soft relationship-oriented metaphors. He suggests that we
become conscious of the prevalence of the
business/industrial in the field so that the search for
alternatives more suitable for education in a developing
world can proceed.
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The search for the metaphors embedded within
development education is rich in promise. Its potential, in
my estimation, is that it can play an important role by
opening the way for reconstructing perception and
stimulating alternative analysis. Developing consciousness
of metaphor means that the truth of current perception
cannot be taken for granted. Claims of knowledge are not
automatically true because they are based on common sense,
science, or religious belief. The grounds for knowledge are
always open to question, particularly when the development
of whole nations is considered. One way to question
knowledge is to search for its metaphorical referents in the
social space in which they are created and applied.
In The Rule of Metaphor
,
Paul Ricoeur remarked that
"...metaphor accordingly is part not of 'descriptive' but of
'historical' semantics..." (1977, pp. 115-116). The problem
with the developmental scientific metaphors, especially
those rational models of organization originating in the
Parsonian structuralist tradition, is that they are rooted
in idealist versions of scientific truth where their
semantic meaning is taken to be both inherent and universal.
The word in this view is imbued with its own, that is,
uniquely correct meaning, irrespective of either its
locutionary or historical setting. That being the case, the
use of metaphor to explain or influence events can be
particularly dangerous in that the metaphor usually goes
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unrecognized as such, being taken instead for absolute
truth
.
The study of ideology in a specific instance can begin
with the realization that metaphor has the power to
transpose covert meaning from one (historical) setting into
another. The position of metaphor floats between ideology
and consciousness, emanating from the former to insinuate
itself in the latter. An example Ricoeur offers deals with
the widespread use of "modelling," which he views as a
transpositional process utilizing a "...heuristic instrument
that seeks, by means of fiction, to break down an inadequate
interpretation and to lay the way for a new, more adequate
interpretation.
. .
' (1977
,
p. 240) . In this vein,
• • • the issue is not whether and how the model exists
,
but what are the rules for interpretation of the
theoretical model and, correspondingly, what are its
pertinent features. The important point is that the
model's only properties are those assigned to it by
language convention, beyond any influence of a real
cons truct ion ... Its fruitfulness consists in our knowing
how to make use of it; its ' deployability '... is its
raison-d ' etre . .
.
(p. 241)
This line of thought opens the way toward investigating
the metaphor as linkage between ideology and policy. The
"rules for interpretation" and the "pertinent features" of
the model become the object of attention where the
interactive role of the rules and features are exposed on
the way toward identifying their ideological referents
through the path opened by exposure of their metaphors.
191
aid's Statements on Educational Policy
Sources and Kinds of Material Collected
The material examined in this study was produced and
issued by the Agency for International Development over the
past two decades. The material was either issued directly
by the Agency itself, or was prepared by the contractors it
had officially commissioned. I identified the majority of
the data required for the study on visits to the AID
Resources Library in Rosslyn, Virginia, and subsequently
ordered microfiche copies of what I had selected from AID's
document retrieval center in Chevy Chase, Maryland.
AID has typically followed an administrative procedure
for the design and implementation of its programs of
assistance to education. Briefly, once educational policy
is set, projects in technical assistance to education follow
a pattern of development and implementation that usually,
though not always, begins with a Sector Assessment (SA) made
in the individual country, most often by a team composed of
experts who are contracted for this purpose. Once the
assessment is reviewed by officials of the host government,
including the Ministry of Education, and by AID, areas of
possible assistance are identified and a series of what are
called Project Implementation Documents (PID) and Project
Papers (PP) are then developed cooperatively. Following
this, individual projects in technical assistance are
developed by Agency mission and/or headquarters assigned
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personnel, often in the form of Requests for Proposals
(RFP), which are forwarded to appropriate institutions for
decision about submiting bids in the form of technical
proposals. The process is described in a staff training
manual published by one of AID's contractors in 1987
(Development Associates, pp. A4-A6)
.
I focus on the policy statements on education issued by
the Agency since 1975. The principal policy sources I have
drawn on are titled, "Education and Human Resources" (issued
December 12, 1975 and supplemented May 15, 1978), the
"Education Sector Strategy" (August, 1983), and the policy
paper, "Basic Education and Technical Training," (December,
1982). Significant trends in the educational resource
allocation patterns of the Agency were heralded by each of
the statements in that they signaled major programmatic
initiatives in nonformal education and school related
assistance respectively.
Policy Themes and the Metaphors Within
In the following paragraphs, I extract what I judge to
be the key elements of the four policy sources enumerated
above. I say "key" because ray focus is on the elements that
indicate overarching developmental economic and political
assumptions, direction, strategy, and resource allocation.
In the first round, the key elements of policy are
identified as themes, either by direct quotation or by
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paraphrase; while in the second round, the developmental
metaphors that are embedded in the themes are examined.
Round 1: The Key Policy Themes
19^. The following excerpts are taken from the sector
policy statement on education issued in transmittal
memorandum number 1:2 dated December 12, 1975.
It is AID policy to help LDC
' s [sic] provide
their poor majority with the knowledge,
skills
,
and orientation to enhance the quality of theirlives
^
and enable them to participate more fully ih
contribute more effectively to, and to receive morebenefits from national economic and social growth . .
.
(p.
In this statement, phrases are underlined that I judge
to be the key elements of policy related to the
developmental process, the direction toward which that
process is supposed to move, the strategy required to induce
such movement, and the allocation of resources needed to
mount the strategy. The statement says that development
involves giving knowledge, skills, and orientation (I call
this ensemble of educational objects "K-S-0" for short.) to
a targeted group (class) of poor people who do not currently
have the requisite K-S-0. There is a giver and a receiver.
There are several references using the word "more," with the
implication that once the targeted poor have more they will
be able to lead better lives.
The direction of development involves integrating the
poor into national economic and social growth. The poor
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have either been left out of national growth or by
implication retard it by their lack of participation. The
movement sought is from a local to a national orientation.
While it says little about how this direction is to be
i'^to effect, the statement implies a strategy of
provision or extens ion of new KSO from a central source to
those in outlying areas. It also highlights the central
role of government in the extension process with the
importance of bilateral assistance a key element.
Further on, the policy statement lists several existing
problems and needs:
"...limited resources...," "...more efficient and
effective education and human resources system... in
support of development...," "
. . . nonformal education
alternatives...," "improve, expand, or reorient formal
education institutions...," "using education as a means
for integrating women and the poor majority into the
development process...." (p.l)
The problems and needs identified here are based on the
belief that education can and should play a role as an
instrument of development. Development is a process that
can take place only on the condition that its obstacles are
removed, the obstacles in this view being a combination of
lack of appropriate material and human resources. The right
kind and amount of education is therefore necessary for the
human factor to become an instrumental part of, not obstacle
to, development.
The direction for education is one of reorientation
toward those K-S-0 that are development related. This is
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borne out by the list of "means and objectives" (pp. 1-2) as
the core of AID policy in educational assistance:
Greater relevance to development and the learning
needs of the poor majority." Examples offered are expanded
programs in nonformal education (NFE)
,
including farmer
skill training, health activities, industrial, construction,
and crafts OJT
. In schools, curricular changes in the
direction of nutrition, family planning, and improvements in
agricultural practices; in higher education, a
reorientation of research and teaching towards economic
and social development; while a shift in education in
general to existing and expected work opportunities" are
all recommended.
* Access to learning for higher numbers of people,
especially the poor, adult illiterates, and women."
Strategies would include the expansion of radio and other
mass education techniques, greater use of PVOs, and the use
of the formal system for adult education.
*
"Lower unit costs for formal and nonformal education
systems," to increase access through "better management and
more intensive use of existing systems," including staff and
facilities. The objective is to reduce failure, repetition,
and drop-out rates as a cost effective measure. One
strategy suggested is to increase the involvement of local
communities in providing educational programs as a way to
increase economies.
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* Increased attention to improved human resources
development strategies," meaning more backing on the part of
leadership to: improve local capacity to assess learning
needs; use and adapt existing means for learning; set up
pilot programs to reach the poor at lower cost; and increase
job opportunities and health through other public policies.
Such actions would include the "institutionalization" of
practices to "utilize resources more effectively," one
example being the establishment of "regional and national
planning units to help accomplish the above objectives.
* Finally, the policies recommended are to be
implemented through a process of identification of
developmental goals, related needs analysis, assessment of
current educational effectiveness, identification of
impinging constraints, both political, economic, and
cultural, as well as educational. The assessment process
culminates in the implementation of suitable formal and
nonformal programs. The analytical process "...should be
coordinated to the maximum feasible extent with the analysis
and planning for other key development sectors, so that it
is related to actual and potential work opportunities and
needs." Assistance is to be given "...in the light of [a
nation's] particular needs, capacity, and commitment to
education for development ...." (p. 1, emphasis added)
1978 . The supplement to this policy statement issued
on May 15, 1978 cites several examples of Agency funded
197
pilot activities using different models for school services,
radio mathematics Instruction, teacher training, literacy,
health, family planning, and nutrition. Higher education
assistance for instructional and research improvement for
development was also cited as a priority (pp. 27-28).
Of central importance is the adaptation of new
technologies for developmental needs through providing
technical expertise in the local setting, participant
training in the United States, and the strengthening of
management capacity to administer development programs
locally. The policy here is to introduce modern technology
through ...an alliance of the best brains in this country
and in the developing countr ies . . . to increase their chances
to pass the development 'take-off point...." (AID, 1978, p.
28)
1_98^. In the eighties, AID reprioritized basic
education in the formal system. The Policy Paper, "Basic
Education and Technical Training," issued in December, 1982
began this way:
The development of human resources (or "human capital")
is vital to the growth of overall productivity and the
efficient use of physical capital. While the
accumulation of physical capital resources is essential
to economic growth, it is the people who shape and
energize a nation's development ... (AID
,
1982, p. 1)
The document goes on to make the following points:
* Sustained economic and social development requires
efforts to increase the numbers and percentages of children
to complete "the first levels of schooling"; "...that most
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adolescents and adults have skills to participate fully in
modernizing institutions and productive activities"; and
...instructional systems which are both effective and cost-
efficient." To this end, AID's policy is directed toward
programs for "...increasing the efficiency and improving Che
distribution of basic education and skills training.
.. for
primary school age children and functional skills training
and vocational education for adolescents and self-employed
adults ..." (p . 2)
* Such education and training are to be "...correlated
with agricultural productivity, rural and urban development,
lower fertility, and increased health and nutritional
status..." The private sector needs a work force skilled in
these areas in order to grow. (p. 3)
^ The educational problems of the eighties are
characterized by: increased lack of educational opportunity
for the urban and rural poor, and for females; illiteracy;
high drop-out and repetition rates; low quality and lack of
resources; inappropriate preparation for employment; high
recurrent costs and inefficient use of available resources;
persistent cultural, political, and economic obstacles to
the education of females; and ineffective administration.
(pp. 4-5)
* The problems are amenable to resolution without a
major increase of resources beyond the capacities of the
countries involved. The major problems are thought to
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result from inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of current
systems to utilize available resources and to effect the
administrative, curricular, materials, and training
improvements necessary to make education more relevant to
developmental needs. In short, "...if little learning
occurs or if the learning is not effectively related to
employment and other desired functions, it is largely
irrelevant how many individuals have the opportunity; and if
the system is inefficient or ineffective in reaching
potential students, it is of little relevance that the
curriculum and pedagogy are appropriate"
... (pp . 6-7)
* The policy priorities of the Agency are therefore to
focus on:
7
The internal efficiency of the system
,
namely,
improving retention
,
promot ion
,
and other efficiency
measures; and programs to improve the home environment;
The external efficiency of vocational and technical
training programs
,
particularly with respect to the
labor market 7 demographic shifts
,
and the backgrounds
and motivations of students;
“ Local initiative and diversification of education and
training opportunit ies7 meaning encouraging parental
and community involvement in schools, local
administration, and the use of community resources.
The range of alternative models of administration and
financing is wide, and experimentation is encouraged to
fit local circumstances. Assistance from the private
sector in the form of materials is also encouraged,
particularly cooperative programs in vocational
training, (pp. 9-16)
* Assistance should involve the identification of
inadequacies, testing of "technical and strategic options
for overcoming the inadequacies," and implementing "cost-
efficient new programs" (pp* 18-19).
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* The following guidelines will apply for the
allocation of AID assistance:
- The focus will be on
private as well as public
•Countries which encourage
schools"
;
Program emphasis will be on "...decentralized
management, local participation, and diversified
sponsorship
. .
. ;
- In order to increase returns on investment in
education, priority will be given to improving theinternal efficiencies of existing systems;
Rather than maintaining inadequate systems,
programming will stress improving educational
administration, increasing completion rates, access forgirls and poor children, and improving technical and
material support for local initiatives;
- Support for secondary, higher, and pre-school
education will be tied to basic education, (pp. 19 - 21 )
* Vocational and technical training policy will respond
to three general problems: shortages or imbalances of
skills with available jobs; needs to supplement deficiencies
in pre-service education with training for specific jobs;
and needs "...to plan for the future supply of skilled
workers, taking changing technologies into account..." This
would include "functional skills training" for the self-
employed and out-of-school adolescents.
* Assistance will be directed toward training for:
increasing individual productivity; increasing the
productivity of enterprises; increasing employment
opportunities by diversifying "productive capacity";
improving the "productive performance" of public agencies;
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and strengthening "technical and administrative capacities
of local development organizations
... through training..."
Other training will be provided to larger employers to
provide training for their own employees, to the pre- and
in-service work forces of smaller enterprises, and nonformal
programs for organizations acting at the local level. The
underlying rule is to gear training as closely as possible
to the jobs needed and available. This means encouraging
employers to both sponsor and advise on the content of such
training to the maximum extent feasible, (pp. 24-28)
The basic guidelines for training assistance are to
relate training to:
employment and improving economic productivity;
specific social or economic objectives for which
training needs would be identified by employers and
participants
;
skill needs of the participants, including women;
the vocational and technical needs of community
organizations, (p. 29)
* Strategic assistance will focus on: strengthening
capacities to assess, analyze, and research educational
needs; improve management at all levels, with a view to
local needs and decentralization; and the specific
circumstances of individual countries. (pp« 30-34)
The document concludes with references to the
"...fuller application of science and technology in
development programs; reliance on market mechanisms and the
private sector to stimulate economic development;
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strengthening of institutions which are key to the
development process; and reinforcement of the efforts of
local leaders to address their own development problems and
to improve the administration and management of local
resources" (p. 36). The role of education in development is
to counteract people's tendencies "...to rely more on
traditional leaders and government officials than on
themselves for most important decisions. Neither market
mechanisms, nor democratic processes, nor informed personal
choice can flourish in such a context" (p. 37).
19^. The final document relating to AID's educational
policy of the 1980s is titled, "A.I.D. Education Sector
Strategy, issued in August, 1983. While its purpose is not
to make policy as such, the paper offers an excellent view
of how policy is to be translated into action.
The paper begins with a brief summary of AID experience
as lessons learned. These include affirmation of AID's
ability to effect reform insofar as efforts to do so are
well aimed and sustained over the long term; ways to insure
host government cooperation; efforts that use a broad,
comprehensive approach; ways to insure a strong
institutional base; provision of relevant long and short
term training for Ministry and other key personnel; and use
of innovational technologies (p. 1).
The strategy in general involves measures to increase
efficiency, the "quantitative and qualitative outputs of
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educational investments, and ef feet iveness . .
. in supporting
educational and economic development objectives" (p. 2).
Nations are targeted according to whether less than two
thirds of primary age children complete grade four and there
is ...a host country policy commitment to increased
internal efficiency... (p. 3). To those countries that do
have a higher primary school age completion rate and a
shortage of skilled workers, AID gives priority for
technical training and vocational education.
At the country mission level, the recommended procedure
to follow is to:
* Conduct an education sector survey which would
include data to support the selection criteria above,
application of the data to local conditions, and a proposal
for subsequent educational activity.
* Implementation factors to be considered in primary
education will be:
- Greater integration of the content (e.g., curriculum
reform, teacher training, educational technologies, and
NFE) into efforts to reform, increase efficiency, and
impact on employment and national development.
- Program areas for efficiency and decentralization of
administration and financing will likely include:
administration and supervision, management systems,
materials development and production, in- and pre-
service teacher training, educational technologies for
remote areas, research to identify constraints to
efficiency, and innovations aimed at "...getting more
education for each dollar spent." Some pre-school
programs would also be considered, (p. 5-6)
* In the area of skills and technical training,
programs would include basic skills; NFE service agency
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outreach to community organizations; skills training for
work through radio and print, extension, and OJT
; literacy;
and project related training for village level workers in
organizing projects, using media, and assessing needs.
The thematic policy review above identifies all the
themes evident in the four documentary sources. While other
policy statements that have an impact on education were also
issued during the period, this material provides an ample
quantity of themes to deconstruct for their formative
metaphors
.
Round 2. Deconstructing the Developmental Themes -
In Search of the Metaphors Within
I use the term "deconstruction" in the sense that AID
educational policy represents a discourse on development.
The materialist view of discourse begins from the position
that the human being in society must be studied as a process
of social construction (e.g.. Coward k Ellis, 1977, pp. 1-
2). In this view all knowledge has social referents. In
the postivist tradition, however, the social referents of
knowledge are denied. Knowledge instead is expressed in
discursive terms which claim their status as truth. An
alternative way to begin the study of the validity of such
claims is to start from the position of the claims and
proceed reflectively.
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AID s policy texts have been produced to guide its
practice, be reported to the Congress, and to inform the
public. In reality, if the texts were momentary
constructions, then the direction of inquiry must be toward
the social forces of the ideologies that produced them. The
route I traverse to expose the ideologies which are
implanted in developmental consciousness is backward, in
reverse, from text to theme to metaphor to ideology. While
the route in this view is not linear by any means, the word
deconstruct seems apt to describe the process.
According to the theory of ideology I have investigated
to this point, the function of ideology is to unify the
clash of contradictory forces of the social space by
generating the texts to do so. The forces "in contradiction
and intersection" in this sense produce the texts which
construct the consciousness of the subject, a consciousness
that appears rational, whole, and self- justifying.
Developmental consciousness is therefore produced as
one moment in dialectical relation to the contradictory
forces of the outside world (Coward k Ellis, pp. 8-10). The
purpose of this particular construction is to fulfill the
main function of ideology, namely to present an
evolutionary, complete picture of social relations that are
natural and subject only to incremental change, that is to
say, to development (p. 27). With this theoretical
introduction in mind, the discursive themes that govern
aid's educational policies are grouped as follow:
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Economic Growth
. The image of economic growth is
prevalent. Growth is portrayed as a social fact of life
that will naturally continue. Economic growth is a
precondition for social improvement. The latter is causally
conditioned by the state of the former. The reforms
recommended in education are based on several problems
related to economic growth: increasing numbers of school
children, more people unemployed, and higher costs. The
picture of a healthy society is one in which economic growth
outpaces social problems. Such growth is presented as the
necessary means to expand services. Economic growth is
assumed to be a social good in and of itself, irrespective
of specific social purpose.
* The poor . The "disadvantaged majority" of human
beings who survive at the margins of life are called "the
poor. They are undereducated, undernourished,
underc lo thed
,
and inadequately sheltered. They have lacks
which prevent them from participating fully in society.
They are characterized by low productivity, a deficiency
that prevents them from receiving the benefits society could
offer. Instead of being active participants in economic and
social development, they are (unfortunately) obstacles to
it. Many of their beliefs and practices about family
structure, leadership and decisionmaking, religion,
community relationships, and social purpose are presupposed
to be antithetical to development.
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Education
_
is indis pensable to development
. Education
vehicle to bring the necessary knowledge, skills, and
orientation (K-S-0) to the poor. The content of education
should be determined by the economic developmental needs of
society. Educational programming should be directed toward
delivering this content to the most needy. Many problems
with education today, as well as in the past, result from
content which is functionally inappropriate for development.
* Improving the "quality of life ." The theme of
improving conditions toward a better life is also evident.
The present quality of life is bad because too many people
are hungry, out of work, suffer from disease, and live in
bad conditions. The right kind and amount of education is
believed to enable the people to change these conditions so
that they can make improvements in the quality of their
lives
.
* Educational resources are in short supply . The lack
of adequately and appropriately trained teachers,
appropriate educational materials, school facilities and
equipment, and competent administration makes schools
ineffective in delivering education to the numbers of
people, both children and adults, women and girls, who need
it
.
* Education management is weak . School and educational
administrators are inadequately prepared and trained to
provide the support necessary to accommodate their students
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and adult clientele. Running large and complex systems from
the national level requires skills in managing information
and resources, planning, organizing programs, providing
support, communication, and making appropriate changes for
improvement. This aspect of the administrative problem is
viewed to be people-related. In this respect, the right
kind of training, often at U.S. institutions, would
alleviate the personal deficiencies of management that
inhibit education systems from running effectively and
efficiently.
* Education systems are beset with inefficiencies
.
These are evident in poor passing, retention, and dropout
rates. The problem here is that even those children who can
attend school are not provided with the quality of education
they need to advance successfully. School resources are not
used intensively enough. Costs spread across numbers of
students could be reduced with better management.
* There is a need for innovation
. Advances and new
practices would help address some of the problems faced by
educational leaders. Possible directions include
experimentation and introduction of models for
decentralization of administration, fostering community and
family participation, needs assessment and project
development, regional planning, and other cooperative
measures to be taken with service delivery agencies outside
the education sector. New developments in teaching
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methodologies for literacy and numeracy, classroom
approaches, and curricular models would increase
effectiveness
.
* ^*^st
i
tut ional development is a necessary means to
effect improvements. The introduction of innovations and
the improvement of management should be institutionalized.
More specifically, the capacity for making improvements
should be incorporated into organizations that are
responsible for delivering educational services.
Institutionalization would involve a dual process of
personnel development and the introduction of innovative
procedures to strengthen the capacities of educational
services in administration, curriculum and materials
development and distribution, and, finally, teacher training
and support
.
* Modern educational technologies are necessary to
increase efficiency and effectiveness . This would include
computerization of teacher services, supply distribution,
tracking and examination of student performance, and
communication among schools and other programs. Advances in
radio and television broadcast, print materials, satellite
communication, and research methods would help systems
reduce costs and reach more people in need. A greater
reliance on science and technology is needed to offset
traditional patterns so that development can proceed.
* The final theme I
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wish to highlight at this stage is
one that is evident throughout all the others. The theme
underlies AID's efforts to translate its policy goals into
action. Its focus is on process
,
a rational approach to
identify problem areas according to educational policy
goals, conducting needs analyses, setting resulting
objectives, organizing resources and developing suitable
plans, dealing with obstacles, taking appropriate actions,
and evaluating results. The process is fundamental to
decision making about the allocation and delivery of
technical resources through projects. It is central to the
implementation of the entire program approach to education
for development. It sits at the core of the rational
planning and implementation methodology employed by the
Agency (as well as most western development organizations)
to expend its resources. I will pay more direct attention
to this general operational model in my summation of AID's
developmental ideology in the next chapter.
Up to this point, the themes interwoven in AID's
education for development policies have been stated in their
own terms. I continue now with the task of deconstruction
by first isolating the metaphors embedded within the
developmental themes.
The function of metaphor I have shown is to explain or
interpret an event or situation such as policy discourse by
taking a concept developed in one context and tranposing it
into another. The insertion of metaphor into policy
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discourse is most effective when it disappears by
substituting itself as real and sufficient description for
and explanation of the conditions that produce policy.
Insofar as it is invisible, the metaphor succeeds in its
task by insinuating ideology into consciousness. This is
why It becomes necessary to deconstruct texts to uncover the
metaphors that lie within them.
For this operation I turn to the analytical scheme
offered by Foucault which suggests several focal points for
the deconstruction of specific instances of discourse. I
apply his scheme formulate three combinations of the
discursive themes (on growth, the poor,
institutionalization, etc.) identified in the previous
section as a way to extract the major metaphors
hypothesized to lie within them.
1. Growth : The concept of economic growth is
fundamental to the entire scheme of development advanced by
the Agency. It is the sine qua non of modernization. It
makes other advances possible. Without growth, specifically
economic growth, there appears to be no possibility of
supporting modernization. It fuels the engine of
enterprise. It provides government with the resources
needed to educate the people, defend the land, and develop
the nation. Whether growth is an end or a means to
"development" is not clear. In the AID educational policy
statements I reviewed, growth appears to be both end and
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means. The terras "developraent " and "growth" are, if not
equivalent in usage, inseparable, the latter conditioning
the forraer.
l^a. Rules of obj ect forraation : In Foucault's
analytical scherae, growth iraagery can be seen in light of
the various "rules" by which it has been forraulated. The
first is what I would call its "definitive rules of
forraation," which set growth apart as an object. What is
growth that it can be identified in the first place and what
are its constituents? Other than to specify its necessity
and to raake references to "economic and social growth,"
aid's policy statements in education say little about it
directly. The commonly applied set of rules governing the
concept, however, are economic in origin. They apply such
statistical macro~indicators as GNP, population growth,
inflation, life expectancy, GDP, trade balance, external
debt, capital flow, development assistance received, income
distribution, government revenues and spending, levels of
education, skill levels of the labor force, internal and
external migration, as well as industrial growth, to name
just a few (The World Bank, 1987, pp . 202-267).
The economy assumes life as an entity, an organism,
which feeds and is fed. It possesses certain
characteristics that define its stage of development, the
definition derived from the indicators wherein size, volume,
and rates of expansion determine its "health." As object.
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the economy then generates its own discourse in the form of
measures of growth activity, either in the terms of its
absence or regression. To the extent they are taken as a
living entity, the growth traits in the form of indicators
the foundation of development.
In this way the organismic growth metaphor establishes
itself as the realm in which development policy is made
possible. It sets the stage on which all development
education policies, the "objects" in Foulcault's
terminology, are produced.
lb. The rules of operation : The indicators of growth
are derived from the science of economics which says that
economic growth is governable according to a set of
"natural laws." The operational rules of the economy in
their form as "natural economic laws" set the context in
which the Agency's policy discourses have materialized. The
discourses define development as problematic according to
the universal rules that govern all economies.
In actuality, however, the operant set of rules now
thought to apply to the economy was originally developed in
the context of natural science. Only as metaphors did they
unconsciously make their way into economic science. In
turn, the rules purported to govern the process of economic
development originated by metaphorical transpositon from the
univeral economic laws which were supposed to govern the
process of economic growth. Finally, the rules governing
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development are used to define the rules by which
educational policy is set. The metaphorical transposition
process referred to by Ricoeur is, in this repect, multi-
tiered, with the science of economic development deriving
Its social force from the science of economics, which itself
was defined by metaphorical transposition from the natural
sciences
.
In this vein, AID's policy statements about education's
indispensable role in contributing toward "national economic
and social growth," "increasing efficiencies in light of
decreasing resources," "increasing access," "decreasing unit
costs through cost effective measures," and aligning skills
with jobs available have borrowed "scientific" backing
through a metaphorical transposition process. The
transposition, however, goes unrecognized as such. In this
sense, the indispensibility of growth serves metaphorically
as a model for social transition. The inducements to growth
are taken as scientifically proven grounds on which to base
development policy.
The model of economic science defines the scope within
which educational operations can take place. The law of
supply and demand, for instance, is cited as governing the
kind of training that should be provided for the learning of
technical skills. Certain natural laws about human economic
behavior and its universality determine the best ways to
organize productive activity, with some allowance for
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cultural difference thrown in as a factor that needs to be
"accounted for." Operations should be set up according to
models of Innate human tendencies to acquire material goods,
since individuals would "naturally" have the highest
potential to maximize returns on economic investment. While
the list of rules for operationalizing growth goes on, the
point IS that they find their backing in the discourses on
economic science.
Ic. Rules governing the formulation of growth concepts :
Conceptual variations on the growth theme are not spelled
out in detail in the policy statements made in education.
However, there are references made that call such variations
to mind. The concept whereby the right skills in the right
quantities are infused at the right time conjures up an old
metaphor imported from nuclear physics, the "critical mass
model." This is generally conceived as a matter of
imparting the right blend of K-S-0 to needy "pockets" of
undereducated poor to counter the scarcity of skilled labor
in usually urban industrial centers. Policy references are
made to design vocational and technical training on the
basis of a tighter "fit" between what is taught and what is
needed by firms doing business in the geographic area. The
educational endeavor in this conceptual scheme becomes more
of a direct function of the labor market, where skilled
labor is looked upon as one in a number of possible "missing
links" in the economic growth chain. The chain itself is
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forged by interlocking links from a variety of theoretical
schemes which have their basis in an educational application
of human capital theory," a subject to which I will turn
presently. As soon as enough skilled labor is made
available, industrial and other productive enterprises will
have the critical mass" needed to spur consumption and
savings to increase capital formation.
The discourses on economic growth offer a rational
explanation for the current social upheaval wrought by the
transition from agrarian to industrialized economies. In
this way they provide a rational basis on which to plan
development programs. The link-chain model of training,
jobs, production, spending, demand, savings, capital
formation, expansion, more jobs, and so on is one example of
metaphorical modeling to guide development policy. The
circularity of an interlocked series of cause and effect
linkages represented by the model, however, is not seen as
metaphor. It is seen as technology backed by science.
Id. The delimitation of theoretical options :
Education's role in economic development is defined by
"human capital theory" (e.g., Becker, 1976, pp. 122-130;
Schultz, 1963). The theory is based on the proposition that
there is an economic value to education that can be
determined monetarily by attributing earned income from
marketable productive activity in the future to past
investment in education. While there is some variation as
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to what is to be counted and disregarded, and how one
factors in inflation, the idea is that choice making on
investment in education, either national (social) or
personal, can be facilitated by exclusive reference to the
future monetary returns anticipated by the original
investment. This referencing process is recommended to be
one of the factors thought necessary to inform policy
decisions
.
For example, in the late seventies and early eighties,
AID made a major shift in policy, without a reallocation of
resources (Rihani, et al
.
, 1986, Vol III, p. 37), from
investment in higher and nonformal education to primary
education at least partly on the basis of greater
anticipated returns, both social and private, per amount
invested (Rihani et al
.
,
1986, Vol. II. pp. 4-5;
Psacharopoulos 8^ Woodhall, 1985, pp. 58 h 119). The
evidence to support the theory of returns to education from
investment in primary education is now widely held to be a
valid basis for policy decisions. The measure of potential
earning power and its correlation with educational resource
input in effect is taken as conditioning the set of
theoretical options for investment in education.
Education for development as development is defined by
the indicators derived from human capital theory then
becomes the equivalent of development. The discourses for
theorizing about education are derived logically from human
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capital theory. The arena of theorizing is thus
circumscribed by the human capital discourses.
The metaphorical image is one of a complex machine that
operates through the adjustment of trained expert planners
who apply the correct amounts of educational input to the
raw material and combine it with other factors to "produce"
the ingredients thought essential for economic growth. A
kitchen of cooks mixing the stew also comes to mind. The
recipe for the stew originates within a particular cultural
tradition for a limited number and kind of people. Only
now, the cooks have been asked to expand the recipe to feed
several households with the same amount of ingredients
.
Having covered the metaphors arising from AID's
discourses on growth, I continue reviewing the other themes
I extracted from AID's policy statements on the poor and the
institutionalization of innovations. In so doing, I
continue using Foucault's analytical scheme as a guide for
reviewing the discourses with a view to uncovering the
formative rules embedded in the themes.
2. The Poor : The "Poor" represent the "Other." As the
majority of human beings, they are looked on as not yet
having the means to participate in the grand process of
economic and social growth. They are locked out of the
design and implementation of their own development. They
suffer the staggering effects of such complex phenomena as
population growth, declining agricultural production, urban
219
poverty, rural stagnation, disease, infant mortality,
malnutrition, and lack of education. They are the "victims"
where there are no criminals. They are subject to changes
over which they have little control and from which they get
little benefit. They survive at the margins of society.
2a. The rules for their objectification : As identified
in AID policy, they are the "target." AID's development and
educational programs are "aimed at" them. Outreach and
resources are directed towards them. In this view, they are
cited as the object of education for development. They are
the ones to be developed. AID's policies are aimed to
integrate them into the economic and social mainstream. The
question of how they got to be left out, however, is not
addressed
.
Rules governing the developmental process are thought
to be linear. That is to say, development is conceived as
progressive, from primitive to more "developed" stages. The
predominant image of progress is temporal. The poor are
represented as existential objects caught in a present that
history is bypassing. They need to "catch-up" with
progress. They have to modernize to be saved. While
religious overtones are explicitly avoided, the religious
metaphor nonetheless strongly parallels the temporal
progression toward salvation through the elect route of
modernization. Various epistles on modernization are
conveyed by "priesthoods" of development workers who
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promulgate the rules for salvation in the form of the K-S-0
required for success in the modern world. At the center of
the portrait on poverty sit the poor as flocks of lost sheep
waiting to be guided. While the parallels could be
extended, the main point is that the conditions of the poor,
their circumstance of life, the relationship patterns that
define their sense of kinship and community, are depicted as
problematic. They lead lives of low quality. The
predominant image that guides interaction with them, the
application of educational policy included, is painted in
tones of material, intellectual, and spiritual deprivation.
Other related aspects of their social lives are defined in
quantitatively problematic, not qualitative terms.
2b. Operationalizing development : Rules for
implementing development schemes are directed toward
variations of targeted populations. The rules are usually
defined not in the terms by which the "lumped poor" refer to
themselves, but in the terms of those defining the scopes of
their respective targets. Examples are derived from project
needs statements: out-of-school youth, unemployed urban
unskilled workers, primary school dropouts, illiterate
farmers, uncertified teachers, undereducated women, and so
on. The rule here is that the definition of the problem
determines the name of the target. In order for the Agency
to show impact, the target has to be defined in specific
terms. Policies devised to support programs follow rules
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that are object related. Resources are directed at the
resolution of the specific problems that are faced by
specific people at specific times. The people and the
problem become so closely intertwined that distinguishing
where the person ends and the problem begins in the project
discourses is next to impossible. People are portrayed as
problems that need to be solved.
The overarching metaphorical operation is that of
"labelling." The poor are subdivided into problem
categories so that assistance efforts can be targeted to the
right places. The order of the labelling process usually
proceeds from priority area to specific problem to target
group, with the measurement of project success determined by
one particular aspect of the problem alone. One example can
be seen in the impact of education on the decline of
fertility rates. The problem addressed by the educational
input is a high birth rate. Educational inputs are made,
outputs are measured, and the outcome (impact) is determined
by the extent of decline of the birth rate. If the rate
declines as planned, ergo success is achieved.
The formation of operational rules is thus a process of
applying "developmental language" in the form of specific
problem-related discourses to targeted groups. The groups
are "interpellated," to borrow from Althusser, according to
the specific instance of developmental discourse to be
applied. The function of the discourse is to divide up the
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sphere of action into manageable pieces toward which
programs can be aimed and impact demonstrated. The
implementation of policy is thus made possible through the
operation of rational language which provides the means to
transpose a host of metaphorical conceptions to isolated
problem groups according to the tools available to define
and address them.
Rules for conceiving the poor as problem cum
opportunity: Applying concepts of development to define the
target group according to the problem (or problems) is a
process dependent on the state of the art. How the problems
of the world s poor majority" are classified is an
outgrowth of the scientific tools at hand to deal with them.
When development is considered, the tools are usually
derived from concepts about growth and modernization. As I
covered growth in the previous section, I focus here on the
concepts of modernization embedded in AID's policies for
development education.
The duality notion I mentioned briefly in Chapter IV
lies at the core of modernization. Duality as a concept is
attractive for the ease with which it can be
"operationalized" and for the power it has to generate
subsequent theory. The concept is, as I noted there, simple
to understand. It offers an excellent adjunct to the grand
macro-economic scheme of development proposed by Rostow in
the early sixties. It is a descriptive process that
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involves identifying the principal traits of modernity
empirically by extracting them from industrialized society
as a model. The profile of modern traits is then ordered
according to the specific levels and forms of social
organization found in "modern" society, namely individual,
institutional, and societal. The second step in the process
results from a simple binary operation - The modern profile
IS contrasted with those found in non-modern societies. To
the extent that the traits so profiled are lacking within a
specific social profile, by definition, that society is
classified as behind, backward, traditional, or any of a
number of alternatives to the same effect.
The notion of duality is applied foremost to the poor.
It is the conceptual source of the trait
-derived lackings
found among them. The lackings are then converted into sets
of needs that govern the production of educational policies
and their curricular offspring. The case of literacy and
numeracy are obvious . Others are to be more thoroughly
integrated into the underlying economic setting. The K-S-0
referred to are derived from those traits that define the
knowledge, skills, and orientation thought necessary for
individual development. The word "orientation" is
emphasized here because it escapes explicit definition in
aid's educational policy statements. I surmise that it
covers important attitudes and behaviors that are deemed
essential for prospering in modern society. These would
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include the entrepreneurial approach, rational planning
(also a skill), achievement motivation, competitive drive,
risk taking, thrift, hard work, and so on. These must be
inculcated in the poor ostensibly because they have been
deprived of the opportunity to learn them in the context of
their own traditional cultures. The image of the path out
of poverty is an analog of the well-meaning, scrappy
apprentice who, after a suitable period of learning from the
master, strikes out on his/her own, takes learning to higher
levels, and ends up better off than the old master. In the
case of development assistance, however, the image is raised
to an international scale where America holds itself forth
as the experienced master with Third World nations depicted
in the position of apprentice.
2d. Theorizing about the poor : Modernization theory
applies two entirely different theories to the development
of the poor. The first, alluded to above, posits the vessel
of economic growth as the mold in which the poor are cast.
The shape of the mold is determined by the constellation of
grand schemes which dictate the economic path all societies
must traverse in order to progress. The two most notable
schemes already covered are Rostow's linear theory of growth
stages and the Harrod-Domar model of capital investment as
the crucial spur to growth. This constellation of theories
and their corollaries provides the frame in which
modernization is conceived to be possible.
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The second major source of theorizing impetus
originates in the concept of modernization itself. The
traits list provides a set of objectives for social
organization. It visualizes the insides of the outer mold.
The ideal individual, institutional forms, and social
framework are pictured as complementary, interlocking
networks of reciprocal functions and interactions. At the
societal level, an expanding industrial economy provides for
the material needs of all citizens. At the institutional
level, corporations, educational and other governmental
services, health facilities, and the customary practices and
patterns through which people interact socially and
economically are all supposed to function in a mutually
compatible arrangement as intermediaries between the
economic system and its individual members. At the level of
the individual, such institutional formations provide people
with the means to relate to each other and to meet their
needs. This functionalist perspective is based in the
belief that the "natural" tendency of society is toward
cohesion. Conflict in the structural functionalist
perspective is viewed to be an aberration always reducible
to either individual or institutional disfunction. For
example, the phenomenon of "underdevelopment" is explained
ultimately as a set of temporal deficiencies that beset
populations and institutions as a result of internal
cultural and geographic influences.
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Theorizing about education and its role in development
is done within the functionalist paradigm of social change.
Imparting the right mix of K-S-0 is thought to be possible
without overturning the basic unity of the social system
because the social system is believed to have an inherent
tendency to cohere. Therefore, all theory of education for
development is directed toward the incremental improvement
of individuals and the institutional frameworks within which
they interact. Education is not directed toward collective
action which aims to overturn or negate existing
institutional relations. "Individuation" is an apt term for
describing the function of education in this view. Reform
is the discourse that is meant to better institutional forms
without eradicating them. Reform theory is to be managed by
those in the know, the ones who are properly trained to
institute innovations. I will take a closer look at some
aspects of institutional reform under the topic of the
institutionalization of educational innovation immediately
below
.
3. Institutionalizing innovations: The context of
education for development : In this section I cover several
themes related to the educational delivery system:
efficiency, administration and management, institution-
building, and the process of innovation as technology
transfer
.
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If the context for development is set in the mold of
growth and modernization, its strategies for implementation
are directed toward problems identified at both the
individual, covered in the section above, and the
institutional levels. The operational discourses for
institutional development" are found in the Agency's policy
statement on institutional development issued in March,
1983. That document stressed the need for "analysis and
reform of the policy environment ,... consideration and
introduction of organizational alternatives ,... development
of institutional learning capacity ,... transfer of knowledge
and technology ,... analys is and improvement of institutional
linkages/coordination,
.. .provision of skills and
training ,... and capitalizing on local capacities and
participation..." (AID, 1983c, pp. 2-6).
3a. The institution and its environment as problem-
object : The institution in AID's policy is to be analyzed
and treated on two levels - According to the interactions it
has with its own external environment; and internally,
according to the influences of its environment. The
development and implementation of policies for institutional
development in this view are conditioned by the prevalent
view of economic development and the functional role of
education. As an entity the institution, that is, the
education system should have the capacity to deliver quality
educational services to the right people. The education
system plays the intermediate role between the individual
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students and the setting within which they are expected to
function. To this end, the institution of education is
designed to turn raw material into effective producers and
consumers
.
In this line of thought, the existing institution can
be compared with a patient in need of care. The current
institution is beset by inner maladies which hinder its
abilities to deliver the services intended. In its
metaphorical representation as patient, the educational
system is seen in need of remedial attention in the form of
a series of organizational interventions before it can
fulfill its institutional mission. The maladies most
frequently cited are: inadequately trained personnel,
fiscal management problems, lack of consistent procedures
for managing personnel, lack of planning, lack of resources,
obstacles to delivering services, unclear objectives, and so
on. When institutional development needs are considered,
the organizational development approach is high on the list
of strategies that can be applied. While AID employs
predominantly business -derived metaphors explicitly,
comparison to health can be made. The path from economic
malnutrition to health is the business of development.
3b. The rules for intervening : The object
"institution" provides a locus for the mobilization of
resources to carry out the education for development
mission
.
To the extent it experiences difficulties in doing
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so, the system as such becomes a focus for the
Identification of problems. The primary function of the
object label, "institution," is to provide a venue for
organizing resources, those introduced in the form of
external innovations included. The rubric "institution-
building" is constructed around the Parsonian "systems"
frame of reference. The educational system in this frame is
charged with a number of outputs it must make to fulfill its
developmental mission. The outputs, as I indicated above,
are determined by the requirements of an expanding and
transitional economy. Fundamentally, the function of the
outputs is to structure the inputs. In order for the system
to successfully produce students with the correct mix of K-
S 0, namely its outputs, it has to organize the resources to
do it
.
The educational system in Parson's view is a
"subsystem" whose operational deficiencies should be
corrected in order to maintain overall balance within the
larger social system. The metaphor that guides this
approach is the construction of a complex edifice in which
component parts must serve each other integrally in order
for the subsystem to function well enough to produce the
outputs required by its environment. The matching process
in a modernizing society becomes increasingly involved and
complex. It consequently can be handled only by duly
qualified experts who can determine what is needed, know how
230
to get the right components, and how to trouble shoot
problems in the construction process.
As the system has trouble meeting its goals, it needs
help. To this end, it calls for the intervention of experts
and other resources to identify its deficiencies, make plans
to deal with them, and operationalize the assistance. The
assistance is aimed to increase the efficiency of the
operating system by alleviating its internal problems. In
this way, the overarching economic and social system can
remain intact while expertise is applied to resolving the
problems of its component subsystems. Expert assistance is
always given under the condition that radical structural
transformation, namely revolution, is not required to
address the problems of underdevelopment. While component
elements of the system may require periodic adjustment, the
system itself is never depicted in a state of severe crisis,
at least in the remedial terms described in AID policy and
project literature.
3c. Concepts of efficiency and innovation : The idea of
efficiency is contained within the idea of system. As an
idea it originated in another field entirely, that of
engineering, from which it was "borrowed as a metaphor"
(Windham, 1988, p. 6). In economic terms, efficiency has to
do with "... maximizing the value of all outputs for a given
cost of all inputs ..." (p. 6). The translation of this
metaphorical concept into educational programming is the
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subject of Windham's recent study, which was done under the
auspices of an AID funded contract. The attempt to
"operationalize" the concept is solidly based in systems
theory and uses a "production oriented model," or some more
complex economic variation, as a way to generate efficiency
theory in education. Windham concludes his study by
recommending three proposals: (1) Middle and senior level
educational administrators be trained in "...decision-making
principles and ...efficiency analysis..."; (2)
Establishment and monitoring of effectiveness and
®ffi-ciency benchmarks within educational institutions and
systems, and, (3) Development and maintenance of an
educational management system based on the principals [sic]
of efficiency analysis" (p. 154). Indicators would be
grouped around the systems order of inputs, process,
outputs, and outcomes. Examples under the category "inputs"
include teacher characteristics, facilities, equipment,
materials, and administrative capacity. Under process are
found administrative behavior, and teacher and student time
allocations. Outputs include attainment, achievement, and
equity effects. Outcomes involve indicators of admission to
and achievement in further study, employment, earnings,
attitudes and behaviors, and externalities (pp. 163-165).
The metaphorical image used to highlight "efficiency"
is one reminiscent of Myrdal's professional social engineer
who comes in a variety of specializations. The whole idea
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of project applied by AID is put into practice through the
matching of expert advice with the problems it has defined.
The financial manager, for example, logically assists in
helping to resolve problems with fiscal operations, the
curriculum developer, practical skills education specialist,
basic education specialist, training manager, nonformal
educator, and so on all in their respective areas. This is
a case of actual practice. Institutional needs for
expertise are centered on the effort to create a rational
model of administration, usually hierarchical in form, into
which the correct dosages of expertise are applied. The
model, echoing Weber, is what is transposed as an ideal
method for organizing institutional relationships. Experts
by definition are called on to help by introducing what they
know, and what they know is based on the models of rational
administration in which they have been trained.
The concept of innovation is clearly circumscribed by
the concept of institutional development. The latter
provides the arena within which the former functions.
Because technical educational innovation in many respects
exhibits such wide variation, citing specific examples would
be superfluous. The circumscription of activity, however,
is of interest. Paulston's summation of the arena of
innovation, while broadly aimed, raises the question of
limits, in that educational innovations amount to
"...isolated attempts to change educational practice at the
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local level..." while leaving the question of "...who
benefits and why..." largely unanswered (1979, pp . 4 - 5 ). if
Paulston underestimated the scope of educational reform
efforts in some countries, his point was aimed in the same
direction as mine in that basic institutional relationships
within the overall economy are not subject to radical
change
.
Diffusionist images dominate the modelling for
introducing innovations. An idealist structure serves as
model toward which the institutional host aspires.
Innovations are usually born and developed in external
settings for introduction and adaptation in new ones. The
inoculation metaphor comes to mind where innovations are
injected into the accommodating host, whose potentially
negative reaction is controlled by careful attention to the
proper catalytic strategies implemented by technical
advisers
.
3d. The production of theory for institutional
innovation : The phrase "local participation" is evident in
aid's policy statements. The notion is complemented by
references to "decentralization" and "private initiative."
The introduction of educational innovation as an outgrowth
of modernization shows some theoretical progression from
Roger's (1962) seminal work on the diffusion of innovations.
In general, innovation theory has developed from the "pre-
packaged" formulae of earlier days to increased attention to
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the supportive and inhibiting factors found in the local
setting. The process of introducing innovations is now
viewed to depend on the extent of receptivity and
participation of the host. AID's strategic responses to
enlist the cooperation and exercise of authority by host
officials now includes joint planning, the offer of
international training to responsible officials, and
increased sharing of decisionmaking at all stages of
implementation
.
Theory production for introducing innovations is now
concerned with schemes for power sharing. Earlier research
in organizational development provided AID with the means
for analyzing cultural, environmental, and decisionmaking
patterns followed by local officials. The research seems to
emphasize several analytical, decisionmaking, problem-
solving, group dynamics, information systems, and
organizational models to promote change in relationship
patterns as a way to increase productivity. In all cases,
successful application of the models depends on the skills
of the technical adviser who looms as the central figure in
the modelling process. The adviser-as -linchpin image is apt
in the sense that the adviser sits at the key point in a
very complex operation. The innovational process is highly
dependent on her combination of skills, experience, and
other personal attributes in analyzing and responding to
local circumstances and personalities. However, state of
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the art theory that explores program dependency on the
convergence of personality and circumstance so far seems to
be in short supply and out of focus.
Up to now, I have highlighted the prominent themes and
extracted several metaphors from AID's policy statements on
education. In Round 3 in the next chapter, I focus on the
"locational" task of relating the metaphors deconstructed
from their original discourses to their place in the
ideological frame of reference - namely, the social space.
CHAPTER VII
DEVELOPMENTAL METAPHORS AND
THE REDUCTION OF DIVERSITY WITHIN THE SOCIAL SPACE
Round 3: The Ideological Referents for the Metaphorical
Components of Educational Policy
This chapter examines the results of the inductive
of AID s policies done in the last chapter with the
purpose of revealing their ideological referents. I apply
the deductive questions derived from the concept of the
social space to the three metaphorical clusters of economic
growth, the poor, and the institutionalization of
innovations. The questions are ordered according to their
place in the social space: the economic/ functionalist
,
polit ical /hierarchical
,
and legitimat ing/scientific
.
Situating the Metaphors of Economic Growth
The Functionalist Referents
Metaphors related to the economic setting dominate
aid's policies in education. The purpose of educational
assistance is determined by the relationships that can be
developed between education and economic growth. Agency
policy appears to be based on rationales for productive
activity that lead to growth. An examination of the
metaphors on which the policy rationales are based assume
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the validity of the interrelationships between economic
growth and development.
The economic organism metaphor gets its scientific
backing from the various growth formulae I have referred to
earlier. The rational claim made by the growth formulae
derive from the validity of growth measures as an objective
application of economic science. The growth formulae depict
the ideal developing economy as an aggregate of individuals
seeking to maximize their personal returns from productive
activities with as little cost as possible. This depiction
behavior is taken to be universally valid. It
means that all rational developmental behavior is reducible
to collective compliance with the growth formulae. The
metaphorical referents for AID's educational policies
reflect the validity of the economic growth imperative as a
key to development.
In this view, economic expansion is a process dependent
on the aggregation of similar behaviors. The growing
economy is a function of people who cumulatively act out of
a similar consciousness about their material self interest.
The Harrod-Domar and other growth formulae depend on a
series of actions to be taken by individuals who are viewed
to act rationally only insofar as they act in their economic
self interest, that is to say, to the extent that interest
is realized by their conformity with the rational behaviors
implied by the formulae .
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Some variation among them notwithstanding, the growth
formulae are derived from a capitalistic model of economic
development that ascribes certain human propensities as
innate. The ideological function of the formulae is to
collapse the cultural gap between existing patterns of
socio-economic interaction by diffusing this specific
version of developmental consciousness. Human development
for everyone then becomes a progressive, evolutionary series
of steps along the path between a primitive economy and a
mature one
.
The bridge to a mature economy has the educational
system as a key support. The ideally productive education
system turns out students who:
* can exercise the requisite basic skill competencies
to thrive within a new economic setting;
* have reoriented their cultural perspective on their
role as citizens in a developing society;
comply with the institutional expectations of a
developing capital economy.
l/hile it may appear objective and neutral, considering
its apparent function in any social setting, the list of K-
S-0 in fact transmits the discourses that formulate
developmental consciousness. The fundamental purpose of the
discourses is to reproduce in students of the Third World
the competencies and orientation which drive a capital
growth modeled economy. The functional referents of AID’s
educational policies are based in an ideology that appears
to constrict, not expand economic choice . The referents do
so by transmitting rationales that:
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as^the^chie?
of formal and nonformal education
^ integration into one kind ofducat ion is given the primary function ofItering and classifying according to competenciesraining according to this competency-based scheme ’andproviding the structural model for organizinraU ’
state-sponsored educational activities. As a centrallymanaged institution, the education system is theprimary vehicle for the socialization of all youth forParticipation in the economy.
"n?
O'^erarchlng image of the economy as anorganism on which all are collectively dependent foreir livelihood. In this view the economy has thepower to reward and punish according to one's behavior.articipation is then defined in terms of the extent ofone s integration into the "economy."
Infuse a one dimensional definition of educational
purpose into all education policy. Education fordevelopment means people go to school or to training
image of a private wealth driven economyimplanted ^ firmly in their minds. Jobs mean work for
pay. One s labor is to be sold for subsistence, or
some marginal allowance above it. The owner of the
enterprise for which one works is entitled by right to
the value of the work done over and above
the wage for his own private ends
. The right to profit
the labor of others is legitimate and natural. All
social relations are to be structured around this
primary economic relationship
. The school and other
educational programs exist as feeders into this version
of economy.
* Set the curricular agenda around one predominant
image of development. The curriculum in the abstract
is depicted as a means to instantiate the human side of
human capital theory" with the correspondent set of K-
S-0. The curriculum is transformed into a set of
objectives for the inculcation of the K-S-O derived
from variations of this theory (Apple, 1979).
The ideological referents for conditioning capital
economic growth are designed so as to explain in scientific
terminology how to go about the business of transforming
societies in the throes of economic and social crisis in an
orderly, incremental fashion. The discourses on growth.
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therefore, delimit the range of economic possibility to one
modeled on orderly progression. To this end, they serve to
preempt other, perhaps more disruptive and radical
alternatives fron^the realm of choice by saving, in effect -
_
Education's role in econom ic development is to infuse this
linage of growth in policy makers, planners, administrators,
and students
. The path to growth along private investment
lines is the only way to go." This is the gist of the
educational message.
To both current national leaderships and their American
counterparts the message is reinforcing. Growth and its
developmental corollaries offer the means to manage economic
existing institutional forms, education
included. Given the proper assistance, an orderly way out
of material deprivation can be found. The ideology, then,
is one of possibility within the current order. The
formulae for growth in this line of reasoning prove that
incremental development is possible. The growth discourses
are then juxtaposed against their binary opposites: non-
growth, stagnation, violence, and, what is worse, communism.
In order to condition development in the Third World,
the mode of capitalist production requires an effective
means to offset the social upheaval characteristic of the
transition to a capital driven economy. The means at hand
is to apply an ideology powerful enough to counteract
opposition to and mobilize resources for such development.
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For this reason, the ideology of economic functionalism was
created dialectically, as antithesis to conceal the real
thesis that spawned it: Social relations within western
industrial economies were in their historical transitional
stage (as they are now) character ized by severe and often
violent contradictions. Previously diverse patterns of
social relations were uprooted by new and predominantly
uniform production patterns of capital-wage labor, expert-
layman, and center-periphery (Kiziltan, 1987). The economic
functionalist ideologies that made their appearance in the
mid-twent ieth century under the guise of social engineering
schemes were designed to rationalize and legitimate a means
to control the basic conflicts they attempted to conceal.
The growth ideology on which AID's development policies are
based serves much the same purpose.
The central purpose of growth imagery is to provide the
context for circumscribing the space within which
educational policies can be formed. The private industrial
growth model takes its place in the social space as a
product of the functionalist ideology whose purpose is to
narrow the range of economic options, frame the set of
developmental goals, provide appropriate (scientific)
methodological procedures, control the means to generate
resources, and convey its own reproductive messages through
education. The capital growth model thereby expresses
itself ideologically as a logical whole. The content of its
expressions is the subject of the next section.
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The Hierarchical Referents
In this section I am concerned with two manifestations
of education's role in realizing growth ideology: The locus
of management control for development education; and
education's role in transmitting images of hierarchy.
State Management of Development Education
The locus of management control for education's role in
promoting growth lies clearly with the state. Education for
development is a function of the state. All of AID's
interventions are managed by policy through bilateral
arrangements with the governments of the Third World. The
process of managing technical assistance to education is
through the vehicle of state administration, American and
Third World alike. Fundamental to the transmission of
assistance is the governmental structure that sends and
receives it.
To the contrary, the basic ideology of growth capital
is not one of "growth with control," at least in the sense
advocated by Friedman's classical economic "Chicago School"
of development. The classical ideology says that controlled
economic growth is a contradiction in terms. Yet, AID's
policies are filled with references to the importance of
decentralization and 1
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ocal participation. The democratic
message of free enterprise seems to square best, at least in
a rhetorical sense, only with unleashing the forces of
development capital, as if centrally induced development
would hinder, not spur the unleashing process. This
contradiction is extremely important. The policy discourses
on the essentially synergistic nature of free enterprise and
development stand in stark contrast to the standard
mechanisms for operationalization of the very same policies!
Business as usual is wrought with the contradiction between
centrally managed development and economic liberalism.
Education and Images of Hierarchy .
Images of hierearchy extend directly to the management
of education. AID s overriding policy is to integrate
education into economic development activities as fully as
possible. Educational policy is set with the economic
context as primary. The means to achieve integration into
the predominant image of capital based economic activity is
to reform the institutional delivery system so that it is
able to "produce" the outputs that fit into it. Successful
graduates are able to market their skills at levels that fit
their individual competencies. The integration of education
into the growth picture in this view requires a great deal
of expert assistance and central coordination, accurate
timing, correct focus, competent management, and efficient
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application of resources. These are, in fact, the hallmarks
of aid's policy I have examined here. Additionally, they
are the basic tenets of rational management.
The contradiction emerges in that the primary vehicle
for the transmission of such policy is the state, that is to
say, by central administration. AID's discourses on
decentralization, local participation, the promotion of
private enterprise, local initiative, and so on are realized
through an ideology of tight central control by a coalition
of narrowly qualified, usually foreign, expert advisers and
national government policy makers. The metaphorical
discourses on localization the Agency produces mask this
contradiction. The discourse on decentralization, for
example, speaks dialectically to actual policies where the
principal means of operationalization is through a
hierarchical, centralized delivery system tightly controlled
from the top.
Something should be said here about "intentionality .
"
When I use the words "conceal" and "mask," there is an
implication of intent. The inference should not be drawn
from the notion of intentionality that the Agency is openly
cognizant of the contradictions as if it were responsible
for their emergence. I see the problem not as one of
culpability, but of structure. While speculation can be
made about the various levels of awareness and sensitivities
of particular staff members, I believe such speculation to
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be misplaced. The Agency is an agency that has a mission.
Individuals who are responsible for setting policy do so
under a set of constraints that determine the conditions and
latitude for their substantive policy decisions. My concern
IS not with the inner space of the policy content itself,
but with the forces that circumscribe its production, forces
whose social referents are not obvious.
aid's discursive references to "local initiative and
participation" are directed to counter the given
hierarchical practices inherent in the service delivery
model. While the word "outreach" has not been used much
lately, the service delivery model is promoted as an
innovation to compensate for the deficiencies of the
outreach model. In essense the model is a variation on the
old extensionist principles of diffusionist theory.
Diffusionist theory at its roots is centralist ic . There are
those who are in the know who use various methods to extend
knowledge to those not in the know. The source of
information and initiative is indisputably central.
In this way, the ideology of hierarchy is cloaked under
the discursive rhetoric of decentralization and local
participation. AID's rhetorical invitations for increased
participation not only implicitly accept the validity of
current centrally organized service delivery forms, they
depend on the rational bureaucratic model to extend and
reproduce them in areas hitherto not reached. Outreach
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means just that, the extension of organizational forms into
marginal areas.
Further, not only is the bureaucratic delivery medium
hierarchical, thereby containing the extent of
experimentation with or adoption of other forms of social
organization, but the educational message conveyed is also
circumscribed by the economic path held open.
One prime example of the circumscription effect can be
seen in the contradictory policy of integrating women into
development. First, women are classified in this discourse
as not being in the development picture at all. Their
current status, roles, and value to family, community, and
productive life is discounted immediately. They are looked
upon neither as a possible source of alternative forms of
organization, nor for an alternative definition of economic
purpose. Instead, women are defined according to the extent
of their marginalization
. Second, their marginal position
is termed an error," that is, an "oversight" in what is
understood to be an otherwise rational system of social and
economic organization. The present hierarchical form in
which development is supposed to mobilize integration into
the economy is to be extended to women, who up to now have
been left out. In order to increase the extent of women's
formal integration into the economy, AID policy proposes
various developmental schemes to bridge the economic gap
between the center and the periphery through such mechanisms
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as cooperative production, marketing, thrift, and consumer
societies. The primary message of the developmental
discourse for women is to be more effectively integrated
into the prevalent enterprise scheme of the economy, not
^at they should have the power to change or control it. or
es tablish an alternative s pace within which to develop a
^alitatively different k ind of economy
, nor should any
collective body, no matter what the sex.
Discourses of the managerial variety speak of
organization of disparate groups whose common thread is
portrayed as being outside the economic and social
mainstream. All organizational efforts in this view should
be inclusionary. The economic whole as entity should absorb
all, irrespective of race, sex, religion, and origin. The
discourse in this line of thought could also be extended to
alternative beliefs, cultures, historical patterns and
traditions, productive practices, and anything else that
falls under the rubric of human social diversity. Nothing
should stand in the way of economic integration. Indeed,
the growth imperative should envelop all within its purview.
Legitimating the Ideology of Growth .
Earlier, I covered the social function legitimation
when I referred to the role of science in providing a system
of rationality to guide AID's educational policies. The
growth metaphors were legitimated by economic science. In
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this section I examine the clash between a scientifically
grounded policy of growth and the actual social conditions
the growth policy is supposed to address.
The growth formula discourses provide a rational basis
for making decisions about the direction and allocation of
resources to education for development. The metaphorical
image of integration frames decisions about the content and
levels of education to be made available to specific
populations. The various statistical projections on
migration, industrial capacity, commercial trade activity,
school enrollments, and educational needs of specific groups
inform these decisions with specific data. The data are
then analyzed and integrated into this vision of development
as the basis for formulating policies.
What this whole process is supposed to do is provide an
apparently rational framework for organizing and supporting
educational activities. To the contrary, the process in
reality appropriates political difference. I referred
several times immediately above to the importance of the
source of educational content and organizational form. The
legitimation of economic growth through policy science
actually constricts the public sphere of the social space.
It removes valuation from the realm of public debate and
places it firmly in the hands of qualified experts, who have
the legitimate authority to administer the educational
process for all. The clash I speak of here is an
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Ideological one between the exercise of authority over
educational content and forms at the local level, and the
coalition of advisers and policy makers at the national and
international levels. The source of authority is removed
from the local level and assigned to the regional and
national levels.
AID s discourses referring to increasing community
involvement in the running of schools is played against the
prior centralization of educational responsibility from
family and community to national and international
authorities. When AID policy says, "localize," it does so
in reference to the prior and continuing administrative
absorption by national bureaucracy of the process of
knowledge production and dissemination. The effect is to
legitimize the importation of economic driven K-S-0 models
and to delegitimize local knowledge production and use
patterns. When it says "foster programs to increase local
intiative and independence," AID educational policy does so
by introducing the innovative forms for becoming
independent. It thereby accomplishes two objectives: The
extension of new organizational forms for economic
integration to schools and training programs; and the
delegitimation and replacement of local practices for
socializing and educating children. The ideology is really
an ideology of dependency whose discourses are represented
as its diametric opposite, that is, as local initiative and
power sharing.
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The Metaphorical Referents for Situating the Poor
Functionalizing the Economy of Poverty
The representation of the poor in AID's policy
statements is also done from a centralistic position. This
fact IS very important to uncovering the ideological nature
of the discursive references the Agency makes about the
poor. The references are made from a position of
development looking out at a world of less
-than-development
.
The discourses on targeting resources in this view serve the
function of deflecting the focus away from the economic
center toward the periphery. The deflection of focus is an
ideological maneuver that is disguised by consistent
references to the importance of reaching the "poorest of the
poor." In reality, the discourses serve the purpose of
hiding the operant ideology of control beneath them.
ihe operant ideology, then, is that which acts to set
the parameters within which the discourses are produced. In
this instance, the operant ideology that undergirds the
poverty discourses is one of control and retention of power
over the process of economic and social change. In order to
advance the version of capital-driven economic development,
maintenance of current forms of international relations is
necessary. Development finance and support, technical
assistance, and private capital investment require stability
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in political relations. Without it, returns on capital
investment, as well as lives, are threatened. Economic
development and the transition to a capital economy,
however, inevitably occur within the framework of tremendous
social upheaval. Consequently, mechanisms must be devised
for the control of social disruption. The ideology of
control says that control can only be exercised in a climate
where rational explanations for and alternatives to manage
disruption are provided. The deflection of focus onto the
poor serves several purposes
:
* The poor become responsible for their poverty. They
can do better if they are taught how.
* The center is absolved of complicity as a possible
cause of poverty. The current order of economic
relations is thus preserved by rational explanation.
* poor~as
-target discourse channels energy awayfrom critical analysis of how poverty is conditioned
toward opportunities for participation in programs to
alleviate poverty by attending to the needs of the
victim.
* The poor are classified, as I showed previously, by
the labels generated in the center. The problem
definition and resolution process remains solidly under
the control of the donor. The donor-as -pries t thus
defines the sin of poverty and as confessor offers the
means for its absolution. The religious metaphor plays
itself out not as the ideology of control, which it
masks, but as the humanitarian-motivated concerns of
the fortunate for the unfortunate. The fortunate as
saved are expected to change only insofar as they are
able to develop more effective methods for reaching the
needy
,
while the needy are expected to bear the brunt
of total change.
In sum, aid's discourses on the poor have the function
of providing believable explanations and administrative
alternatives for the rational management of poverty, not its
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elimination. They are able to do this by virtue of the fact
that its solutions to the problems of poverty delimit the
range of options for development to incremental measures
alone. They do so by cautious avoidance of any attribution
to the structural referents of economic, political, and
legitimational power.
Solutions to Poverty i
The Hierarchical Referents ^
aid's program initiatives are administered centrally,
as they must be. This is a structural condition of
international relations. The forms of administration
employed derive from the cluster of international assistance
rationales which provide models and justification for the
intervention of one state into the internal affairs of
another. Consequently, educational policy making is managed
through the discourses of assistance and improvement, not
intervention. The discourses on project programming serve
the purpose of transforming its interventionist referents
into expressions of state sponsored cooperation. The
subsequent policies that govern specific project initiatives
insure centralized control is maintained from
conceptualization through implementation phases.
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The Project Model of Organization
The Agency defines a project as "a combination of human
and nonhuman resources organized in a 'temporary'
arrangement to achieve a specified purpose..." with
development projects defined as "...investments to develop
new capabilities in a society to produce additional goods
and services. Projects attempt to produce a particular set
of outputs to meet identifiable development needs, with
specific inputs, within a specified time period..." (Pragma
Corporation and Management Systems International, 1985, p.
1-17). The Agency uses a series of documents, which I
enumerated in the previous chapter, as steps in the project
planning, implementation, and evaluation cycle. The cycle
enacts the conceptual framework that governs all projects.
The cycle in actuality realizes a set of hierarchical
discourses in the name of logical planning.
The poor, toward which educational activities are
aimed, may be consulted only at project implementation, not
at conceptualization phases. The consultation activity
usually takes form as a needs assessment. The locus of
assessment and decision about project content is ultimately
maintained by project planners and policy makers. Decisions
about objectives, design, content, resource allocation, and
indicators of impact are made at the center by those who are
familiar with the requirements and regulations of their
respective agencies, that is, AID and the host government.
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This procedure is an essential part of the scheme of
rational management employed. It is indispensable to the
grant process.
The medium of rational planning and its discursive
corollaries in the form of project documentation are the
rules. The educational message, irrespective of its
specific content, is conveyed through the medium of cause
and effect planning. The medium is a reproduction of the
relations that characterize doing business at the center. I
refer not just to the fiscal discourse of accounting for the
expenditure of government funds with its accompanying rules,
but to the systems discourse of the management of inputs
toward outputs, contracting services, monitoring
performance, and evaluating achievement.
The project model is indicative of the balance of power
realized in the donor-recipient relationship. As such, it
embodies an array of complex administrative discourses whose
effect is to divest the poor from the process of managing
their own development. The discourses are open to them,
ironically, only to the extent that their education
qualifies them to participate at the level of target.
One example is typical. In order to be qualified to
work in an educational development project - let us say -
designed to teach teachers how to introduce new methods of
literacy into crowded classrooms, the technical adviser
hired must have an advanced degree in education. Now this
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is an entirely logical result of the credent ialing discourse
that insures the appropriate provision of expertise. Its
correspondent effect, however, is to further the
professionalization of the local workforce according to
externally introduced models of centralized planning.
Virtually all education for development initiatives
supported by the Agency delimit the power that can be
exercised to those technically qualified to do it. What is
reproduced in the Third World setting are the hierarchical,
®^^it-driven systems of professionalization open only to
those with the appropriate educational qualifications. The
route to such qualifications is exclusively through the
institutions sanctioned by the state, whose organs control
the curriculum for such qualificatiion
.
The ideology of hierarchy is then masked by the
discourses of qualification and professionalization. The
Agency in this way conceals its interventionist role under
the reformist discourse of educational merit whereby the
object status of the poor and the way government deals with
them is determined. The intervention does not appear as
intervention. The interventionistic ideology is cloaked by
developmentalist consciousness of the lump of "unqualified
poor" in contradistinction to the avenue newly opened to
them - education. In this line of thought, AID comes across
as helper, not as intruder. The recipient nation asks for
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its help. It consequently offers the tools for social
mobility through its educational discourses.
\Jhat is not so apparent is that the price for mobility
is paid by assimilation of a new mode of hierarchy.
Whatever patterns of social interaction characterized
traditional life, whether they, too, were hierarchical or
not, are to be replaced by a new hierarchy. Only this one
does not reveal itself as the necessary political adjunct of
the rational management schemes belonging to a capital
economy. The ideological discourses of hierarchy speak to
their dialectical "Other" as instrument necessary for social
advancement. The poor in the sense portrayed as "Other" do
not represent diversity. They embody its antithesis,
redundant poverty. The discourses thus transform the
ideology of hierarchy into a set of tools to climb the
ladder of success. Diversity then is reduced to a vertical
operation where one can ascend or descend, depending on the
competencies and motivation one is able to learn through
this kind of education. Lateral diversity, on the other
hand, is absorbed by the new economy, where success is to be
adjudicated exclusively by the value of one's performance in
the marketplace.
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Legitimating Intervention by
Reference to Logical Positivism
The image of development AID transposes is, as I showed
above, non-interventionist. The discourses of non-
interventionism the Agency abides by in providing assistance
find scientific backing in the force of their own logic.
The prime example of the logic of rational planning is seen
in the planning device that is used to guide the project
development and implementation process. The device is
called, "The Logical Framework," or "Logframe" for short
(Practical Concepts Incorporated [PCI], undated). I have
included a copy as Figure 7 on page 258.
The cause-effect relationship the Agency considers
basic to development project planning and implementation
that I referred to earlier underlies the project cycle. The
relationship is based on multi-tiered set of conditions
whose final outcomes are supposed to result in the
achievement of some developmental goal. The planning device
depends on a simple logical progression stated clearly by
PCI, which developed the instrument for AID: "The Logical
Framework requires that at each 'level' [i.e., goal,
purpose, outputs, inputs] the activities or results planned
plus assumptions at that level constitute sufficient
conditions to achieve the next higher level" (p. II-IO
[emphasis in original]). Assumptions are defined as those
conditions beyond the control of project planners and
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practitioners that nonethpl pq<3u cneiess impinge on the success of the
project
.
The Logframe structures the planning process. Its
power derives from its instrumental utility in identifying
the controllable and non-controllable factors that are
thought to condition successful project implementation. It
provides a framework for indicators of attainment at each
level of operation, a means for their verification, and the
identification of contingent assumptions that must be in
place before advancement to the next higher level is
possible
.
What the Logframe also does is to reduce the complexity
of factors involved in carrying out development projects to
those that are identified by planners. The option of
distinguishing controllable from noncontrollable factors as
necessary conditions for success provides the planner with
two means of control. One means is derived from the
authority over the identification of inputs, outputs,
P^^pose
,
and the final goal. While AID policy requires that
the project be a joint venture with host government
officials, the donor in fact controls the major source of
inputs in the form of key personnel, material resources,
and, more important, the scientific language for development
- an isolated set of needs, resultant project objectives,
design factors, measurement indicators, and outputs. The
project by definition would not happen without the donor.
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its agents, and the rational developmental language
imported. This is entirely normal procedure in the delivery
of foreign assistance.
The other means is intrinsic to the logic of the
Logframe itself. The device represents the power of science
applied to the resolution of economic and social problems.
The belief that rational planning along a systems model is
central to the developmental process, indeed conditions it,
is what is being reproduced as developmental consciousness.
Without it, orderly development is conceived to be
impossible. The logic represented by the Logframe is
depicted as the logic of development itself. What is
reproduced in the Logframe then, and by extension AID's
development planning discourses, is the ideological doctrine
that the preferred model for human development is a product
of this model of rational planning. I quote directly from
the PCI document:
. . .The concepts [contained within the Logframe
approach] draw heavily from science, and experience
gained from the management of complex space age
programs, such as the early satellite launchings and
the development of the Polaris submarine. Most
importantly, the concepts help one apply basic
scientific methods (including hypothesis formulation
and testing) to program/project management and are
complementary with other management tools. (PCI, p. I-
2 )
When taken at face value, the brief reference to
science is deemed sufficient to guide the project
development process. "Science says this is the way it
should be done." The science of space engineering is held
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out as model for the social engineering of development. The
knowledge behind this model is what AID introduces in the
form of innovations. The ideology, however, is one by which
the production of knowledge is reserved to those deemed
legitimately qualified to administer it. Knowledge options
for the poor are circumscribed by a superior, heretofore
remote system that marginalizes their role in the production
of knowledge. The effect of the new knowledge is to limit
diversity by relegating alternative knowledge systems to the
past as myth, tradition, and backwardness.
The Ideological Referents
for Institutionalizing Innovations
Functionalizing Economic Knowledge
"Innovation" is the name of the process AID uses to
introduce new technologies into the educational systems of
the Third World. Once the primary function of education is
reduced to that of trainer, feeder, personnel developer,
skills builder, and attitude molder within the context of
economic development, its curricular offerings fall into
place. The school in this view becomes instrumental to the
development process. Changes and improvements in the
curriculum and its delivery are made within the
developmental framework. The process of innovation is
directed to strengthening the interconnections between the
school, as arm of the educational system, and the economy.
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This is, incidentally, not an approach unique to the Third
World. It is a continuing matter of serious debate in the
United States and other industrialized nations.
The several metaphorical images I traced in the
previous chapter on the subject of innovation revolved
around the institution as an embodiment of relations in a
particular view of the economic and social environment.
Visions of the institution as patient, host, edifice, and
site for focusing attention were observed. It is that view
I wish to focus on here. While the two are interrelated,
the environment is seen to be separate from the institution.
Both exist, bounded one from the other. Now this is a
structuralist view that I argue contains an ideological
referent
.
As soon as the validity of the split between the
institution and its environment is accepted a priori
,
then
the way toward the introduction of their ideal forms and
subforms is opened. This Parsonian structuralist view
provides the basis on which the economic integration of
social forms is made possible. The idea that there is an
"ideal" form for anything, be it institution or environment,
is full of power. AID's discourses on institutionalization
are premised on the belief in the institution as an entity
and its reformability according to an idealized set of
standards
.
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aid's policies in education accordingly subscribe to
this idealistic view of the institutional development
process. The possibility of institutional innovation is
then dependent on a certain economic environment. That
environment is depicted as being definable in ideal terms.
Its constituent elements are likewise identifiable in ideal
terms. What AID's policy discourses stressing education's
^^begration into the economy do is to predefine the
conditions for development in an idealistic environment.
The conditions I examined were derived from the economic
standards for "take-off," such as the growth formulae that
dictated necessary levels of savings, investment, capital
formation, job creation, consumer activity, and so on.
These are what I mean by "idealist" standards that are
extrapolated empirically from industrial countries and held
out as models to be adapted for the Third World.
The idealist version of the developing economy provides
the structure for reproducing its institutional forms. The
substructure of the educational system is shaped according
to the extent to which it can be made to conform with its
ideal model. The process of institutional development is
then circumscribed as an adaptat ive series of progressive
steps, guided by such questions as: "How ready are they for
this? Can they use this at this stage? Can they absorb
this amount and kind of help now? If not, how can we get
them ready?", and so on. The power of the ideal derives
from its ability to mobilize policy around it. The source
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of initiative and direction therefore remains solidly within
the province of the center-expert system of relations.
AID s institution-building discourses are played
against its structural-functionalist ideology.
Strengthening" and "building" conjure up images of their
opposites, weakness and disarray. The binary operation
serves to link the ideology with its discourses, the former
setting the economic agenda for the latter. Innovation then
enters the development scene as the process of
diversification, when in reality it delimits the entire
milieu of possibility to the adaptation of pre-defined
institutional forms.
The Hierarchical Referents for Innovation
In the last chapter I looked at the discourses of
diffusionist theory as the guiding methodology for the
introduction of innovations. More recent advances in
theories of diffusion call for increased attention to
adaptations necessary to be made in the institutional
environment of the host so that the innovation can not only
be adopted more readily, but also be sustained over the long
term. AID's more recent policy statements in education,
furthermore, direct attention to the greater returns thought
to accrue from investments made "internally," that is, to
those countries focusing on encouraging private investment
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in education, strengthening basic education, and improving
the efficiencies of current systems.
The idea "internal" I examined in the last chapter is
explained in terms of an emphasis on existing institutional
forms to improve service delivery, management practices, and
pass and completion rates. There, I reached the conclusion
that the Agency's innovational discourses actually increased
local dependency rather than foster self-reliance. The
clash between the ideology of hierarchy and the discourse of
1 1 ^^rice reveals itself in the dilemma faced by policy
makers and practitioners around the issue of achieving
project results and what is called "sustainability" in the
institution
.
The Agency on the one hand is bound to measure results
through the indicators of development contained in the
Logframe. The Agency so binds its contractors to the same
results. In turn, the contractors bind their technical
specialists to produce the results for which they were
contracted. The result-oriented policy framework is worked
out in practice at the level of the educational specialist
in the field. The specialist, on the other hand, is put
into the position of resolving the dilemma between producing
results in a timely manner and working out the means to
sustain them in the institution. The approaches to
accomplish both, however, usually require contradictory
strategies
.
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The dilemma is deeper than the clash of personal
approaches implies. The dilemma goes to the heart of the
ideology of hierarchy and dependency. AID ' s policy
discourses on the management of innovations and the content
expressed within the innovations themselves is often
contradictory. I have already investigated the power of the
management process in precluding the poor in exercising
control over project resources, the pacing of project
implementation, the assignment of personnel, and so on
earlier in this chapter. For the discourses of
Participation and decentralization speak to inclusion only
by legitimating exclusion.
What I have not covered is the social significance of
the dependency production process. The poor are not simply
left out of the process of producing and managing
innovations. The poor and the varieties of nomenclature
applied to them are, in point of social fact, reproduced by
the innovative process . This is more than the operation of
metaphorical labelling I discussed in the last chapter. The
social conditions by which poverty is internationalized are
themselves the result of an ideological reproduction of a
system of social relations that requires the maintenance of
certain levels of impoverishment and dependency for its own
growth. aid's discourses on educational technology and the
method of their application legitimate that system by
precluding the development of options to change it.
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The Innovational Re ferents
for the Legitimation of Poverty
Recall here that the main function of ideology in
theory is to act within the space between the contradictory
brute forces of economy and polity and consciousness in
order to preserve and expand the system of social relations
in current force. The contradictions I refer to involve the
crises in which poverty and its manifestations have not been
and cannot be resolved by that system of relations. Marx's
observation about the necessity for a "reserve army of the
poor" is illustrative not of capitalism's inherent
limitations so much as it uncovers the intrinsic collision
of social forces unleashed when relationships hitherto
characterized as social are transformed into relationships
increasingly mediated in the marketplace. The ties that
previously bound families, clans, and communities are split
as they are uprooted by the prevalent need to survive in an
increasingly market -driven economy.
The discourses on overpopulation, ignorance, disease,
and hunger that AID and other agencies produce and read are
to be understood in light of their ideological depiction as
anonymous causes of poverty, as "referenceless" phenomena
suffered by some in the ineluctable course of human events.
In order to explain the continued incidence of poverty, AID
produces policy discourses as innovations in education,
health, nutrition, and agricultural and industrial
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productivity. The innovational discourses are addressed to
the mobilization of resources for the symbolic eradication
of poverty. Their overarching function is to serve as a
buffer to mitigate the crises represented by the growing
incidence of world poverty and to mask the ideological
referents that condition it. Their effect is to preserve
the anonymity of the referents by diverting attention to the
problems of the poor as source of their economic station.
The function of the discourses then is to legitimate
this state of affairs. The process of institutionalizing
innovations must be understood in light of what and whom the
discourses speak to: mainly to current leaders of the Third
World, to rivals in the socialist, to international
educators and practitioners, and, last of all, to the poor
themselves
.
Summary of Metaphors and
Their Epistemological Effect
The three metaphorical clusters embedded within AID's
educational policy discourses can be summarized as those
concerned with economic growth, the reduction of poverty,
and institutional reform. The discourses speak to the
audiences responsible for the control of resources and the
production of policy. The discourses serve the purpose of
rationalizing the relations of control through the
epistemological claims they make about the nature of the
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social development process. Their combined effect is to
mobilize the commitment of diverse interests for the
extension of American influence.
The next chapter explores the dialectical nature of the
relationships between the discourses and their ideological
referents in the social space. Its purpose is to further
clarify the homogeneous, counter-diverse nature of the
American developmental ideology.
CHAPTER VIII
THE DEPLOYMENT OF EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION AND
THE APPROPRIATION OF DIVERSITY
In this final chapter I focus on how AID's educational
discourses act to constitute the subject of developmental
consciousness. I examine the process through which the
developmental ideology usurps the meaning of diversity
through deployment of its educational policy discourses.
The purpose of the chapter is to futher clarify the nature
of the dialectical relationship between the discourses and
the counter diverse intent of their ideological referents.
Finally, I conclude the entire study with a review of
the potentials and limitations of the critical method used
in this work for the analysis of educational policy.
aid's Summary Discourse on the Third World
Ever since the United States and other western powers
turned their attention from the reconstruction of Europe to
the development of Africa, Asia, and the Americas nearly
four decades ago, the question of how to provide assistance
has been a matter of contention. Discussion throughout the
period, however, was limited almost entirely to the relative
merits and liabilities of various kinds of assistance
thought to be of greatest potential effect in the effort to
achieve development. While intermittent attempts have been
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made to examine the nature of development more directly,
research of late continues to be framed in predominantly
economic and technical terms. The fundamental assumption
made is that the problem of the Third World is by and large
an e^conomic problem. That is to say, development involves
the implementation of technical strategies for making more
goods and services available to more people.
This inquiry began from the point that framing the
question of development in strictly economic terms has
diverted attention away from how the question itself has
been framed toward an amorphous conception labeled loosely
as the plight of the Third World." In this view, we see
ourselves as innocent spectators in a panoramic drama of
collective misery. While we have done our best to remedy
the problem, sent our money and expertise abroad, educated
foreign leaders, granted favored treatment, and brought to
bear the most advanced technology at our command, success
has been sporadic and the problems grow worse.
This work explored the premise that the image we have
devised to portray the plight of the Third World has less to
do with a realistic picture of development problems there
than it does with an obfuscation of our own developmental
needs. I suggest herein that the very concept "Third World"
is a figment we have devised to suit our own purpose, a
purpose that has become obscured even to those of us who
would recoil at the thought of somehow being implicated in
that plight. Yet, as a nation we remain convinced that what
we witness from the safety of physical and administrative
distance could not be of our own making. I believe this
view to be wrong. So long as we keep to it, we will
continue to suffer the delusion that the measures we take
are inherently remedial or beneficial, as if they were by
definition of intent fundamentally different from the
context in which they are delivered.
In sum, the discourses we have devised to govern our
relations with the Third World have enabled us to sustain a
vision the epistemic foundations of which are subject to
more question than they have received so far. In its most
basic sense, this study is offered to further the cause of
critical reflection on ourselves and not just on others.
Deploying the Discourses
and the Appropriation of Diversity
The concept of diversity I have used herein involves
the extension of options for development within the social
space. The thesis that guided this inquiry suggested the
possibility that AID's educational policies and the
discursive rationales that support them act to narrow rather
than expand development options. They do so by confining
the economic and political space within which development
options are possible to create. In the review of
developmental metaphors that follows, I use this concept of
diversity as a point of reference.
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If the theoretical function of ideology is to unify
disparate and contradictory forces of the social space into
rational wholes, it can fulfill its mission only by
concealing itself inside the discourses which it creates.
Once the ideology is exposed by critical analysis of its
discourses, it becomes subject to refutation. Its
contradictions are then made vulnerable to reasoned
critique. Its power to unify the disparate interests it
serves is thus weakened. In the event of total refutation
through revolution, new alignments of interests need to be
drawn with a new ideology. In the meantime, however, the
operant ideology continues to generate modifications in
current discourse. In all cases, the discourses still must
stand in contradistinction to the ideology in which they
were created. Born in ideology, the discourses serve their
purpose in dialectical relation to it. Their function is
fulfilled only to the extent they are successful in both
concealing and realizing the ideology in which they arose.
In this functional definition, ideology is by itself
not false consciousness. Ideology rather plays a
determinative role in producing false consciousness, AID's
developmental discourses included as one instance. The
discourses AID sets out under the rubric "development"
cannot themselves be the developmental ideology actually put
into practice because in their specific discursive instances
they arose in dialectical relationship to that ideology.
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Developmental Consciousness
and Narrowing Economic Choice
In the instance of AID's policy discourses on
development, what I have been calling "America's
developmental ideology," the range of socio-economic
relations is narrowed by legitimating one predominant mode
of economic organization at the expense of others. In the
last chapter, I examined how the discourses are based on the
supposition that the "free enterprise" economy is both
prerequisite to and co-terminous with development. The
policy discourses act to offset the developmental ideology
that undergirds them. The discourses do so by
circumscribing the functions of education into one of the
state's principal mechanisms to achieve fuller economic
integration. The central purpose of education is
preparation for functioning in a market-driven capital
economy. The curriculum is accordingly defined by the
knowledge, skills, and orientation (K-S-0) necessary for
advancement in this economy. What the policy discourses
represent as the essential path to economic development and
social change, in actuality reproduces the major relations
of capital production: capital/wage-labor, expert-layman,
and center-periphery.
The ideological function of the discourses is to
portray the developmental path as being paved only within
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the economic relations of capital. The economic core of the
developmental ideology dictates that previously social
relationships are to be increasingly mediated in the
marketplace. Productive activity in the developmental
ideology is no longer a result of people's social
obligations to each other. Increasing production as a goal
depends entirely on the motivational power and the incentive
of the widespread belief that personal gain can only be made
through the mechanism of impersonal exchange transacted in
the marketplace. The discourse of economic rationality
dictates that the owner of capital maximize the returns
received from the market over and above the investments
,
material and personal, he or she makes. Labor in this
exchange is defined not in terms of a social relationship,
where one's product is an embodiment of one's self, but in
terms of a cost. One's product, labor included, is reduced
to commodity. The developmental ideology transmitted by
aid's discourses realizes this system of relations and no
other
.
aid's discursive policy references to diversifying the
curriculum are set within the same economic frame. The
references to diversification serve the ideology of
uniformity in like manner. The term "diversification"
distorts the conditioning effects that the market-driven
economy has on formulating developmental problems. The
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references thereby mask its real ideological referent,
namely economic uniformity, by ruling out the diversity
needed to develop alternative forms of production and
exchange in accordance with the local circumstance of
history and culture.
Similarly
,
the discourses on decentralization and local
Participation originate dialectically in the hierarchical
models used to organize and manage educational innovation
projects. The ideology of hierarchy conveyed by the models
is that developmental activity can only be initiated from
the center. AID's countervailing discourses, however,
stress the opposite. They refer to supporting local
rtiitiative in the form of encouraging community involvement,
local funding, and decentralizing authority for school
administration. The legitimate power the state has to
manage education is never questioned. Development occurs at
its prerogative. The discourses thereby accomplish the
purpose of ruling out alternative organizational forms that
challenge the economic orthodoxy commissioned by the state.
The educational policies promoted by the discourses preclude
rational, democratic consideration of organizational
alternatives that do not advance the political interests of
the state as they are interpreted by the administrators that
serve it.
The economic growth formulae were likewise found to
serve the purpose of scientific grounding of private
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©nterprise driven models of economic development. The
effect of the growth formula discourses is to delegitimate
other economic models from the field of possibility. The
scientific discourses thereby narrow economic choice by
limiting the range of diversity to the orthodox version of
development backed by positivist economic science. The
legitimating power of economic positivism brushes aside
incipient efforts to focus assistance on the development of
alternative forms of economic organization as either
vestiges of tradition whose effect is to retard development,
or as attempts to institute totalitarian (i.e., socialistic)
forms of rule that constrain individual initiative. The
discursive formulae achieve the purpose of lending
scientific backing to official state policy that seeks to
expand the power the state exercises over the process of
social change in the name of economic democracy.
Developmental Consciousness
and Marginalizing the Poor
Likewise, AID's discourses on the poor are based on the
view of the poor as the source of the problem. The ideology
is one that validates centrally managed economic development
approaches at the same time that it admits their severe, but
nevertheless "manageable," shortcomings. The idea that
programs can be targeted to the poor conveys the impression
that poverty is manageable without structural change having
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to occur in the center itself. The diversity with which
economic problems can be addressed is therefore confined to
effectiveness and efficiency strategies where the focus is
on the development of better delivery mechanisms to the
poor. The only problems with the center as source of
developmental initiatives admissible in the discourses are
not ones of structure, but of incremental deficiencies that
can be alleviated by technical measures alone.
aid's discourses about more effective targeting of
assistance to the poor thus achieve the purpose of
deflecting and channeling critical attention from the center
to outlying areas. The control over economic intiatives the
center exercises is consequently maintained by the
discourses it creates on programming in education. The
educational policy discourses are shaped within an
ideological frame of reference whereby central control over
development initiatives is maintained by the state and its
agencies. The discourses stress managing programs to combat
poverty by changing the victim. Educational services are
designed to develop K-S-0 in the poor as a qualification for
participation in a one-dimensional version of productive
life. aid's role, as we saw in the institutional cluster of
metaphors, is then classified as helper. The bilateral
intervention process where the American state is given the
legitimate authority to assist in the reorganization of key
agencies of the host state is seen as a helping
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relationship. The discourses on attainment of competencies
and qualifications in actuality, however, eliminate
consideration of alternative qualification systems whose end
results may be different from integration into a capital
economy
.
AID s educational discourses also emphasize imparting
the new knowledge necessary for survival and prosperity in a
modern, expanding economy. The ideology they conceal
thereby seeks to replace local and alternative knowledge
production processes with a unitary one managed by central
authorities. Knowledge production is defined as an outcome
of the discourses on rational planning and management that
are held out as models on which to base the organization of
educational and other social subsystems. The rationality
model is legitimated by science, while alternatives are
conversely delegit imated
. Rational management through
policy science is held forth in the discourses as key to
diversity where in actuality the possibility for
constructing alternatives is reduced.
Developmental Consciousness
as Institutional Innovation
The innovational process is one moment in the
deployment of ideology in the sense that it seeks to
ins trumentalize education into servant of an idealist vision
of the economy. Innovations are directed to improvements in
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the delivery of educational services. The innovational
discourses are based on rational models for organization
which are then adapted to local conditions. The discourses
consequently stress the importance of adaptation from a
P^tticular idealist referent, usually derived from a
hierarchical institutional form. The discourses on the
adaptation of innovations are designed to conceal the
functionalist ideology whereby education is equated with the
inculcation of the K-S-0 that lead to economic
marketability. Alternative purposes for education are
thereby subordinated to the governing ideology whereby
education is effective, efficient, and useful only to the
extent that it is instrumental to the transmittal of
economically rational competencies.
Innovational discourses also emphasize the need to
create the institutional climate for self-reliance. What
the discourses actually produce is more dependency.
Innovations to encourage community involvement in the
school, local financing, and decentralized management, for
example, aim to facilitate the integration of local
communities further into a larger economic system controlled
by the state and the national and international interests it
represents. As representative of such interests, the state
still seeks control. It serves the local community only to
the extent that it, the state, furthers the economic needs
of the center from which it derives its real power.
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The images of education portrayed in the discourse of
self-reliance in their specific instances are thus dominated
by the purpose of increasing individual and corporate
productivity, urban employability, and industrial
enterprise. The concrete images of purpose are anti-rural,
^ ~
>
sn t i - 1 rad i t ional
,
and anti-local. They
present an idealized version of their opposites: urban,
industrial, modern, and national and international, to which
the poor are expected to aspire. The locus of
diversification is therefore shifted from the rural poor to
the urban rich. Insofar as the source of ideological
authority over education for development is shifted to the
center
,
the power the poor could otherwise develop for
alternative forms of education is nullified. The range of
choice they can exercise over the kind of ideology they
develop to guide their lives is narrowed to what is offered
to them by the state. The result is not less dependency,
but more
.
Finally, the legitimation of new institutional forms
through the innovation of old and deficient ones actually
preserves the system of social relations in which the
maintenance of some level of poverty is necessary. To this
end, aid's function is to produce discourses which counter
the crises of poverty. The discourses have the effect of
appropriating criticism of the economic order. The
appropriation function provides positive opportunities for
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the potential energies of the concerned and devoted in order
for them to work in programs for educating and helping the
impoverished. Social criticism is thereby given a
legitimate channel for expression. When that channel is
circumvented, as in question, protest, confrontation, or
resistance, criticism is relegated to the plane of deviation
and disorder. As agency, AID provides an institutional
mechanism to channel the energies of the concerned to do
something about poverty, not just criticize it.
The appropriation of the critical function, however, is
more significant a phenomenon than the mere channeling of
potentially negative energy in positive directions. The
appropriation of social critique by an agency of the state
represents the point at which the ideology of positivism
becomes practical without our awareness. The state, as
servant of anonymous interests, provides the mechanism
through which the irrationality of the clash of brute forces
in the social space is rationalized as expressions of truth
sufficient to unify and govern action. It does this through
the power it has to produce the policy discourses that frame
specific spheres of collective action, educational
development being the concern of this study. To this end,
aid's developmental ideology has generated a constellation
of discourses that have succeeded in capturing the
attention, imagination, and support of those who often hold
mutually contradictory views of the world. The discourses
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have something in them for liberal and conservative,
missionary and pragmatist, militant and pacifist, reformist
and radical, foreign and American. The remarkable fact is
that such overtly disparate students of social change can be
mobilized so effectively to unite themselves to work
cooperatively under one agency, regardless of the
incompatabilit ies represented in their respective theories
of social change. The power of the developmental ideology
to accomplish that feat alone was sufficient reason to
prompt this critical inquiry.
The Developmental Ideology as False Consciousness
Institutional Implications
The institution responsible for producing the
discourses on development education is the U. S. Agency for
International Development. The discourses AID has produced
indeed have social referents. They represent an underlying,
strategic coalition of interests united by a developmental
ideology. The economic, political, and legit imational
referents of the developmental ideology are embedded in the
policy discourses, oblivious to the uncritical eye. The
question of how the knowledge claims that support the policy
discourses are validated is epistemological. Are the
knowledge claims redeemed by their respective economic,
political, and legit imational rationales or not?
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The investigation done in this work is not conclusive
one way or the other. The most that can be said is that the
validity of the economic formulae, the ideal models of
institutional organization, and the scientific authority for
educational programming as means to rationalize development
policy are subject to question. Why? Because several of
the claims were found to be mutually contradictory and
deceptive. This finding does not falsify the claims
definitively, one by one. The finding simply reports that
some of the claims may be true, while others must be false.
Which are true and which are false is an issue yet to be
resolved
.
This finding, however, has major implications. The
Agency as an institution cannot justifiably remain oblivious
to the critical analysis of its own policies as if all were
true and consistent in fact . AID is the primary site at
which the amorphous, conceptual elements of the
developmental ideology are translated into actionable
discourses. It thereby produces the texts that serve to
unify the adherents of apparently competing belief systems
about social development to the extent that the humanitarian
and the pragmatist can share a common praxis. If part of
the praxis is false, then all of it must be, for in the
absence of reasoned critical analysis in which all affected
parties participate as equals, who is to judge which is
which? The danger is that the policy for the reconstruction
of whole societies will be modelled on a flawed base before
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rational critique is engaged by the audiences most
immediately affected.
The central questions then turn on a political
referent. In its role as producer of official development
discourse, to what extent is AID bound by the propensity to
base policy on conventional approaches to development
knowledge? How committed must it be to remaining on its
current path of producing discourses that depict the
developmental process as simultaneously linear, logical,
scientific, propelled by natural law, sequential, technical,
apolitical, impartial, and so on? What are the specific
referents that obligate the Agency to rationally order what
it portrays as an irrational, traditional world by a
simplistic act of binary logic - If "a," represented by
developmental consciousness, is the source of economic and
social diversity, then its opposite, "b , " namely
underdevelopment, can only be depicted as uniformity and
stagnation. What binds the Agency to continue its policy of
promoting an ensemble of answers instead of the means to ask
and debate questions?
Is it feasible to sensitize the Agency to the policy
implications of its ideological referents? In the present
American socio-economic structure, what pressure can
realistically be brought to bear that would awaken AID as an
institution to the implications of spreading false
knowledge? Is the institution capable of self-reflection?
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Moreover, is any institution capable of refective action?
The problem with expecting an institution to engage in
sel f -re fleet ion on its own is that it begs the question of
its social function and historical situation. The
institution is an agency for the deployment of a particular
instantiation of ideology. The extent of its volition to
mount a project of institutional self-crit ique
,
at least one
that challenges the very roots of knowledge production that
govern its whole enterprise, is limited to the accommodation
of disaffected voices from within. A project of that
magnitude, for better or worse, is thus left to individual
ij^i-tistive. The individual, in an act of resistance, can
abet the cause of institutional freedom with the effort to
expose and renounce falsehood by a critical search for
truth. The institution, on the other hand, embodies only
the consciousness it inherits, nothing more.
Individual Implications
After more than two decades of work in the development
field, I find not more wisdom, but more certainty. The
certainty comes in the form of discursive prescriptions
intended not for those claimed as beneficiaries of
development, the poor. The certainty is rather directed
toward those who control funds and governments
,
those whose
concern is with the advantage to be gained from the
extension of American expertise and influence in the Third
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World. The objective of the epistemology of certainty is to
provide believable reassurance for the sustenance and
enhancement of one's position doing the business of
development
.
I come to this conclusion not because I attribute
necessarily underhanded motives to anyone involved in the
development field. But the rush to epistemic certainty is
an individual response to a structural problem, one I think
we have lost sight of. The developmental ideology promoted
by the United States is first and foremost the business of
doing business. While the virtues of the astute business
mind are extolled openly as developmental consciousness, the
structural requisites of doing development work as a
business are not. My motive in undertaking this work,
however, is not to impugn business. V/hat I question is the
strength of our commitment to see the process of social
change as a quest instead of competition among enterprises
specializing in development.
Competition may be a way of life hallowed in America,
hallowed to the extent that it pervades all our endeavors,
business and otherwise. But its permeation of the
development field raises social issues that have evaded
critical analysis for too long. These issues need to be
examined along the lines that follow:
* To what extent and in what ways do the requirements
of conducting development as a competitive enterprise
between nations on the one hand and firms within
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nations on the other affect the content and structure
of development projects?
* Why and how do firms engaged in development make use
of specific kinds of knowledge and discard others to
win business?
* To what extent do the social referents of knowledge
choices inhibit or encourage critique of development
alternatives ?
* What are the possibilities for incorporating critique
of alternative development paths into education for
development projects?
While other questions of this nature should be raised,
the objective would be to reintroduce direct consideration
of the philosphical
,
political, and social valuational
dimensions into development, dimensions either absent,
weakly acknowledged, or suppressed altogether in the fervor
of activity necessary to gain competitive advantage on the
development scene.
The impetus toward critique would otherwise remain
latent
,
buried underneath layers of the technological
schemes patented and promoted by the enterprises which have
to own and package knowledge before they are able to spread
it. It disturbs me that we fail to see we are reproducing
the conditions under which knowledge is turned into a
commodity before it can be shared.
I am reminded of the pain I felt while living for two
years in a village on the Anatolian Plateau. I arrived with
what I thought were all the right answers. I was going to
develop that village. Instead, I experienced not just the
steady erosion of the validity of the answers themselves.
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one by one, often under a barrage of well-aimed ridicule,
but also the subconscious disdain embedded within me, an
inbred arrogance that retarded my own development.
Arrogance brooks neither question nor criticism.
The degree to which our policies on development
preclude self-analysis on terms broader than technical merit
may be a reflection of our own lack of will to develop
ourselves. A friend in Turkey back then helped me take the
step to social awareness when, after working hard for
months and months to change recalcitrant attitudes about
development, he was stopped by a village elder one day. The
old man leaned over on his cane, looked him in the eye and
said, "Friend, I've seen you working hard here day in and
day out, at great sacrifice to yourself, too. To help us
change for the good. Well, if you are to do better in the
time you have left with us, you have to understand the
meaning of the question I 'm going to put to you now. .
.
"Why do you resent me? I've never given you anything .
"
Potentials and Limitations of
Critical Analysis of Educational Policy
This work employed a two-directional strategy of
research. A deductive review of the theory of ideology
raised sets of questions about the nature and function of
ideology in the production of official policy. This
provided a frame of reference for the investigation of
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ideology in a specific instance. An inductive analysis of
policy texts was then done to surface the metaphorical
referents on which the policies were based. The results of
each research process were then combined to critically
analyze the interrelationships between the metaphorical
bases of policy and their ideological referents.
The method used has the advantage of at least
recognizing the epistemological bind where ideology tends to
reproduce itself through research methodologies that make
dubious claims for knowledge. The procedure of
deconstruction begins with knowledge in its existential
form, where the weight and nature of knowledge is evaluated
according to the social context in which it is situated.
If, on the other hand, a claim for universally valid
knowledge is made, then the supposition that the claim
embodies a cluster of interests dispenses with conventional
requirements to test the claim only on the basis of
procedure that is already suspect. It is logically
fallacious to attempt to confirm a universal knowledge claim
using procedure identical to the one used to produce the
knowledge in the first place. To do so can only lead to the
discovery of error in following procedure and its subsequent
rectification. It cannot deal with the epistemological
implications of flawed procedure itself.
Discourse analysis applied to the study of the meaning
and interpretation of the social referents of knowledge
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appears to be a tool rich in promise, though seldom used by
policy analysts of the western world. The bedrock goal of
all policy is the ordering of social relations. The
deconstruction of policy texts offers the potential for
negating the propensity to mystify the knowledge claims on
which it is argued society should be ordered. The process
of deconstruction is a way to yield the operations whereby
the grounds of knowledge are backed. The objectionable
epistemological operations found in this inquiry involve
surreptitious metaphorical transposition, universalizing
situation-based and
-produced knowledge, modelling in one
context for deployment into another, legitimation of systems
of knowledge production and dissemination controlled by
elites, and delegitimation of valuation as a viable
knowledge referent for policy making. All operations are
ideological to the extent that their material referents are
concealed by their discursive products. It is, however,
extremely difficult to attribute a specific instance of
policy discourse to the advancement of specific interests.
While the procedure of deconstructing texts has the
potential to yield the social referents of knowledge, it is
limited in its theoretical potential to evaluate the
referents comparatively. This work made use of a theory of
ideology as the means to study the ways by which meaning is
mobilized for the purpose of ordering social relations. The
theory of ideology I have used stipulates that unless the
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value-bases of whatever standards applied to the ordering
process are exposed, reflected on critically, and accepted
democratically, then domination in some form must be at
wo^k. The study of ideology provides a means of inquiry
into the value standards whereby knowledge claims used to
order social relations are validated. The potential of the
theory of ideology is to offer a means for the exposure and
comparison of value standards.
The combination of the two strategies enabled this
inquiry to discover the epistemological flaws of policy and
their ideological functions. The combination, nonetheless,
has important limitations. Foremost is that the attribution
of specific interest to specific policy is an extremely
complex task, one I discovered to be impossible to undertake
given my focus. At this point, 1 cannot advise whether the
combined strategy used here could ever unravel the knot of
the complexity of relations involved between material
interest as a social referent, the functional role of
ideology, and the production of policy in specific instance.
All I was able to do was to deal with the interconnections
by premising their existence and to reveal the operations
which made their concrete instantiation possible.
Another limitation of the strategy is found in the
negational source of its power. Its direction is anti-
positivist. Its potential offers a way of release from the
implicit limits that dominate consciousness. Using it, I
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found I could rationally refute the propensity to use
knowledge as a way to impose ideology as certified truth.
Surely, this must be an essential purpose of the power to
emancipate oneself from the ideological constraints on
reason. Yet, while refutation through critical reflection
should become an institutional as well as personal practice,
the structural pressure to formulate concrete, ready-made
alternatives in a world that cries out for reassurance is
very powerful indeed. Nevertheless, critical reflection
allows only for conjecture, not for the redemption of
certainty. Used for the good, it is an indispensable
guardian of freedom from our tendency to misuse our power to
reason
.
Some day
,
we my be able to crack the coconut from the
inside after all.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
General References
Adams, D.^ (1986). Development theories and education: 1950-
• Unpublished manuscript, University “of PittsburghSchool of Education, Pittsburgh. ’
Adelman, I. (1961). Theories of economic growth anddevelopment . S tan ford : Stanford Un iver s i ty Pres s
Adriaansens, H. P. M. (1980). Talcott Parsons and the
conceptual dilemma . London: Routledge Kegan Paul.
Althusser, L. (1984). Ideology and ideological state
apparatuses. In L. Althusser, Essays on ideology. London:
Verso.
Althusser, L. (1984) . Reply to John Lewis. In L. Althusser,
Essays on ideology . London: Verso.
Apple, M. W. (1982). Cultural and economic reproduction in
education . London: Routledge 8c Kegan Paul
.
Apple, M. W. (1979). Ideology and curriculum . London:
Routledge 8c Kegan Paul
.
Apter
,
D. E. (1965). The politics of modernization
. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Aristotle. (1981). The politics (T. A. Sinclair, Trans. 8c T.
J. Saunders, Revised) . Harmondsworth
,
Middlesex, England:
Penguin Books.
Bacon, F. (1939). The great ins tauration . In E. A. Burtt
(Ed.), The English philosophers from Bacon to Mill . New
York: The Modern Library.
Banfield, E. C. (1952). American foreign aid doctrines. In
R. A. Goldwin (Ed.), Why foreign aid ? Chicago: Rand
McNally 8c Company.
Becker, G. S. (1976). The economic approach to human
behavior . Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Bell, D. (1962). The end of ideology . New York: The Free
Press
.
Berger, P. L. 8c Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction
of reality . Garden City, New York: Doubleday 8c Company.
295
Rlerstedt, R. (1981)
critical history
.
• American soc ioloeical theory, aNew York: Academic Press.
Blum, J. M.
,
Catton, B., Morgan, E. S.
Jr., Stampp. K. M., Sc Woodward, C. V.
experience
. New York: Harcourt
,
Brace
Schlesinger, A. M.,
(1963) . The national
Sc World, Inc.
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Cultural reproduction and social
reproduction. In J. Karabel Sc A. H. Halsey (Eds.), Power^d ideology in education. New York: Oxford University?
—
Bourdieu, P. Sc Passeron, J. C. (1977). Reproduction in|ducation, societ y and culture (R. Nice, Trans. )
. BeverlyHills: Sage Publications.
S' powerful idea in the world. InW. M. Daniels (Ed.), The point four program . New York: H.
W. Wilson Company.
Braden, S. (1960). The international dilemma. In D. E.
United States foreign aid, readings in theproblem area of wealth . San Francisco: Chandl er Pnb1 gbi* no
Company.
Buescher, J. B. (1987). The marriage of alma mater to Adam
Smith. Thought and action
, 3(2), 33-47.
Burrell, G. Sc Morgan, G. (1979). Sociological paradigms and
organizational analysis . London: Heinemann.
Burton, F. Sc Carlen, Pat. (1979). Official discourse: On
discourse analysis
,
government publications
,
ideology and
the state . London: Routledge Sc Kegan Paul.
Butterfield, H. (1962). The origins of modern science, 1300-
1800. New York: Collier Books.
Carnoy
,
M. (1974). Education as cultural imperialism . New
York: David McKay Company, Inc.
Castle, E. W. (1960). Foreign spree for our superspenders
.
In D. E. Pentony (Ed.), United States foreign aid,
readings in the problem area of wealth . San Francisco
:
Chandler Publishing Company.
Chambers, W. (1952). Witness . New York: Random House.
Chenery, H. B. (1962). Objectives and criteria for foreign
assistance. In R. A. Goldwin (Ed.), Why foreign aid ?
Chicago: Rand McNally Sc Company.
296
Chenery
,
London
:
H . B
. et
Oxford
al. (1974)). Redistribution with erowth
University Press
.
~ ^
Chenery, H. B. ^ Strout
economic development.
679-723.
A. (1966). Foreign assistance and
American economic review
, 56,(4),
Cooke, A. (1951). A generation on trial: USA v. Al Por Htqq
New York: Alfred^A? Knopf. i^erji]^.
Condliffe, J. B. (1950). Point four and the world economy.New York: Foreign Policy Association. ^
Coward, R. & Ellis, J. (1977). Language and materialism.
London: Rout ledge Sc Kegan Paul.
Curtis, C. P. (1955). The Oppenheimer case: The trial of a
security system . New York: Simon and Schuster.
Daniels, W. M. (Ed.). (1951). The point four program. New
York: The H. W. Wilson Company.
Diesing, P. (1982). Science and ideology in the policy
s c iences . New York: Aldine Publishing Company.
Dittberner, J. L. (1979). The end of ideology and American
social thought: 1930-1960
. Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research
Press
.
Durkheim, E. (1964). The rules of sociological method (S. A.
Solovay 8c J. H. Mueller, Trans. 8c G. E. G. Gatlin, Ed.).
Glencoe, NY: The Free Press.
Esman, M. J. (1972). The elements of institution building.
In J. W. Eaton (Ed.), Institution building and
development . Beverly Hills : Sage Publications.
Eyerman, R. (1981). False consciousness and ideology in
Marxist theory . Stockholm: Almquist and Wicksell
International
.
Fay, B. (1975). Social theory and political practice .
London: George Allen 8c Unwin.
Foucault, M. (1972). The archeology of knowledge and the
discourse of language . New York: Harper 8c Row.
Foucault, M. (1978). Politics and the study of discourse.
Ideology and Consciousness
, _3, 6-26.
297
Freire, P. (1973). Educat ion
B. Ramos, L. Bigwood, M.
The Seabury Press.
critical consciousness (M.
Marshaii, Trans.). New York
:
Freire, P.
Trans
.
)
.
riedland, W. H. (1969). A sociological approach tomodernization. In C. Morse, D. E. Ashford, F. T. Bent W
k’
Lewis, 8. D. B. Macklin (Eds.)
^dernization by design, social change in the twPn^^o^hcent^. Ithaca: Cornell Univers it^PF^iT: ~
Giddens, A (1979). Cultural problems in social theorvLondon: The MacmilTi^n Company. ~ ^
Giddens, A. (1974). Pos it
i
vism and sociology
Heinemann. ~ ^ London
:
Giddens, A. (1977). Studies in social and political theorv.New York: Basic Books, Inc. ^ ^
^
Giroux, H- A. (1983). Theory and resistance in education.South Hadley, MA: Bergin St Garvey Publishers.
Goldwin, R. A. (1962). Why foreign aid ? Chicago: Rand
McNally Company.
Goulet, D. (1971a). The cruel choice: A new concept in thetheory of development
. New York: Athenenm.
Goulet, D. (1977). The uncertain promise: Value conflicts in
technology transfer . New York: IDQC North Amprirp.
Goulet, D. St Hudson, M. (1971). The myth of aid, the hidden
agenda of the development reports . New York: IDQC North
America
.
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks (Q.
Hoare St G. N. Smith, Trans. St Eds.). New York:
International Publishers.
Gran, G. (1983). Development by people . New York: Praeger
Publishers
.
Gray, G. (1950). Report to the President on foreign economic
policies . Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing
Office, November 10, 1950, 12-16.
Habermas, J. (1971). Knowledge and human interests (J. J.
Shapiro, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.
298
Habermas
,
Lennox
Habermas
Trans
.
)
.
J. (1974). The public sphere (S, Lennox 8. F.irans.). New German critique
, 3, 49-55.
J. (1973). Theory and practice (J. Viertel
Boston: Beacon Press. *
Habermas, J. (1970). Toward a rational society (J. J.Shapiro, Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press.
Hall, G. 8t Loucks
,
S. (1978). Innovation configuration:Analyzing the adaptation of innovations. Austin: THp
University of Texas.
Hall, S. (1978). The hinterland of science: Ideology and the
sociology of knowledge." In Center for Contemporary
Cultural Studies (CCCS, Ed.), On ideology. London:
Hutchinson St Company, 9-32.
Hamilton, P. (Ed.). (1985). Readings from Talcott Parsons.
Chichester: Ellis Horwood Limited . “
Haney, L. H. (1949). History of economic thought . New York:
The Macmillan Company.
Harris, M. (1980). Cultural materialism, the struggle for a
science of culture . New York: Vintage Books.
Havelock, R. G. (1971). Planning for innovation through
dissemination and utilization of knowledge . Ann Arbor, MI
:
Institute for Social Research.
Head, B. W. (1985). Ideology and social science, Destutt de
Tracy and French liberalism . Dordrecht, The Netherlands:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Heilbronner, R. L. (1985). The nature and logic of
capitalism . New York: W. W. Norton St Company.
Heilbronner, R. L. (1980). The worldly philosophers . New
York: Simon St Schuster.
Held, D. (1980). Introduction to critical theory, Horkheimer
to Habermas . Berkeley : University of California Press.
Hiss, A. (1957). In the court of public opinion . New York:
Alfred A. Knopf.
Hobbes, T. (1949). Leviathan. In E. A. Burtt (Ed.), The
English philosophers from Bacon to Mill . New York: The
Modern Library.
299
Horkheiner, M. (1972). Critical theory (M . J.Trans.). New York! Herder 8c Herder
.
O'Connell et
Horkheimer
,
M. 8c Adorno, T. W. (1972).
enlightenment ( J
. Cumming, Trans.)
Herder
.
Dialectic of
New York: Herder 8c
and Utopia in the Unitedtates, 1956-1976
. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hughes, E. F. (1975). Organizational development and chaneeSt. Paul, MN: West Pilblishing Company. ^
Hume, D. (1949). An enquiry concerning human understanding.
i-n
English philosophers from Baconto Mill . New York: The Modern Library. ~ ^
Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political order in chanaine
societies
. New Haven: Yale University Press. —
^
Ilich, I. (1970). Deschooling society
. New York: Harper 8cRow Publishers.
Inkeles, A. 8c Smith, D. (1974). Becoming modern: Individual
change in six developing countries
. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Jay, M. (1973). The dialectical imagination: a history of
school and the institute of social research,
1923-1950
. Boston : Little Brown and Company
.
Jessop, B. (1982). The capitalist state . New York: New York
University Press.
Kaplan, J. J. (1967). The challenge of foreign aid . New
York: Praeger Publishers
.
Katouzian, H. (1980). Ideology and method in economics . New
York: New York University Press.
Kennan, G. F. (writing as "X"). (1947). The sources of
Soviet conduct. Foreign Affairs
,
^(4), 566-582.
Kennedy, J. F. (1961). Message of the President to the
Congress. The Department of State bulletin. April 10,
1961, 507-5T7T
Keynes, J. M. (1964). The general theory of employment,
interest, and money . New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
.
300
Kinloch, G. D. (1981). Ideology and contemporary
^ociological theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice Hall,
Kinsey, D. C.
education
.
Comparative
GA.
^(1984). Formative metaphors in international
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
and International Education Society, Atlanta
>
Kiziltan, M. U. (1987). The analysis of ideology indevelopment education . Eaper presented at thp annual
meeting of the Comparative and International EducationSociety, Washington, DC.
Krause, W. (1962). The U. S. foreign aid program: Appraisal
and
.
proposal
. In P. D. Zook (Ed.), Foreign Trade and HumanCapital . Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press.
(1970). The structure o f scientific revolutions.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. ^
Lacan, J. (1977). Ecrits: a selection (A. Sheridan, Trans.).
New York: W. W. Norton k Company.
Lasswell, H. D. (1951). World organization and society. In
D. Lerner 8t H. D. Lasswell (Eds.), The policy sciences.
Stanford: The Stanford University Press.
Legislative Reference Service (LRS), Library of Congress.
(1968). U. S. foreign aid . New York: Greenwood Press.
Leighton, R. M. 8t Sanders, R. (1963). The economics of
national security, new dimensions in the Cold War:
Transition and tension in the undeveloped world .
Washington
,
DC : Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
Lerner, D. (1958). The passing of traditional society,
modernizing the Middle East T New York: The Free Press
.
Lindquist, J. (1978). Strategies for change . Berkeley, CA:
Pacific Surroundings Press.
Lipset, S. M. (1960). Political man: the social bases of
politics . New York: Doubleday St Company.
Locke, J. (1949). An essay concerning the true, original,
extent and end of civil government. In E. A. Burtt (Ed.),
The English philosophers from Bacon to Mill . New York: The
Modern Library
.
Magee, B. (1973). Karl Popper . New York: Viking Press.
301
Mager, N. H. Katel, J. (Eds.) (1961).
. New York: Simon 8c Schuster.
Conquest without
Mannheim
Shils
,
K. (1946). Ideology and Utopia (L. Wirth 8c E.Trans.). New ^orki Harcourt, Brace 8c Company.
Marcuse, H.
Books
.
^^^^2). Eros and civilization
. New York: Vintage
Marcuse, H.
Press .
(^9^^)* One-dimensional man. Boston: Beacon
Marcuse, H. (1941).
University Press.
Reason and revolution. London: Oxford
Marx
,
(B.
K. (1977). Capital, a critique of po litical economy, 1Fowkes, Trans
.
) . New York : Vintage Books . ^
Marx
,
K
.
(1978). Economic and philosophic manuscripts of
1844. In R. C. Tucker (Ed.), The Marx-Engel s reader. New
York: W. W. Norton 8c Company.
Marx, K. (1978). The eighteenth brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
In R. C. Tucker (Ed.), The Marx-Engels reader . New York:
W. W. Norton 8c Company.
Marx, K. (1978). The German ideology. In R. C. Tucker (Ed.),
The Marx-Engels reader . New York: W. W. Norton 8c Company.’
Marx, K. (1978). Theses on Feurbach. In R. C. Tucker (Ed.),
Marx-Engels reader . New York: W. W. Norton 8c Company.
Matthews, M. (1980). The Marxist theory of schooling, a
study of epistomology and education . Sussex, U. kT
:
Harvester Press.
McClelland, D. C. 8c Winter, D. G. (1969). Motivating
economic achievement . New York: The Free Press.
McCloskey, H. (1969). Concensus ideology in American
politics, in K. M. Dolbeare (Ed.), Power and change in the
IJnited States . New York: John Wiley 8c Sons, Inc.
McDonough, R. (1978). Ideology as false consciousness. In
Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (Ed.), On
ideology . London: Hutchinson 8c Company, Ltd., 33^4.
Meek, R. L. (1967). Economics and ideology and other essays .
London: Chapman 8c Hall
,
Ltd
.
Meek, R. L. (1976). Social science and the ignoble savage .
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
302
Merton, R.
Glencoe
,
Social theory and social strnrtirrp.
IL: The Free Press.
Merton, R. K. (1951). Social scientists
In D. Lerner 8c H. D. Lasswell (Eds.),
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Pre
and research policy.
The poli cy sciences,
ss .
Mickelwait, D. R.
,
Sweet, C. F., 8c Morss, E. R. (1979). New
^rections in development: A study of U. S. AID. BouldeF"CO: Wes tview Press! ’
Mill, J. S. (1949). On liberty. In E. A. Burtt (Ed.), TheEnglish philosophers from Bacon to Mill. New York: ’THi~Modern Library. ~~
Millikan, M. F. (1962). The political case for economicdevelopment aid. In R. A. Goldwin (Ed.), Why foreign aid?Chicago: Rand McNally 8c Company.
Millikan, M. F. 8c Blackmer, D. L. M. (1963). A framework of
principles and guidelines for policy toward the
undeveloped societies. In R. M. Leighton 8c R. Sanders
(Eds.), New directions in the cold war . Washington, DC:
Indus triaT CoTTege of the Armed Forces
.
Millikan, M. F. 8c Blackmer, D. L. M. (1961). The emerging
nat ions . Boston: Little Brown 8c Company.
Millikan, M. F. 8c Rostow, W. W. (1957). A proposal, key to
an effective foreign policy . New York: Harper Brothers.
Monsen, R. J., Jr. (1963). Modern American capitalism,
ideologies and issues . Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Morgenthau, H. J. (1962). Politics among nations . New York:
Alfred A. Knopf.
Morss, E. R. 8c Morss, V. A. (1986). The future of western
development assistance . Boulder, COl Westview Press.
Morss, E. R. 8c Morss, V. A. (1982). U. S. foreign aid: An
assessment of new and traditional development strategies .
Boulder
,
CO : Westview Press.
Myers, M. L. (1983). The soul of modern economic man, ideas
of self-interest . Chicago : The University of Chicago
Press
.
Myrdal, G. (1973). Against the stream, critical essays on
economics. New York: Pantheon Books.
303
u’
Value in social theory . New York: Harperh Brothers . ^
Nelson, J.
New York:
M. (1968). Aid, influence, and foreign policy
The Macmillan Company
.
° ^ ^
Nuyeen J. (1962). Social and poltical aid. In R. A. Goldwin
Why foreign aid ? Chicago: Rand McNally & Company.
Oganesoff, I. (1960). Living it up in Laos. In D. E. Pentony
United States foreign aid, readings in the problem
area of wealth
. San Francisco: Chandler Pnhl i shi* na
Company
.
Packenham, R. A. (1973). Liberal America and the Third
World . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press
.
Parsons, T. (1947). Introduction. In M. Weber, The theory of
social and economic organization (A. M. Henderson 8: T.
Parsons, Trans.). New York: The Free Press.
Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. Clencoe, IL: The Free
Press
.
Parsons, T. 8t Smelser, N. J. (1956). Economy and society.
New York: The Free Press.
Paulston, R. C. (1979). Multiple approaches to the
evaluation of educational reform: From cost benefit to
power benefit analysis . Paris: UNESCO.
Pecheux, M. (1971). A Method of discourse analysis applied
to recall of utterances. In E. A. Carswell and R.
Rommetveit (Eds.), Social contexts of messages . London:
Academic Press.
Pentony, D. E. (Ed.). (1960). United States foreign aid,
readings in the problem area of wealth . San Francisco:
Chandler Publishing Company.
Plato (1942). Republic . Princeton, NJ : D. Van Nostrand
Company, Inc.
Popkewitz, T. S. (1984). Paradigm and ideology in
educational research . London: The Falmer Press.
Popper, K. (1962). Conjecture and refutation . New York:
Basic Books.
Preston, P. W. (1985). New trends in development theory .
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
.
304
Psacharopoulos, G. Woodhall, M. (1985). Education for
^eveloment, an analysis of investment choices. New York:Oxford University Press tor the' World Bank.
Pye, L. W. (1963). Armies in the process of political
modernization. In R. M. Leighton R. Sanders (Eds.) New
^mensions in the cold war . Washington, DC: IndustrialCollege of the Armed Forces
.
Ricoeur, P. (1977). The rule of metaphor (R. Czerny,
Trans.). Toronto: University oT Toronto Press.
Rockefeller, N. A. (1951). The Rockefeller Report. In W. M.
Daniels (Ed.), The point four program . New York: The H. W.
Wilson Company.
Rogers, E. M. (1962). Diffusion in innovations . New York:
The Free Press.
Rosenthal, M. S. (1951). Helping them help themselves. In W.
M. Daniels (Ed.), The point four program . New York: The H.
W. Wilson Company.
Rostow, W. W. (1964). The stages of economic growth .
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rostow, W. W. (1963). The stages of growth as a key to
policy. In R. M. Leighton k R. Sanders (Eds.), New
dimensions in the cold war . Washington, DC: Industrial
College of the Armed Forces
Rovere, R. H. (1959). Senator Joe McCarthy . New York:
Harcourt
,
Brace.
Russell, F. H. (1951). Design of the world economy. In W. M.
Daniels (Ed.), The point four program . New York: The H. W.
Wilson Company.
Sabine, G. H. (1961). A history of political theory . New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Schultz, T. W. (1963). The economic value of education . New
York: Columbia University Press.
Schuman, F. L. (1958). International politics . New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1962). Capitalism, socialism and
democracy . New York: Harper 8c Row, Publishers
.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1954). History of economic analysis . New
York: Oxford University Press.
Seers, D. 8c Myrdal, G. (1982, July 2).The Guardian.
305
The withering of aid.
Shils, E. (1958)
intellectuals
.
•Ideology and civility: On the politicsSewanee Review
. ^(3), 450-480.
of
Shils, E. (1960). The
development of the
368.
intellectuals in the political
new states. World politics
, 12(3), 329-
Shils, E. (1956). The torment of secrecv: The
consequences of American securi ty poliries.
The Free Press. ^
^
background and
Glencoe
,
IL
:
^^Row^^’
(1964). Point of the lance
. New York: Harper 8c
Smith, A. (1937). An inquiry into the nature and causes ofthe wealth of nations . New York: The Modern Library.
Smith, A. (1976). The theory of moral sentiments (D. D.
Raphael 8c A. L. Maetie, Eds.). Oxford, England: Clarendon
Press .
Staley, E. (1954). The future o f underdeveloped countries.
New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
Staw, B. M. 8c Salancik, G. R. (Eds.). (1977). New directions
in organizational behavior . Chicago: St. Clair Press.
Straight, M. W. (1954). Trial by television (R. Osborn,
Illus.). Boston: Beacon Press.
Streeten, P. (1981). First things first: Meeting basic human
needs in the developing countries. London : Oxford
University Press.
Streeten, P. (1958). Introduction. In G. Myrdal, Valuation
in social theory . New York: Harper 8c Brothers Publishers
.
Sullivan, G. (1964). The story of the Peace Corps. New York:
Fleet
.
Sutton, F. X. (1982). Rationality, development, and
scholarship. Items
, _^(4) , 49-57.
Textor, R. B. (1966). Cultural frontiers of the Peace Corps .
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Thompson, J. B. (1984). Studies in the theory of ideology .
Berkeley: University of California Press.
306
Thorp, W. L. (1971). The reality of foreign aid.
Praeger Publishers.^ ^ New York:
Todaro, M. P. (1977). Economic development in the ThirdWor Id . London: Longman . '—
Tully, J. (1980). A discourse on property. Cambridge.
England: Cambridge University Press. *
Watnick, M. (1963). The appeal of communism to the
underdeveloped peoples. In R. A. Leighton k R. Sanders(Eds.), New dimensions in the Cold War . Washington, DC:
Industrial Col lege o£ the Armed Forces
.
Weber, M. (1958). The Protestant ethic and the spirit o f
capitalism (T. Parsons
,
Trans
.
)
. New York: Charles
Scribner
' s Sons
.
Weber, M. (1947). The theory of social and economic
organizat ion (A. M. Henderson 8t T. Parsons, Trans.). New
York: The Free Press.
Weick, K. E. (1977). Enactment processes in organizations.
In B. M. Staw G. Salanik (Eds.), New directions in
organizational behavior . Chicago: St. Clair Press, 267-
Weick, K. E. (1979). The social psychology of organizing .
Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
Weiler, H. N. (1983). Knowledge and legitimation: The
national and international politics of educational
"
researclri Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
Comparative Education Society, Palo Alto, CA.
Wilson, H. T. (1977). The American ideology: Science,
technology and organization as modes of rationality in
advanced industrial societies . London : Routledge St Kegan
Paul
.
Windham, D. M. (1988) . Improving the efficiency of
educational systems . Tallahassee
,
FL : The Florida State
University
.
World Bank. (1987). World development report 1987 . New York:
Oxford University Press.
307
Agency for International Development References
Agency for International Development (AID). (1983a) A.I.Deducation sec tor strategy (Document No. PN-AAQ-4401 ^
—
Washington, DC: Author. ^ ‘
AID. (1983b). Basic education and technicfll(Document No\ PN-AAM- i 90) . Washington
,
DC
:
training
Author
.
AID. (1985). Congressional presentation.(Document No. PD-AAP-154). Washington,
fiscal year 1985
DC : Author
AID. (1983c)
(Document
• Policy paper, inst itutional
Nol PN-AAN-108)
. Washington
,
development
DC : Author
AID. (1975, December 12). Education and human resources.
Handbook 1, Part III-4 . Washington, DC: Author.
AID. (1978, May 15). Supplement to Handbook 1. Washington
DC: Author. *
Blase, M. G. Institution building: A sourcebook. Washington.
DC: AID.
~
— ^ ’
Development Associates, Inc. (1987). Project implementation
course participant manual . Arlington, VA: Author.
Practical Concepts Incorporated, (undated). The logical
framework. Washington, DC: Author.
Pragma Corporation Management Systems International.
(1985). Project design course . Washington, DC: Author.
Rihani, M.
,
Barnes, V., k Vander Linde, J. (1986). AID
policies and programming in education, Vol. 1-3 .
Washington
,
DC : Creative Associates.

